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Abstract 
The research presented in this thesis focuses on the design of a flexible cryptographic 
hardware module capable of implementing a variety of private-key cryptographic al-
gorithms and their modes of operation using different implementation methodologies 
such as iteration and pipelining. The design of the SHERIF cryptographic hardware 
module was motivated by the difficulties inherent in implementing cryptographic al-
gorithms: software implementation is easy and flexible, but offers low performance, 
whereas hardware implementations offer high performance but are difficult to design 
and are generally inflexible. 
The design of the SHERIF architecture was driven by an analysis of several lead-
ing block ciphers and hash functions which identified six basic operations that could 
be used to implement most block ciphers and hash functions. Configurable compo-
nents were developed to implement each of those operations, and these components 
were arranged into processing elements capable of implementing a single round of 
most of the algorithms under consideration. These processing elements were then 
integrated into a top-level system with complex data control mechanisms to provide 
added flexibility. 
A sample pipelined implementation of the AES algorithm Rijndael has been suc-
cessfully simulated. Synthesis results in 0.18 f-Lm CMOS technology suggest the device 
would have an area of approximately 10 million gates and have a clock speed of 4. 78 
MHz, leading to a throughput of 611.84 Mbps for the sample implementation of 
Rijndael. These results demonstrate the flexibility and performance of the system. 
The current SHERIF architecture offers greater flexibility and ease of use than 
existing cryptographic hardware modules, but there are still many areas in which it 
can be improved through future research. A number of avenues of future research 
have been identified that will improve system speed, integration, and flexibility. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Modern telecommunications technology forms the foundation of today's global soci-
ety. Evidence supporting this bold statement can be seen in the rapid pace of cultural 
and technological development since the introduction of modern communication tech-
nology. 
The first communication technology that might be considered modern was the 
telegraph. Once a telegraph network was in place, it allowed the transmission of 
text messages over long distances with minimal human effort. This was followed 
by telephones, to allow transmission of voice messages, and then radio, television, 
satellite communication, early computer networks, cellular phones, and the Internet. 
Each new technology opened new avenues of communication between disparate people 
and groups, helping build a global society and adding yet more complexity to human 
social interaction. 
Today, the world is awash with communication technology. Cellular phones can 
now frequently connect to the Internet and provide e-mail and web browsing, and 
have long provided text-messaging and paging capabilities. E-mail and instant mes-
saging have replaced the postal system for personal written communication. High 
speed Internet access is becoming more common. Overall, the various communica-
tion technologies are starting to converge, so that voice, video, text, image, and other 
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data may be communicated over the same network. 
Modern communication technology makes it easy and cheap to communicate 
across great distances, including national boundaries. The effect this has on society 
is profound, though not everyone is convinced that it is a good effect. Konetheless, 
modern telecommunications has become an important part of many people's lives, 
integrated into their daily routine, and this introduces a host of new problems to deal 
with. 
First, let us consider the kinds of communication networks people frequently deal 
with in the developed world. 
1.1 Communication Networks 
The most ubiquitous modern communication network is the telephone network. Ini-
tially designed to carry analog voice data, it has evolved into an elaborate computer-
controlled network to manage hundreds of millions of calls around the world on a 
daily basis [1]. In the core of the network, at least, the voice data is converted from 
analog to digital to facilitate easier processing and transmission. 
The telephone network is more an interconnection of different networks, run by 
different organizations. Regional companies build local phone networks to service the 
end user, and these smaller networks are connected into larger and larger systems 
that allow national and international telephone communication. As such, telephone 
networks are built on a set of international standards to ensure interoperability. 
The typical visualization of the telephone network consists of the end-user, who 
has a telephone handset or end-system. The end-user's telephone is connected to a 
central office (frequently called an exchange). Other end-users, typically from the 
same geographic region, would be connected to this same central office. The central 
office can connect calls between its end-users, or to other nearby central offices for calls 
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that are between more distant end-users. For long distance calls, the central office will 
connect to the long-haul network (or backbone), which interconnects different groups 
of central offices over long distances [1]. 
Cellular phone systems are integrated into the traditional telephone network as 
shown in Figure 1.1, but the end-system is quite different. End-users have wireless 
handsets which communicate with a base station responsible for providing service 
to a particular area of coverage (called a cell). The base station essentially has the 
role of a small central office, serving only cellular users in its area, and connects to 
a central office of the wired network. Base stations must not only handle regular 
telephone services, but also work together to track the location of users (to allow 
proper routing of incoming calls) and to transfer service between each other as users 
move into different areas of coverage [1]. 
systems 
Central 
offices 
Cellular 
base station ( ((r !obile 
Long-haul 
network 
end system 
systems 
Central 
offices 
Figure 1.1: Telephone and Cellular Network 
The telephone system is an example of a circuit-switched network. In essence, 
when a call is made, a dedicated path through the network is reserved for that call, 
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and is guaranteed to be available for the duration of the call. Thus, the telephone 
network provides Quality of Service (QoS) with respect to voice communication [1]. 
Consequently, the telephone network is substantially different from the other rna-
jor computer network that has become dominant in people's day-to-day lives- the 
Internet. 
The Internet, illustrated in Figure 1.2, is a computer network primarily used for 
the transfer of data traffic. :'viore accurately, it is a network of networks, hierarchically 
arranged into larger and larger systems [1]. Because of the flexibility of the end-
systems - easily programmed computers - the data transmitted over the Internet can 
be for a variety of purposes: text messages on bulleting boards, web pages, e-mail, 
file transfer, video and audio streaming, and even real-time voice communication. 
Internet 
backbone 
Figure 1.2: The Internet 
The Internet is a packet-switched network- it breaks up the data to be transmitted 
into smaller chunks (called packets), and those chunks are transmitted individually [1]. 
Furthermore, the Internet is not centrally controlled. It has a distributed architecture, 
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so routers in each member network simply know neighbouring network nodes and 
which neighbour is likely to be on the best path to a given destination. This data is 
constantly updated based on actual network conditions, and so packets traveling from 
one destination to another may not all follow the same route through the network [1 J. 
The Internet does not guarantee QoS. Rather, it promises best effort. The store-
and-forward routing approach means that delay through the network is unknown, 
and that packets can be lost if the network is subject to a lot of traffic [1 J. However, 
even with this unreliability, the Internet architecture is useful for many applications, 
and consequently has seen widespread adoption [1 J. 
Of course, other networks invade people's daily lives "below the radar", in such a 
way that they do not even realize they are using them. Automated Banking Machines 
(ABMs) communicate over a private network with the the bank's central servers, and 
via the Interac network with other financial institutions to provide banking services 
and debit purchasing at retailers. Modern credit card authorization systems work 
in much the same way. Satellite television, phone, and Internet are newer entries 
into the list of ubiquitous networks. New network architectures that seek to combine 
voice, video, and data (such as Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) networks) are 
constantly in development, as well [1]. As a society, people have become used to the 
presence of communication devices and networks, and incorporate them into nearly 
every aspect of their daily lives. This has serious implications. 
1.2 Security Concerns 
People have always been concerned about the secrecy of their communications, though 
not in an obvious way. Whispered conversation and personal diaries have been the 
primary means of private thought. Governments and other organizations often have 
a more pressing need for secrecy- even Julius Caesar was said to use a basic cipher 
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to protect his messages [2]. Military, diplomatic, and economic/financial information 
have all been candidates for secrecy at an organizational level, resulting in secret 
codes like Caesar's shift cipher [2] or the well-known rotor-based Enigma machine 
used by the German military in World War II [3]. The general populace, however, 
has had little need to be concerned with telecommunications security until recently. 
The latter part of the Twentieth century has seen an explosion in the use of com-
puting and telecommunications. From what was initially just the public telephone 
network (which was difficult to eavesdrop on due to physical access barriers and its 
central control), telecommunications has grown to encompass: computer databases 
full of personal information; banking done via automated machines, the phone, or In-
ternet; cellular phones; e-commerce; interactive television services; and more besides. 
This is problematic in several ways. 
The control of some of these newer forms of communication (such as the Internet) 
is decentralized by the very nature of their design. This has some advantages in terms 
of reliability, since a failure at a single point does not bring down the whole network, 
but it does mean that every computer through which communication passes might 
not be trustworthy. For most types of communication, this is not a concern, but 
when using the Internet for operations like banking, shopping, or even file transfer, it 
poses a security risk. Other technologies such as cellular phones and wireless Internet 
access have no physical access restrictions, since anyone with the appropriate receiving 
equipment can read the messages out of the air. Depending on the nature of the 
conversation or Internet use, this can pose a security risk. 
Each of the different technologies has their own respective security risks. Those 
risks, however, are more important than ever before due to the way people are in-
tegrating them into their lives. Telecommunications technology has an effect on the 
day-to-day routine of many people; it has become a part of how people function in 
society. As such, it is relied upon more than ever before. The more it is used, the 
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greater the need for security becomes. Cellular phones are now commonly used to 
conduct business deals and conversations, by law enforcement, and by individuals 
doing banking. The Internet is used for everything from personal e-mail and instant 
messaging to banking, tax submission, shopping, university registration, and busi-
ness networking. When handling monetary transactions, personal information, and 
business secrets, security of communications becomes a major concern. 
This begs the question, "What exactly is security?" 
1.3 Types of Information Security 
Information security is an extremely broad field that is difficult to define. It includes 
such things as virus protection, access control, user identification, privacy, control of 
data, and much more besides. In terms of communications, the definition is generally 
more specific: communication security should keep transmitted data private from 
everyone but the intended recipient, prevent the data from being altered in transit, 
and make sure that the sender and receiver are who they say they are. Cryptography 
is the main means by which this kind of security is provided [3]. 
Cryptography concerns itself with the study of several aspects of information 
security, namely privacy or confidentiality, data integrity, entity authentication, and 
data origin authentication [3]. Even though it is a subset of information security, 
cryptography is still a broad field. Cryptography has four primary goals [3]. 
1. Confidentiality involves keeping the content of information secret except to those 
authorized to view it [3]. 
2. Data integrity ensures that the information has not been altered by an unau-
thorized party, including insertion of additional information, deletion of existing 
information, or substitution of new information over the original [3]. 
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3. Authentication relates to identification- it verifies that two parties involved in 
a communication are who they say they are (entity authentication) and that 
the source of the data is what it is supposed to be (data origin authentication) 
[3]. 
4. Non-repudiation essentially provides a guarantee that neither party can deny 
involvement in a communication (also called a transaction) that has already 
occurred. This frequently involves a trusted third party [3]. 
There are a number of tools (or cryptographic primitives [3]) that can be used to 
meet these goals, which can be broadly classified as unkeyed, private-key, or public-
key primitives [3]. A key in this context is a value used to control access to protected 
information, just like a physical key controls access to locations or storage areas. In 
either case, only authorized parties- who are given access to a key- can fully access 
the secured information or location, and so much of the security of the scheme relies 
on protecting the key. 
The four cryptographic goals described above are commonly met using a combi-
nation of cryptographic primitives. Ciphers are used to provide confidentiality, and 
hash functions and digital signatures can be used to provide data integrity, authenti-
cation, and non-repudiation services [3]. Modern cryptography has been designed to 
work with digital data, and the discussion here is in the digital context. 
1.3.1 Block Ciphers, Stream Ciphers, and Public-Key Ci-
phers 
Ciphers are mathematical algorithms that transform the original data (called a plain-
text) into a different set of data (called a ciphertext) that has no obvious relation to 
the original plaintext. This process of transformation, called encryption, is performed 
at the originating end of a communication channel and uses a key as described above. 
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The ciphertext is then transmitted over the channel. At the receiving end, a key is 
used to decrypt the ciphertext and recover the original plaintext. If a good cipher 
is used, only the people with keys - that is, only authorized entities - can view the 
content of the information. Should any malicious party intercept the transmission, it 
would be useless to them since they would only intercept the ciphertext, and without 
the key they cannot recover the original message. This is illustrated in Figure 1.3, 
where E represents encryption and D represents decryption. 
t--c-ip_h_e_rt_ex_t_c __ >~l D 
unsecured 
channel 
Figure 1.3: Encrypted Communication 
plaintext 
1---+) p 
There are two basic classes of ciphers: public-key ciphers and symmetric-key ci-
phers. Public-key ciphers have two keys, a public key and a private key. The public 
key is used to encrypt the plaintext into ciphertext, and the private key to decrypt 
and recover the original plaintext [3]. Thus, an entity will generate a public key 
and private key pair, and make the public key freely available. Anyone wishing to 
securely communicate with that entity simply encrypts the message with its public 
key, and then only that entity can use the corresponding private key to decrypt the 
message [3]. (Some public-key ciphers work in such a way that either key may be 
used to encrypt, and the other decrypt. This is more relevant to authentication than 
confidentiality). The security of public-key ciphers depends on the keys - it should be 
infeasible to determine the private key from knowledge of the public key [3]. Public 
key cryptography is illustrated in Figure 1.4. 
Symmetric-key ciphers (also called private-key ciphers) use a single key for both 
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Figure 1.4: Public Key Cryptography 
encryption and decryption. A message encrypted with a particular key must be 
decrypted with the same key. Thus, the key must be kept secret from all parties 
except the sender and receiver in order to maintain security [3]. This is illustrated in 
Figure 1.5. 
Symmetric-key ciphers further break down into two sub-categories: stream ciphers 
and block ciphers (shown in Figure 1.6). They are basically similar, but stream ciphers 
operate on one plaintext symbol at a time, whereas block ciphers operate on groups 
of plaintext symbols, or blocks [3]. Stream ciphers typically consist of a mathematical 
function that generates a stream of bits that gets mixed with the plaintext stream, 
one bit at a time, via the exclusive-OR (XOR) operation [3]. Block ciphers transform 
blocks of plaintext (say, 64- or 128-bits at a time) into an output block of ciphertext 
of the same size [3]. 
If a single input bit to a stream cipher changes, only a single output bit will change. 
However, if a single input bit to a block cipher changes, many of the output bits should 
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change [3]. These differing properties suggest that stream ciphers and block ciphers 
each have their own strengths and weaknesses, depending on their application. It 
should also be noted that block ciphers can be converted into stream ciphers quite 
easily [3]. Block ciphers will be discussed in more detail in Section 1.3.2. 
1.3.2 Block Cipher Modes of Operation 
An unfortunate characteristic of block ciphers is that identical blocks of data, en-
crypted with the same key, will produce identical ciphertext blocks [3]. Since data 
that repeats might be commonly encrypted (such as in communication protocol head-
ers, for example), it might provide statistical information to attackers or reveal other 
information about the plaintext. Thus, several different modes of operation of block 
ciphers are used [3]. These modes are illustrated in Figure 1. 7 for both encryption 
and decryption. 
The normal mode of operation is Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode [3]. This 
is how most block ciphers are defined, and has the problem described above. The 
alternate modes of operation seek to avoid the disadvantages of ECB mode, and have 
their own properties related to error propagation and chaining dependencies that 
makes them appropriate in different situations. 
Cipher-Block Chaining (CBC) mode alters the input plaintext to the cipher by 
XORing it with the ciphertext of the previous block encrypted by the cipher [3]. The 
first block of data to be encrypted is XORed with an Initialization Vector (IV). Thus, 
identical plaintext blocks will be modified to appear different via the XOR operation, 
and thus the ciphertext produced by the identical plaintexts will be different [3]. This 
mode is appropriate for streams of related data that are encrypted and decrypted 
together. 
Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode essentially turns a block cipher into a stream cipher, 
using the cipher as a generating function for a random-seeming stream of bits [3]. It 
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uses an IV as the input into the cipher, and the output (or some part of it) is XORed 
with the message plaintext to produce a ciphertext for transmission. The transmitted 
ciphertext (or some part thereof) is then used as the input to the cipher for the next 
block of data [3]. Output Feedback (OFB) mode is similar, but rather than using 
the ciphertext as the input to the cipher for the next block of data, it uses the block 
cipher output directly [3]. 
These modes of operation are important, and are specified in many common pro-
tocols. Thus, support of these block cipher modes of operation is crucial for any block 
cipher implementation. 
1.3.3 Hash Functions and Signatures 
Entity authentication (or identification) can be provided in several ways. Its goal is to 
verify the identify of parties involved in a transaction [3]. This service can be provided 
along with confidentiality, but also in its absence. Certain types of confidentiality 
provide entity authentication automatically - for example, in a communication which 
uses a symmetric-key cipher, entity authentication is implicit because only the sender 
and authorized receiver should have access to the secret key. Public-key cryptosystems 
provide a degree of entity authentication as well - only the intended recipient can 
recover the encrypted message, though the recipient cannot be sure of the identity 
of the sender [3]. However, in situations where entity authentication is desired in 
the absence of confidentiality, other primitives such as hash functions and digital 
signatures can be used. 
Hash functions are efficient algorithms that convert a message of any length into a 
fixed-length value called a hash-value [3]. Typically, the length of the message is much 
greater than the length of the hash. They essentially create shortened representations 
of the entire message, although the message is not recoverable from the hash-value 
since the function maps from an infinite set of messages onto a finite set of hash-values. 
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Useful hash functions have properties such that it is computationally infeasible to find 
two messages that produce the same hash-value [3], and as a result, small changes in 
the input to the hash function leads to significant changes in the hash-value. 
Hash functions can be keyed or unkeyed. Unkeyed hash functions will always 
produce the same output given the same input, whereas keyed hash functions mix 
the key information into the hash-value, so keyed hash functions will produce different 
hash-values when using different keys [3]. 
As stated above, hash functions can be used to provide authentication services, as 
well as data integrity services. The sender of a message calculates its hash-value, and 
appends this value to the message when it is sent. The receiver calculates the hash of 
the received message, and compares it to the transmitted hash-value to authenticate. 
Unkeyed hash functions are thus primarily useful in providing data integrity with 
respect to channel errors rather than a malicious attacker, since an attacker could 
alter the message and replace the original hash-value with a new one matching the 
new message. 
Keyed hash functions, on the other hand, provide data integrity (since any modi-
fication to the message will cause the receiver to calculate a different hash-value and 
thus reject the message) and both data origin authentication and entity authentica-
tion (since the sender and receiver must share a secret key used by the hash function, 
and thus the identity of the sender and origin of the data is known) [3]. The assertion 
of the shared secret key is the basis of the security of the authentication services 
provided by keyed hash functions. 
Digital signatures are used similarly to hash functions, but do not require shared 
secret knowledge in order to authenticate. A digital signature is essentially a process 
that allows an entity to bind its identity to a piece of information [3]. The entity uses 
a signing function that transforms the message as well as some private information 
held by the entity into a tag or signature that is much like a hash-value [3]. The 
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signing function might also include temporal or other supplementary information. 
The signature is transmitted along with the message. The receiver can verify the 
identity of the sender by running a publicly-known verification function on the signa-
ture, which will either verify or deny the identity of the sender. The verification will 
fail if either the message has been altered from what was originally signed, or if the 
signature has been altered [3]. In this way, it ensures the authenticity of the sender, 
the integrity of the data, and consequently the origin of the data. 
The private information incorporated into the signature might be considered to be 
a type of private key, and the verification function might be considered to make use 
of public information about the entity, such as a public key. Digital signatures only 
provide one-way verification - they identify the signing entity and the origin of the 
data, but the sender knows nothing of the receiver. Nevertheless, digital signatures 
are another tool used to provide entity authentication, data origin authentication, 
and data integrity. 
Non-repudiation services are provided implicitly as part of all of the preceding 
cryptographic tools. Confidentiality and authentication using shared secret keys en-
sure that all parties involved in a transaction are known, and that no malicious parties 
could impersonate them. Even in the absence of confidentiality, authentication and 
digital signatures provide data integrity and entity identification which disallows the 
possibility of denying a transaction. 
Thus, it can be seen that the main cryptographic goals can be met with just a 
small set of cryptographic primitives. Unfortunately, theory often has difficulty being 
applied to the real world, and there are a host of issues which make implementing 
information security a truly daunting task. 
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1.4 Applications of Cryptography 
Cryptography has long been relevant to military communications, to the extent that 
modern military communications must support a variety of cryptographic systems and 
thus programmable encryption systems are desired [4]. In recent years, the need for 
cryptography in business and private communication has become equally important 
as communication moves from "secure" channels such as letter mail or the wired 
telephone system, which are both operated by trusted agencies, to more accessible 
mediums such as the Internet or cellular telephony. Cryptography is needed not 
just to preserve privacy, but also to verify business transactions and protect financial 
information and trade secrets. 
Cryptography is used in everything from digital cell phones and ABMs to Virtual 
Private Networks (VPNs) and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) transactions over the In-
ternet. These different systems all have different protocols, and often use different 
cryptographic algorithms to provide security. This introduces some interesting issues. 
The primary issue with respect to cryptography is the distribution of the keys. 
Block ciphers require the sender and receiver to have the same secret key. Public-
key cryptography, which is much slower than private-key, can be used to exchange 
secret keys, and then private-key ciphers can be used for the bulk of communication. 
There are a number of key exchange protocols designed for this [3, 2, 5], and to allow 
interoperability, a number of standard security protocols have been defined. For 
example, secure Internet transactions typically use SSL, whereas VPN applications 
(which use the Internet) generally use the IPsec protocol [5]. 
Unfortunately, cryptographic systems are difficult to implement properly [5]. Soft-
ware implementations of cryptography are easy, and offer flexibility, but are often 
open to attack from other malicious software. Additionally, software implementa-
tions are too slow for many applications, since they only offer throughput on the 
order of tens to low hundreds of megabits per second (Mbps) [6], which is insufficient 
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for high-bandwidth communications applications. 
Hardware implementations of cryptography offer much greater speed, ranging from 
the mid hundreds of Mbps to several gigabits per second ( Gbps) [7], as well as offering 
a degree of physical security that software lacks. Such implementations, whether in 
the form of a cryptographic Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) or an 
algorithm implemented in an Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), are difficult 
and time-consuming to develop, requiring specialized hardware design skills. ASIC 
implementations tend to lack flexibility as well, in that they generally cannot be 
changed once manufactured, whereas with some degree of effort, FPGAs can be. 
In today's communication landscape, with new applications being developed all 
the time that must exist alongside legacy applications and different systems and 
protocols, the need for a flexible cryptographic solutions is obvious. Flexible systems 
capable of dealing with different algorithms and protocols are highly desirable, and 
such a hardware system would have a wide range of applications. 
1.5 Motivation and Proposed Solution 
As can be seen, common methods of implementing cryptographic algorithms each 
have their respective good and bad points. Software implementations are easy and 
flexible, but result in low throughput. Hardware implementations, such as in ASICs or 
FPGAs, provide high throughput, but require a lengthy and difficult design process. 
The purpose of this research is to develop a middle-ground, something that com-
bines the best features of both common forms of implementation: the ease of software 
implementation and the speed of hardware. Unfortunately, to achieve this, compro-
mises will have to be made. 
The rationale for such a project is two-fold. Firstly, such a system will lighten the 
workload of developers, allowing them to integrate relatively fast security hardware 
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into their products more easily than doing their own FPGA designs, and with more 
flexibility than an pre-packaged ASIC implementation, thus allowing changes and 
fixes after production has begun. This will save time and money. Secondly, use of 
such a system benefits the end-users since if a weakness is found in the currently-
implemented security algorithm, the system could be reconfigured more easily that 
implementing a new FPGA implementation. This combination of the ease of use 
and flexibility of software with the speed of hardware might in many instances be a 
desirable combination. 
Thus, the goal of this research is to design a cryptographic hardware module 
that can be configured for a variety of different algorithms, which provides greater 
throughput than software implementation, and requires less design time than stan-
dard hardware implementation. It should also support standard block cipher modes 
of operation, and different algorithm implementation methodologies such as pipelin-
ing and iteration. The cryptographic hardware module, entitled Security Hardware 
Enhanced for Rapid Implementation and Flexibility (SHERIF), is intended for use 
in high-throughput communications systems, and thus must be able to implement 
several different algorithms and provide a significant degree of throughput to be con-
sidered a successful prototype. 
The discussion of this research is presented in the subsequent chapters, as outlined 
below. 
• Chapter 2 provides a concise but thorough review of existing cryptographic 
implementations, with particular attention paid to reconfigurable hardware ar-
chitectures and special-purpose cryptographic modules. 
• Chapter 3 introduces and analyzes the six major cryptographic algorithms 
around which the subsequent design was based. 
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• Chapter 4 details the design and implementation of the basic operational com-
ponents and data control components that were used to build our higher-level 
system. 
• Chapter 5 describes the overall system architecture of our cryptographic hard-
ware module, showing how it is constructed from the components detailed in 
Chapter 4 and demonstrating the reasoning behind the architecture and control 
scheme. 
• Chapter 6 describes the design and use of the software configuration utility 
written to aid the end-user in configuring the cryptographic hardware module 
to implement specific algorithms. 
• Chapter 7 details the functional testing of the device, focusing on the implemen-
tation and validation of a pipelined version of the AES cryptographic algorithm, 
and also discusses synthesis results. 
• Chapter 8 investigates possible directions for further research related to the 
cryptographic hardware module, and draws conclusions about the existing de-
sign. 
The appendices contain samples the VHDL code for the SHERIF cryptographic hard-
ware module, Java code for the software configuration utility, and overall configuration 
details. 
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Chapter 2 
Current Cryptographic Hardware 
Before designing a new cryptographic hardware module, it is necessary to consider 
existing implementations and platforms, from pure software to dedicated ASICs, 
FPGAs, and special-purpose cryptographic hardware modules. Knowledge of such 
implementations guided design efforts for the SHERIF cryptographic hardware mod-
ule under development. 
2.1 Standard Algorithm Implementations 
Note that the following analysis is focused on performance as measured by through-
put, where throughput is defined as the number of bits per second (bps) that the 
algorithm implementation can process. Sometimes throughput is also reported in 
bytes per second. Other considerations such as code size (for software), power con-
sumption, area (for hardware), and latency are not considered. 
2.1.1 Software Implementations 
The easiest means of implementing cryptographic algorithms is in software. Software 
implementations are flexible, and general-purpose microprocessors can run software 
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to implement any cryptographic algorithm. The key drawback to software implemen-
tation is that it is comparatively slow, meaning it is too slow for certain applications. 
For example, a 600 MHz processor is incapable of encrypting data fast enough to 
saturate a T3 communication line using Triple DES (3DES) encryption [8]. Further-
more, speed of operations is clearly dependent on the speed of the processor, and 
certain operations such as permutations are very slow to implement in software. 
Still, software implementation is viable and cost-effective in many applications, 
and thus is well-studied. In particular, during the AES selection process sponsored 
by United States National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [9] and 
the NESSIE standardization process [10], software implementations of the candidate 
algorithms were extensively developed and tested. Table 2.1 summarizes software 
speeds for several interesting algorithms from the two standardization efforts. Note 
that the AES candidate numbers were converted from average cycle counts per block 
when encrypting 128 blocks [6] to get the throughput. 
Algorithm Platform Throughput 
Rijndael ANSI C ( 450 MHz Pentium II) 98.3 Mbps 
RC6 ANSI C ( 450 MHz Pentium II) 122 Mbps 
Serpent ANSI C ( 450 MHz Pentium II) 21.1 Mbps 
Twofish ANSI C ( 450 MHz Pentium II) 101.6 Mbps 
MARS ANSI C ( 450 MHz Pentium II) 72.18 Mbps 
Camellia assembly (700 MHz Pentium III) 290.9 Mbps 
Camellia Java (1 GHz Pentium III) 161.4 Mbps 
Table 2.1: Software Implementation Results from AES Development and NESSIE 
More recent software implementations have in many cases improved upon these 
performance figures, due to increasing microprocessor speeds and better understand-
ing of the algorithms themselves. For example, recent software implementation speeds 
ofthe AES are listed in [11]. Highly optimized software on very high end microproces-
sors (such as Intel's Pentium 4 running at 3.2 GHz) can achieve impressive speeds, 
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as high as 1537.9 Mbps, and other high end microprocessors range in performance 
from the mid-to-high hundreds of Mbps. The key downside to such software im-
plementations is that they achieve such performance by running on expensive and 
power-hungry high end microprocessors, and thus even if such a software implemen-
tation on a high end processor could satisfy the requirements of a communication 
system, it might not be cost-effective to do so, especially in systems where space or 
power consumption are important. 
Despite the ever-increasing speed capabilities of software implementation, dedi-
cated hardware will still be needed for the foreseeable future to support new applica-
tions requiring higher and higher data rates, such as high definition real-time video. 
Perhaps more importantly, while software implementations may offer sufficient speed 
for end-users in whatever applications they may need, such capabilities do not scale 
to large networks and the vast amounts of data that they must transport. Thus, the 
need for hardware implementations to offer greater speed than software is apparent. 
These software numbers are provided primarily as a point of comparison for hardware 
implementations. 
2.1.2 Dedicated Hardware Implementations 
Hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms are widely varied, and en-
compass both ASIC and FPGA technology. Both types of hardware typically provide 
much greater speeds than capable in software, but share (to an extent) the same 
lengthy and complex development cycles. 
There are other advantages to hardware implementation as well. In [12] and [13] 
the need for encryption algorithm agility in ATM networks is discussed. Algorithm 
agility means that a system must be able to handle multiple algorithms, since there 
are several defined in the ATM security standard. While software running on a micro-
processor inherently offers such flexibility, it would likely be incapable of supporting 
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the high data rates needed for an ATM switch. The architecture presented in [12] 
proposes a number of encryption hardware pipelines in parallel to support the differ-
ent algorithms in the specification. The various pipelines are fed by an input sorting 
queue. This approach avoids software or reconfigurable logic overhead, and achieves 
aggregate speeds of up to 21.2 Gbps when running at 100 MHz [12], far beyond the 
performance available at that clock speed for a software implementation. 
ASICs such as the above tend to provide the greatest performance, but once 
manufactured, they cannot be fixed, altered, or updated. They are totally inflexible, 
and have a longer and more costly development process than FPGAs. Only when 
manufactured in large quantities do ASICs become cost-effective [14]. 
FPGAs typically provide lower performance than ASICs, but have the advantage 
of shorter and less costly development cycles since less work is needed before the design 
can be mapped into a standard FPGA part. Also, since FPGAs are programmable, it 
is possible for FPG A implementations of cryptographic algorithms to be updated or 
replaced if the final system is designed to accommodate this, which offers much greater 
flexibility than ASICs. This flexibility also means that, as hardware technologies 
improve, it is easier to re-implement an algorithm in a newer FPGA than it is to 
produce a new ASIC. 
Both ASICs and FPGAs have their benefits and drawbacks. Cryptographic algo-
rithm implementations in both have been studied extensively. The five finalist algo-
rithms for the AES were implemented in hardware by the National Security Agency 
in the United States [7] in both iterative and pipelined implementations. Similarly, 
New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity, and Encryption (NESSIE) candi-
dates such as Camellia [15] included extensive hardware performance results in their 
submission. Table 2.2 shows several hardware performance values for a number of 
algorithms that were AES and NESSIE candidates. Most of the devices are im-
plemented in various sizes of Complementary Metal-Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) 
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technology. 
Algorithm Implementation Details Throughput 
Rijndael pipelined (0.5p CMOS) 5163 Mbps 
Rijndael iterative (0.5p CMOS) 443.2 Mbps 
RC6 pipelined (0.5p CMOS) 2171 Mbps 
RC6 iterative (0.5p CMOS) 103.8 Mbps 
Serpent pipelined (0.5p CMOS) 8030 Mbps 
Serpent iterative (0.5p CMOS) 202.3 Mbps 
Two fish pipelined (0.5p CMOS) 2278 Mbps 
Two fish iterative (0.5p CMOS) 104.6 Mbps 
MARS pipelined (0.5p CMOS) 2189 Mbps 
MARS iterative (0.5p CMOS) 56.7 Mbps 
Camellia unrolled (0.18p Mitsubishi) 3200 Mbps 
Camellia iterative (0.18p Mitsubishi) 1881.25 Mbps 
Camellia pipelined (Xilinx VirtexE FPGA) 6749.99 Mbps 
Table 2.2: Hardware Implementation Results from AES Development and NESSIE 
A unified hardware implementation of Camellia [16] and AES [17] is presented 
in [18]. The unified implementation used structural similarities between the two al-
gorithms to reduce hardware where possible, and algorithm-specific hardware where 
necessary. It provided throughput for AES of 469.22 Mbps and 794.05 Mbps when 
optimized for area and speed respectively, and 661.18 Mbps and 1118.89 Mbps for 
Camellia [18]. In comparisons to separate implementations cited in that paper, the 
unified architecture was slightly slower than independent implementations of the al-
gorithms, but had a lower overall area. The independent implementation of AES was 
listed as having a throughput of 548.68 Mbps when optimized for area, and 875.28 
Mbps when optimized for speed, whereas the independent implementation of Camel-
lia had throughput of 1094.04 Mbps when optimized for area, and 1616.14 Mbps when 
optimized for speed [18]. All implementations were in 0.13 pm CMOS technology. 
The results presented here are in no means considered to be comprehensive. 
Rather, they are given to provide a general context for the performance of the system 
under design. 
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2.2 Commercial Cryptographic Co-Processors 
There are a number of commercial products available that generally refer to them-
selves as cryptographic co-processors. They generally focus on increasing the speed 
of public-key cryptography, whether it is RSA encryption or digital signatures. Al-
though architectural details are scarce on many of the products, they mostly seem 
to be system-level products (rather than single-chip solutions) that are used to off-
load the processing from the main processor in the system. Most of them seem to 
be based around a general microprocessor with special hardware to implement the 
cryptographic algorithms. Also, all of the commercial products are very application-
specific - most are designed to accelerate the IPsec or SSL security protocols. 
There are three general types of security chips or devices [19]. 
1. Coprocessors exist as part of a larger system, and off-load the cryptographic du-
ties from the main processor, freeing it for other tasks. This sort of arrangement 
is limited by the communication between the main processor and coprocessor 
[19]. 
2. Inline security processors are used directly in the communications path, and thus 
are forced to take on additional processing tasks beyond security. However, they 
allow a significant improvement in speed and throughput [19]. 
3. Network processors with integrated/embedded security functions are the third 
class of devices and can basically be seen as a combination of coprocessor and 
inline processor, or a consolidation of an inline security processor with the other 
communication components. Such integrated processors bring all the network 
and security functionality into a single device to allow line-rate operation [19]. 
These different approaches can be seen in the many varied commercial devices cur-
rently on the market. 
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2.2.1 Motorola's Sl Family 
Motorola [20] has a family of security processors, the S1 family, consisting of the 
MPC180, MPC184, MPC185, and MPC190 [21]. The processors are targeted toward 
edge routers, wireless base stations, e-commerce servers, broadband access equipment, 
and more [22], and are designed to support standard internet security protocols such 
as IPsec, IKE, WTLS/WAP and SSL/TLS [23]. The MPC185 also supports 3rd 
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) protocols [24]. 
To support these protocols, the processors must support algorithms such as public-
key cryptography (RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic curve), various modes of DES 
(and AES in later processors), and message digests (including SHA-1, MD4, and 
MD5) [25]. While the specific features of each processor differ, their general architec-
ture is the same. 
Rather than provide a general architecture optimized for cryptography, the S1 
family processors incorporated dedicated hardware for the supported algorithms onto 
a single chip. The architecture of the MPC185 provides a good example of this [24]. 
It has 10 execution units plus a random number generator. There are two public key 
execution units, which offer programmable support of RSA and Diffie-Hellman as well 
as elliptic curve cryptography [2], and several modes of each. Likewise, there are two 
DES execution units offering DES and 3DES in a variety of modes and configurations. 
Two AES execution units provide support for various modes of Rijndael, and the two 
message digest execution units support various modes of SHA-1 as well as MD4 and 
MD5. It even provides stream cipher support in the form of a single ARC4 execution 
unit (compatible with the RC4 algorithm), and support for the 3GPP algorithm 
Kasumi (for both encryption and authentication) via a dedicated execution unit. 
The estimated performance numbers for the MPC185-supported block ciphers, as 
shown in [24], are included in Table 2.3. Note that overall performance improves 
as the amount of data being processed increases. This is due to the memory access 
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required by the processors operating within a larger system. 
Data Size DES-CBC 3DES-CBC AES MD5 SHA-1 
64 byte 204 168 180 177 162 
128 byte 355 260 281 311 279 
256 byte 562 358 391 472 411 
512 byte 815 449 489 636 540 
1024 byte 1051 513 557 770 639 
1536 byte 1164 538 585 828 681 
Table 2.3: Block Cipher and Hash Function Estimated Throughput (in Mbps) from 
Motorola MPC185 Security Processor Technical Summary 
2.2.2 The IBM 4758 Secure Coprocessor 
IBM [26] produces the 4758 secure coprocessor, described in [27, 28]. The 4758 has a 
two-fold purpose: to accelerate cryptographic functions and always operate correctly 
despite physical attack [28]. Thus, much of the design effort for the 4758 went into 
the physical tamper-resistance of the device, rather than an innovative cryptographic 
architecture. 
The 4758 secure coprocessor incorporates a Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
acceleration unit (the device predates AES selection), a modular math unit, and 
a general-purpose 486 microprocessor to provide cryptographic support [28]. Later 
revisions of the device offer SHA-1 and Triple-DES execution units as well [29]. 
Given that the focus of the device is on providing a secure operating environment 
rather than high cryptographic performance, it might be expected that the perfor-
mance will not be optimal. In [30], the latest models are described as supporting up 
to 175 1024-bit key RSA operations per second, which is quite good, but the DES 
encryption throughput is 15.3 MBytes/section (approximately 122.4 Mbps), which 
is slow compared to many other DES implementations [31]. The performance may 
be partly limited by the PCI interface of the device, which has limited bandwidth, 
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but the focus of the device on protecting the secret/private keys, authenticating op-
erations, and providing a secure execution environment (not just for cryptography 
[28, 32]) likely contributes to its comparatively lackluster performance. 
2.2.3 Harris Corporation Sierra 
The RF Communications Division of the Harris Corporation has produced a program-
mable cryptographic device to meet military and law enforcement needs as described 
in [4]. The Sierra device is aimed at providing Type 1, Type 3, and Type 4 encryption 
for wireless devices [33], and thus is designed to maximize flexibility while providing 
sufficient performance. 
Wireless applications typically have lower bandwidth requirements than wired net-
works, though modern wireless systems can have throughput of several megabits per 
second [4]. The Sierra module provides both flexibility and sufficient speed through 
use of a dedicated ASIC called Palisades [33] which incorporates a variety of func-
tionality (including cryptography). 
The Palisades ASIC is based around an ARM7T Reduced Instruction Set 
Computer (RISC) processor core, which provides most of the device's flexibility and 
functionality. However, the processor is supplemented by several cryptographic blocks 
to accelerate cryptographic operations: two Type 1 encryption hardware blocks (for 
military encryption support), a DES encryptor, a 128-bit multiplier, a randomizer 
function, and even Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs) for stream cipher sup-
port. These blocks are tightly coupled to the processor core, allowing great flexibility, 
performance, and support for many different modes and algorithms [33]. 
This sort of architecture is fairly common in terms of programmable cryptographic 
hardware; most programmable solutions rely on general microprocessors with exten-
sions to speed cryptographic operations. Several further examples of this will be seen 
in subsequent sections. 
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2.2.4 Cavium Networks 
Cavium Networks [34] offers a series of security processors supporting the IPsec and 
SSL protocols, as described in [35]. This device runs at 500 MHz and has high-
bandwidth I/0 which contribute to its ability to achieve very high peak throughput, 
as shown in Table 2.4 [35]. 
Operation Peak Bandwidth 
3DES 70 Gb/s 
AES (with 256-bit key) 61 Gb/s 
ARC4 28 Gb/s 
MD5 56 Gb/s 
SHA-1 89 Gb/s 
Table 2.4: Peak bandwidth of Cavium IPsec/SSL processor at 500 MHz 
These very high throughput numbers are primarily due to the somewhat unique 
architecture of the device. It consists of 28 execution units, each of which is pro-
grammable [35]. Each execution unit consists of a 16-bit microcode processor engine 
with 12 kB of code storage, which controls the 64-bit Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU) 
and the cryptographic units and provides high level protocol processing. Hardware 
support is provided for 3DES, AES, and ARC4, MD5, and SHA-1. A hardware mod-
ular multiplier is also included to support public-key operations via the microcode 
processor [35]. The large number of execution units, and the large bus connecting 
them all, combined with fast chip I/0, leads to some very impressive performance 
figures. However, the microcode processors are limited, and thus, while this device 
provides excellent support for IPsec and SSL algorithms, it is not easily expandable 
to new applications. 
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2.2.5 Other Commercial Solutions 
There are many other cryptographic hardware products commercially available, a 
number of which are discussed in [19] and [36]. 
Many commercial cryptographic accelerators focus on accelerating public-key op-
erations, since they are more computationally intensive than the block ciphers which 
are used for bulk encryption. As such, they are often packaged as add-in boards for 
larger systems. Such cryptographic accelerators from nCipher and Rainbow Tech-
nologies are discussed in [36]. The nCipher product is an add-in or a larger computer 
system, whereas the Rainbow product is attached to the same network as other sys-
tems, allowing different forms of acceleration. Both are targeted at improving the 
speed of SSL transactions, primarily in terms of the public-key setup, although that 
includes some block cipher components as well [36]. 
Broadcom's CryptoNetX line of security processor devices work with host proces-
sors, although the company provides them on fully realized add-in boards as well. Like 
most commercial security hardware vendors, their chips such as the BCM5840/5841, 
BCM5850, and BCM5851 support the standard protocols such as IPsec and SSL [19]. 
The BCM5840/5841 devices are meant to support IPsec for VPNs, and thus they 
support DES, 3DES, AES, MD5, and SHA-1 in hardware, allowing 2.4 Gbps and 4.8 
Gbps data rates, respectively [19]. The BCM5850 and BCM5821 support the pro-
tocols and public key cryptography needed for SSL, with the BCM5821 accelerating 
the RSA public-key cryptography (allowing 4000 1024-bit transactions per second) 
as well as providing hardware support for DES, 3DES, ARC4, MD5, and SHA-1 [19]. 
Corrent has a series of security chips and boards as well, including the CR7020 and 
CR7120. These devices accelerate SSL or IPsec operations using special hardware for 
DES, 3DES, AES, ARC4, MD5, and SHA-1, as well as having on-chip exponentiator 
circuits for public-key algorithms. The CR7020 runs at 1.5 Gbps, while the CR7120 
runs at 3 Gbps [19]. 
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HiFN has a variety of cryptographic devices available. Their coprocessors range 
from the 7855, which supports IPsec protocols and algorithms at rates up to 650 Mbps, 
up to the 7955 processor, which supports a greater degree of public-key cryptography 
as well as supporting the IPsec algorithms at speeds of up to 756 Mbps [19]. They also 
have several in-line security processors, the 8300 and 8350 FlowThrough processors, 
which are meant to be used directly in a communication system datapath, rather 
than as a coprocessor. They support IPsec applications with public-key operations 
and standard private-key encryption and authentication, as well as an IKE stack. 
The 8300 runs at 600 Mbps, while the 8350 operates up to 4 Gbps [19]. 
Layer N Networks is a relatively new company that has developed a fast SSL 
chip, using a simplified mathematical algorithms to speed up public-key cryptogra-
phy. Their UltraLock chip is an in-line processor, and thus incorporates protocol 
processing hardware for TCP /IP along with the security hardware [19]. It has a 
control unit to handle the SSL and TLS protocols (using RSA encryption), and a 
separate cryptography controller which interfaces to a hardware execution unit sup-
porting SHA-1, MD5, DES, 3DES, RC4, and AES. This architecture allows it to 
implement security at the a rate of 1 Gbps [19]. 
Intel's IPX2850 network processor is primarily intended to support network 
processing, but incorporates security features as well, such as 3DES, AES, and SHA-
1, and allows speeds of up to 10 Gbps [19]. Software support allows the device to 
implement either IPsec or SSL/TLS, and makes this processor somewhat more flexi-
ble in terms of the applications it supports than most of the other devices considered 
here, but the cryptographic algorithms themselves are fixed [19]. 
Overall, the commercial solutions overwhelmingly tend to offer flexibility through 
incorporation of a general processor supplemented by additional cryptographic hard-
ware for specific algorithms. Thus, while excellent performance may be achieved in 
current applications, expandability to new algorithms, protocols, or applications is 
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limited. 
2.3 Implementation on Reconfigurable Platforms 
While dedicated hardware implementations provide high speed, they lack the flex-
ibility of software implementations. Straightforward FPGA-based hardware imple-
mentations offer almost as much speed as ASIC implementations, but with the added 
benefit of being reprogrammable, and yet the development effort is similar in many 
respects. Also, once operating, an FPGA tends to be static, although newer FPGAs 
allow dynamic reconfiguring of themselves (or parts thereof). A number of crypto-
graphic hardware systems have been proposed to take advantage of this. 
In [37], a reconfigurable computing system based on an FPGA is described, and 
implementation of the DES algorithm is used as an example of its operation. While 
their configuration management scheme (in which FPGA configurations are multi-
plexed from ROMs into the FPGA) provides good support for an algorithm-agile 
cryptography, it is still just a general reconfigurable system that could be used for 
virtually any application. 
The PipeRench architecture described in [38] is also a general reconfigurable sys-
tem used to implement cryptographic algorithms. It supports the concept of virtual 
hardware, in which parts of its configuration may be swapped for others to effectively 
support a design larger than the resources of the device. This degree of flexibility 
makes implementation of a variety of cryptographic algorithms feasible, and allows 
them to share the same execution platform. 
An extension to the PipeRench architecture optimized for cryptographic oper-
ations, called PipeRench+, is also described in [38]. The PipeRench+ system is 
identical to the baseline PipeRench architecture except for the addition of a small 
memory accessible from each of the computational stripes, in order to support larger 
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table lookups than the standard PipeRench. However, PipeRench is not fully config-
urable; some algorithms cannot be mapped onto the device, although they can still be 
accelerated by it if custom instructions are implemented in a co-processing situation 
[38]. 
The CryptoBooster is a cryptographic coprocessor described in [39]. It is opti-
mized for implementation with FPGAs, and meant to work within a host system. It 
incorporates a number of session control features to handle the details of each task it 
is asked to perform. However, the core functionality lies in the hardware implemen-
tation of the ciphers in the FPGA part of the system. CryptoBooster supports the 
partial reconfiguration capabilities of the FPGA, and allows the session controller and 
adapter to configure the FPGA as required by the session setup. Though designed 
to support cryptographic operations, it is still based around general reconfigurable 
hardware. 
Another FPGA-based algorithm-agile cryptographic coprocessor is presented in 
[40]. The FPGA in this system houses the cryptographic processor, which is config-
ured with data from a non-volatile memory block called the algorithm library. Thus, 
a number of algorithm configurations can be stored in the algorithm library, and de-
pending on how the system is controlled, different algorithm configurations can be 
loaded into the FPGA. This provides a flexible platform and allows algorithm agility. 
However, there is still the difficulty in designing such FPGA configurations. 
Overall, the use of FPGA-based reconfigurable computing may be an effective 
solution to the problem of flexibility and good performance. However, they are typ-
ically board-level solutions, rather than single-chip, and apart from providing an 
FPGA platform, are not optimized for cryptographic processing. 
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2.4 Generalized Cryptographic Hardware 
While much study has been performed on implementation of individual cryptographic 
operations, such as ROMs for use as s-boxes [41], there has also been some acad-
emic effort toward the development of generalized cryptographic hardware capable of 
implementing a variety of algorithms, apart from those implementing cryptography 
in general reconfigurable systems. Many of these architectures propose extensions 
of general microprocessor architectures, adding instructions that accelerate crypto-
graphic operations in order to speed up software implementations of algorithms using 
optimized hardware. 
An example of this in its most basic form is shown in [42], which proposes the addi-
tion of a bit permutation instruction to a general microprocessor. Such an instruction 
would enable significant speedup over a normal processor when implementing cryp-
tographic operations that require bitwise permutations, such as DES [43]. 
A more extreme example of this microprocessor-supplemental approach is pre-
sented in [44], which adds an instruction to the user-customizable ARC processor 
that implements an entire round of the DES algorithm. This single instruction vastly 
increases the speed of DES and 3DES encryption by providing custom hardware and 
reducing the number of needed memory reads/writes, allowing an speedup of 47 for 
DES and a speedup of 92 for 3DES [44]. The new DES round instruction also al-
lowed a dramatic reduction in code size. For a processor speed of 200 MHz, 3DES 
performance was estimated to be 337 Mbps [44]. 
These sorts of processor extensions have their limitations. Adding a bit permuta-
tion instruction is only useful at accelerating algorithms that use bit permutations, 
and does nothing to address the word-size disparity between the microprocessor (most 
of which are 32-bit or less) and modern block ciphers (most of which are 128-bit or 
more). In the case of the specialized DES instruction, it certainly allows speedup 
of DES, but has no flexibility advantage over a dedicated hardware implementation. 
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However, a number of different architectures have been proposed that extend this 
concept even further. 
2.4.1 Crypto-CPU 
The Crypto-CPU is presented [45] and [46]. It is designed as a processor for low-power 
communications, and as such much of the design effort went into minimizing power 
consumption. However, it does offer specialized hardware to speed cryptography. 
Based around the MIPS architecture, is uses several modern computer architecture 
techniques such as superscalar execution and explicit parallelism. In addition to 
providing a good general-purpose RISC processor, it provides a substitution unit (in 
the form of SRAM memories) for implementing s-boxes, as well as a programmable 
bit expansion/permutation unit [45]. 
The presence of general purpose AL U operations along with the specialized cryp-
tography extensions gives the Crypto-CPU a significant performance boost in crypto-
graphic operation in comparison to other low-power processors. Running at a speed 
of 100 MHz, the Crypto-CPU offers approximately five times the throughput of the 
other devices (running at 120 MHz and 133 MHz respectively); at 200 MHz, the 
performance gap widens to almost a factor of ten. The Crypto-CPU even compares 
favourably to a general-purpose microprocessor such as an Intel Celeron running at 
850 MHz [45]. 
2.4.2 CryptoManiac 
In [8] a number of additions are proposed to a basic microprocessor instruction set 
to support symmetric-key ciphers. In addition to the standard ALU operations, the 
extensions include rotation instructions, instructions for constant rotations followed 
by an XOR operation, modular multiplication instructions, substitution instructions 
accessing a 256-entry by 32-bit lookup table, and an instruction to implement a 
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partial 64-bit permutation capable of generating 8 bits of the permutation output 
each time it is executed. These additional instructions improved encryption operation 
performance over a baseline processor by 59% for processors which already have rotate 
instructions, and 74% for processors without [8]. 
The CryptoManiac architecture [47] is partially derived from the instruction set 
operations presented in [8]. It is a processor based around a 4-wide 32-bit Very Long 
Instruction Word (VLIW) processor optimized for cryptographic operation, meaning 
it has no cache and only simple branch prediction. To integrate more easily into 
communication systems, the device is session oriented, meaning that it can operate 
for multiple channels of data in parallel or sequence. 
Compared to many of the architectures seen so far, the CryptoManiac has a some-
what unique design. It interfaces with a host processor via an input queue which 
buffers requests for the services of the device (create private key session, delete pri-
vate key session, and encrypt/decrypt data). There are a number of CryptoManiac 
Processing Elements (PEs) in parallel, and the requests are sent to them by a sched-
uler. The scheduler maintains sessions where possible, and uses a Least Recently 
Used (LRU) allocation scheme to send new sessions to the PEs. The outputs of the 
PEs are sent to an output queue. The system also has a storage element called the 
keystore which is used to hold key and substitution data, and is shared between all 
of the PEs to allow context switching [47]. 
Naturally, the CryptoManiac PEs are the core to the functionality of the system. 
Each processing element is a 4-wide 4-stage VLIW processor which has a local in-
struction memory to store the instructions for the algorithms the PE is implementing. 
Instructions are fetched and branches predicted in the first stage, decoded and regis-
ters accessed in the second stage, processed through the four parallel 32-bit functional 
units in the third stage (which also may access data memory), and then results are 
written to the appropriate places in the final stage [47]. 
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The functional units can execute a limited number of instructions, derived from 
those in [8], and consisting of Boolean AND and XOR, addition, subtraction, rotation, 
s-box lookups, and multiplication (regular or modular). The instructions are classified 
into three types: tiny, short, and long. Tiny and short instructions can be executed 
simultaneously in various combinations, whereas the long instructions (multiplication) 
can only be executed by themselves [47]. 
The four 32-bit functional units are nearly identical, each consisting of a logical 
unit (providing XOR and AND logic) followed by a 32-bit adder, 32-bit rotator, and 
1 kB s-box cache in parallel, all of which are followed by another logical unit. Two of 
the four functional units also have a pipelined 32-bit multiplier in parallel to all the 
rest [47]. Clearly, such a system offers great flexibility. 
The estimated speed of the CryptoManiac is 360 MHz, and performance numbers 
suggest a speed improvement of anywhere from 32% to 290% over a 600 MHz Alpha 
21264 microprocessor, depending on the algorithm. For example, an implementa-
tion of Rijndael on the CryptoManiac can achieve an encryption rate of up to 64 
megabytes per second, more than 2.25 times faster than the corresponding software 
implementation [47]. This is a significant performance boost, and the architecture 
has the flexibility to support other algorithms as well. 
2.4.3 Programmable Processor for Cryptography 
In [48], the design of a high speed programmable architecture to handle a variety 
of cryptographic algorithms is presented. The architecture is based around several 
functional units controlled by a control unit ROM. Hardware units for addition/sub-
traction and XOR are provided, as well as an EPROM to implement substitutions 
and permutations. These operations primarily support private-key ciphers. 
A modular multiplication and exponentiation unit is also provided to support 
public-key ciphers such as RSA. The unit implements a loop-unrolled version of the 
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Montgomery multiplication algorithm to achieve higher throughput [48]. 
The different functional units are controlled by a control unit which receives in-
structions, bit lengths, and round numbers as inputs from a master processor. The 
control unit has a ROM which stores processing cycle counts for the different in-
structions and different bit lengths. The control unit takes over from the master 
processor sending control signals to the various functional units, and then writes the 
valid output after the necessary number of clock cycles [48]. This processor is thus 
very much like a microprogrammed controller - a very small, limited, task-specific 
microprocessor -rather than an extended general microprocessor. 
The processor was fabricated in 2 micron technology, and managed to achieve a 
speed of 77 MHz. This allowed it to achieve a DES throughput of 44 megabytes per 
second and a throughput of 300 kilobits per second for RSA encryption. The authors 
suggest that if the design were fabricated in submicron technology (for example, 0.18 
Jlm CMOS technology) much higher clock speeds and throughputs could be achieved 
[48]. 
2.4.4 Reconfigurable Public Key Architecture 
Though beyond the scope of this thesis, which focuses on the design of an archi-
tecture to support private-key functionality, [49] offers an interesting reconfigurable 
processor for public-key cryptography. Despite the technical difficulties of implement-
ing public-key cryptography in hardware, in some respects the implementation of a 
reconfigurable general-purpose public-key cryptographic architecture is easier than a 
private-key system simply because the class of base operations is much more limited. 
The design in [49] is based around implementing those few basic problems, defined 
in the IEEE P1363 public key cryptography standard: integer factorization, discrete 
logarithms, and elliptic curves. 
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This Domain-Specific Reconfigurable Cryptographic Processor (DSRCP) is de-
signed around a microcode controller that interfaces with a 32 by 32-bit reconfigurable 
datapath. There is also dedicated SHA-1 hardware to satisfy the requirements of the 
IEEE P1363 standard. The DSRCP receives instructions from an external controller, 
which it then decodes in the controller. This is because some of the instructions use 
others in their implementation. Thus, when an instruction is decoded, the necessary 
microcode is fetched from a ROM and used to control the datapath [49]. 
The reconfigurable datapath has a local register file, a fast adder unit, a compara-
tor unit, and reconfigurable unit. The reconfigurable unit can be reconfigure on the 
fly to one of three operations: Montgomery multiplication/reduction, multiplication 
in GF(2n), and GF(2n) inversion. The system is also accommodating to different 
bit widths (though larger bit sizes naturally require more iterations in the hardware) 
[49]. It can be used to implement elliptic curve computations, mathematics of finite 
fields, and exponentiation of large numbers - all basic operations of various forms of 
public-key cryptography. This smaller set of basic operations makes such a reconfig-
urable processor much easier to develop for public-key cryptography than the widely 
varied private-key cryptographic algorithms. 
2.5 Summary of Cryptographic Hardware Archi-
tectures 
A variety of cryptographic hardware architectures have been surveyed in this chap-
ter. Dedicated hardware implementations tend to achieve speed through brute force, 
efficiency, and parallelism, with fully loop-unrolled and pipelined implementations 
offering the greatest performance but least flexibility, since they cannot even be used 
in different modes of operation without a performance hit. 
Implementations in programmable hardware such as FPGAs are similar, offering 
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high speeds but little flexibility other than the ability to reprogram with a different 
algorithm. However, a number of FPGA-based reconfigurable platforms offer a much 
greater degree of flexibility, whether specifically meant for cryptography or not. 
Non-FPGA-based programmable solutions mostly take the form of extended 
microprocessors. Either extra instructions are added to a general microprocessor 
to accelerate cryptographic operations, or else smaller processors supporting only 
cryptography-oriented instructions are proposed. Such systems offer a high degree 
of flexibility and a significant speedup over pure software implementations, but often 
cannot approach the throughput levels of dedicated hardware. 
The SHERIF cryptographic hardware module will take a somewhat novel approach 
to implementing a flexible cryptographic platform. Its design will be developed in the 
following chapters. 
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Chapter 3 
Algorithm Survey and Analysis 
To design a hardware architecture optimized for cryptographic operations, it is nec-
essary to determine what capabilities need to be provided and optimized so as to give 
such a cryptographic hardware module an advantage over a general-purpose micro-
processor. This can only be determined by study of the algorithms the device must 
implement. 
There are a multitude of cryptographic algorithms in existence; many are detailed 
in [3] and [50]. New algorithms are also being developed on an ongoing basis. Analysis 
of all such cryptographic algorithms would prove impossible, so it is necessary to limit 
the scope of the algorithms that must be considered. 
It is possible to remove algorithms from consideration by applying several broad 
criteria. Algorithms that are outdated, or that have been shown to have severe 
weakness to specialized attacks, will be discounted immediately. Likewise, algorithms 
that are not widely used will be discounted, since a cryptographic hardware module 
to implement such algorithms would likely be economically infeasible. 
This leaves algorithms that are widely used and/ or standardized to be considered. 
Standardized algorithms are selected by government institutions such as NIST [51] or 
through open processes such as NESSIE [10]. Thus, the analysis will focus on a small 
set of algorithms that have received much public study and have been standardized 
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or were viable candidates in a standardization process. Furthermore, the algorithms 
are all symmetric-key block ciphers or hash functions. 
3.1 Algorithms Under Consideration 
NIST has long been responsible for setting security standards for the U.S. Govern-
ment. The current standard for data confidentiality, known as the AES, is the al-
gorithm Rijndael [17]. It replaces the older DES [43], although DES is still used in 
many applications. NIST also specifies the hash function SHA-1 [52] which is based on 
the older hash function MD5 [3]. These standardized algorithms are natural choices 
for consideration. MD5 will be excluded from consideration since SHA-1 is a close 
derivative of it. 
The NESSIE selection process was in progress at the start of this research, and 
thus a number of algorithms considered to be strong contenders were selected for 
consideration: Camellia [16], RC6 [53], SAFER++128 [54], and SHACAL (which is 
based on the SHA-1 hash function) [55]. 
At the conclusion of the NESSIE project, Camellia, AES, and a version of SHA-
CAL were recommended algorithms [56]. No attacks against or weaknesses of RC6 
or SAFER++128 were discovered, but they were not recommended due to intellectual 
property concerns in the case of RC6, and concerns about certain structural elements 
and low security margins in SAFER++128 [56]. Nevertheless, they are included in 
this analysis as representatives of modern cipher design, rather than standardized 
algorithms. 
The following sections examine these algorithms in detail. However, the algorithms 
as depicted are only meant to describe the general structure of the algorithms, and 
do not necessarily provide all the specific details needed for implementation. For 
example, details on the S-boxes or bit permutations and expansions will be glossed 
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over. 
3.1.1 Notation 
In the following algorithm descriptions, some specialized notations are used to ensure 
uniformity among the descriptions. 
• SBOX() is used to represent a table lookup. Different-valued s-boxes will be 
differentiated by unique numbers or subscripts (SBOXl, SBOX2, and so on). 
• E9 is the XOR operation. 
• & is used to concatenate bit strings. 
• Ncx) represents byte X of bit string N, where the least significant byte is byte 
0. 
• Ncx ... Y) represents bytes X toY of bit string N, where the least significant byte 
is byte 0. 
• +- represents assignment. 
• 1\, V, and-, represent bitwise Boolean AND, OR, and NOT respectively. 
• N < < < X represents a left rotation of bit string N by X bits. N > > > X is a 
right rotation by X bits. 
• +, -, and x represent addition, subtraction, and multiplication, respectively. 
The notation can be used in various combinations. Other unique notations are de-
scribed in the algorithms in which they appear. 
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3.1.2 AES 
The AES algorithm, Rijndael, is relatively simple as described in [17]. Like most 
block ciphers, it iterates through a number of identical rounds, applying different 
round keys each time. It is somewhat unique in the way the specification describes it, 
since it organizes the input data into a two-dimensional 4 x 4 array of bytes. The four 
main operations- SubBytes(), ShiftRows(), MixColumns(), and AddRoundKey() -
operate on this array. 
The SubBytes() operation is a non-linear byte substitution on each byte of the 
input [17]. This sort of structure is commonly known as an S-box or substitution 
table, although it can be implemented with boolean logic as well. 
The ShiftRows() operation is a fixed permutation of the bytes of the input data. 
The input bytes are rearranged into a different order. 
The AddRoundKey() operation is a simple bitwise exclusive-or (XOR) of the input 
data and the current round key. 
The MixColumns() operation is perhaps the most complex. Each 32 bit word 
of the input is considered a polynomial over GF(28 ) and multiplied modulo x 4 + 1 
with a(x) = {03} x 3 + {01} x 2 + {01} x + {02}. This can also be viewed as a matrix 
multiplication, and there are a number of ways of implementing this operation. This 
operation produces a result in which each output but is the XOR of a subset of the 
input bits. 
AES has a variable key size. The version described in this analysis has a 128-bit 
key size and 10 rounds. Other key sizes simply require a greater number of rounds 
and a different key schedule. 
As mentioned above, the standard description of Rijndael organizes the plaintext 
into an array. To make comparisons to other algorithms easier, it was necessary to 
write the algorithm in terms of operations on a 128-bit vector. This is shown in 
Algorithm 3.1.1. 
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Algorithm 3.1.1 AES (Rijndael) Encryption 
Input: 128-bit plaintext M. 
Input: 11 128-bit round keys w0 to w10 • 
N +-- M EEl Wo 
for i = 1 to 9 do 
N +-- SBOX(Nc15)) & SBOX(Nc14)) & ... & SBOX(Nco)) 
N +-- NC15) & Nc10) & NC5) & Nco) & Ncn) & NC6) & Ncl) & Nc12) 
& NC7) & Nc2) & Nc1a) & Ncs) & Nca) & NC14) & NC9) & NC4) 
N +-- Nc15 ... 12) x [{03} x 3 + {01} x2 + {01} x + {02}] modulo x4 + 1 
& Ncn ... s) x [{03} x 3 + {01} x2 + {01} x + {02}} modulo x4 + 1 
& Nc7 ... 4) x [{03} x3 + {01} x2 + {01} x + {02}] modulo x4 + 1 
& Nc3 ... o) x [{03} x3 + {01} x2 + {01} x + {02}] modulo x4 + 1 
N f- N EEl Wi 
end for 
N +-- SBOX(Nc15)) & SBOX(Nc14)) & ... & SBOX(Nco)) 
N +-- NCI5) & Nc10) & Nc5) & Nco) & Ncu) & Nc6) & Ncl) & Nc12) 
& NC7) & Nc2) & NC13) & Ncs) & Nca) & NCI4) & NC9) & NC4) 
Output: 128-bit ciphertext C +-- N EEl w10 
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The AES decryption algorithm, given in Algorithm 3.1.2, is similar. 
Algorithm 3.1.2 AES (Rijndael) Decryption 
Input: 128-bit ciphertext C. 
Input: 11 128-bit round keys w0 to w10 . 
N +-- c EB WlQ 
for i = 9 down to 1 do 
N +-- N(15) & N(2) & N(5) & Ncs) & Ncn) & N(14) & Ncl) & N(4) 
& N(7) & N(IO) & N(l3) & Nco) & N(3) & N(6) & N(9) & Nc12) 
N +-- SBOX-1(N(15)) & SBOX-1(N(l4)) & ... & SBOX-1(N(o)) 
N +-- Nc15 ... 12) x [{Ob} x3 + {Od} x2 + {09} x + {Oe}] modulo x4 + 1 
& Ncn ... s) [x {Ob} x 3 + {Od} x2 + {09} x + {Oe}] modulo x4 + 1 
& Nc7 ... 4) [x {Ob} x3 + {Od} x2 + {09} x + {Oe}] modulo x4 + 1 
& Nc3 ... o) [x {Ob} x3 + {Od} x2 + {09} x + {Oe}] modulo x4 + 1 
end for 
N +-- N(15) & N(2) & N(5) & Ncs) & Ncn) & N(l4) & N(l) & N(4) 
& N(7) & N(IO) & N(l3) & Nco) & N(3) & N(6) & N(9) & Nc12) 
N +-- SBOX(Nc15)) & SBOX(Nc14)) & ... & SBOX(N(o)) 
Output: 128-bit plaintext M +-- NEB w0 
The key schedule of AES, which takes the initial 128-bit key and expands it into 
the 11 round keys used in encryption and decryption, is shown in Algorithm 3.1.3. 
3.1.3 DES 
DES is the old NIST standard [43], which has been officially replaced by the AES. 
However, it is certain that DES is still in use in existing systems, or in modified 
versions such as Triple-DES [3]. DES is a Feistel cipher structure, with a 64-bit block 
size and a 56-bit key size, and 16 rounds. The DES encryption algorithm is given in 
Algorithm 3.1.4. Note that the details of the bitwise permutations and expansions are 
not given. Also, note that the S-boxes in DES take a 6-bit input and produce a 4-bit 
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Algorithm 3.1.3 AES (Rijndael) Key Expansion 
Input: 128-bit key K. 
Input: 32-bit round constants Ri = [xi-1 , {00}, {00}, {00} J over GF(28 ). 
Output: 11 128-bit round keys w0 to w 10 • 
Comments: Let temp be a 32-bit variable. 
w0 f- K 
for i = 1 to 10 do 
temp f- (wi-1)(3 ... 0) 
temp f- temp(2 ... o) & temp(3) 
temp f- SBOX (temp(3)) & SBOX (temp(2)) 
& SBOX (temp(1)) & SBOX (temp(o)) 
temp f- temp E9 Ri 
( wi)(15 ... 12) f- temp E9 ( wi-1)(15 ... 12) 
(wi)(n ... s) f- (wi)(15 ... 12) E9 (wi-1)(11...8) 
(wi)(7 .. .4) f- (wi)(n ... s) E9 (wi-1)(7 ... 4) 
(wi)(3 ... o) f- (wi)(7 ... 4) E9 (wi-1)(3 ... 0) 
end for 
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output, which will account for the apparent size mismatch in the given description. 
Algorithm 3.1.4 DES Encryption 
Input: 64-bit plaintext M. 
Input: 16 48-bit round keys k1 to k16 
Comment: Let L and R be 32-bit variables. 
Comment: Let X be a 48-bit variable. 
N +--- IP(M) (initial permutation) 
L +--- N(7 ... 4), R +--- N(3 ... o) 
for i = 1 to 16 do 
temp+--- R 
X +--- E(R) (bit expansion of R to 48 bits) 
X+--- X EB ki 
R +--- SBOX1(X(Bits 47 to 42)) & SBOX2(X(Bits 41 to 36)) & SBOX3(X(Bits 35 to 3o)) 
& SBOX4(X(Bits 29 to 24)) & SBOX5(X(Bits 23 to 18)) & SBOX6(X(Bits 17 to 12)) 
& SBOX7(X(Bits n to 6)) & SBOX8(X(Bits 5 too)) 
R +--- P(R) (bit permutation P) 
L +---temp 
end for 
Output: 64-bit ciphertext C +--- IP-1(R & L) (inverse permutation) 
Decryption with DES is identical, since this is a Feistel cipher, and thus simply 
requires that the keys be applied in the reverse order. This is shown in Algorithm 
3.1.5. 
The 16 48-bit subkeys are determined from the 56-bit key using the key schedule 
described in Algorithm 3.1.6. Note that it is also possible to generate the round keys 
within each round of computation, rather than doing all computations up front. The 
56-bit key is actually represented with 64 bits, where the extra bits are odd parity 
bits. 
3.1.4 Camellia 
The version of Camellia [16] under consideration has a 128-bit block size, a 128-bit key 
size, and 18 rounds. The key schedule converts the 128-bit key into 26 64-bit subkeys. 
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Algorithm 3.1.5 DES Decryption 
Input: 64-bit ciphertext C. 
Input: 16 48-bit round keys k1 to k16 
Comment: Let L and R be 32-bit variables. 
Comment: Let X be a 48-bit variable. 
N +--- IP(M) (initial permutation) 
L +--- N(7 ... 4), R +--- N(3 ... o) 
fori= 16 down to 1 do 
temp+--- R 
X+--- E(R) (bit expansion of R to 48 bits) 
X+--- X EB ki 
R +--- SBOX1(X(Bits 47 to 42)) & SBOX2(X(Bits 41 to 36)) & SBOX3(X(Bits 35 to 3o)) 
& SBOX4(X(Bits 29 to 24)) & SBOX5(X(Bits 23 to 18)) & SBOX6(X(Bits 17 to 12)) 
& SBOX7(X(Bits u to 6)) & SBOX8(X(Bits 5 too)) 
R +--- P(R) (bit permutation P) 
L +---temp 
end for 
Output: 64-bit plaintext M +--- IP-1(R & L) (inverse permutation) 
Algorithm 3.1.6 DES Key Schedule 
Input: 64-bit key K including 8 odd parity bits. 
Output: 16 48-bit round keys k1 to k16 
Comment: Let T be a 56-bit variable. 
Comment: Let L and R be 28-bit variables. 
Comment: Let vi = 1 when i E [1, 2, 9, 16], else vi = 2. 
T +--- PC1(K) (permuted choice 1, selects the 56 key bits and permutes them) 
L +--- T(Bits 55 to 28) 
R +--- T(Bits 27 to 0) 
for i = 1 to 16 do 
L f- L <<<Vi 
R f- R <<<Vi 
ki +--- PC2(L & R) (permuted choice 2, selects and permutes 48 bits for subkey) 
end for 
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The specification for Camellia uses a series of nested function calls to describe the 
algorithm, but to allow easy comparison to other algorithms, it was necessary to 
rewrite the description as is shown in Algorithm 3.1.7. 
The decryption operation of Camellia is identical to encryption, since it is a Feistel 
cipher [3]. Thus, the same algorithm is used, but the keys are applied in the reverse 
order. The subkeys are determined by a key schedule based on the cipher, which is 
shown in Algorithm 3.1.8. 
3.1.5 SAFER++12s 
SAFER++128 is a specific variation of the SAFER++ algorithm which has a block 
size of 128-bits, a key size of 128-bits, and 7 rounds [54]. SAFER++128 has some 
interesting operations, making it rather different from most of the other algorithms 
considered. There are several operations in particular that bear mentioning in terms 
of how the are actually implemented. 
There is a nonlinear layer in which certain bytes are are used to compute an expo-
nential value which replaces them, and other bytes are used to compute logarithmic 
values. The exponential computation replaces byte x with 45xmod257 with the con-
vention that when x has a value of 128, then 45128mod257 = 256 is represented by 0. 
The logarithmic computation replaces a byte y with log45 y with the convention that 
when y = 0, then log45 0 is represented by 128. 
However, such computations are complex. We can replace them by pre-computing 
the results for possible values of x and y and using 8-boxes to implement these oper-
ations. This 8-box representation of these operations will be used in the description 
of SAFER++128 given the algorithm descriptions below. 
The other unique operation in SAFER++128 is called the 4-PHT in the specifi-
cation [54]. This operation is an invertible linear transformation that operates on 32 
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Algorithm 3.1.7 Camellia Encryption 
Input: 128-bit plaintext M. 
Input: 4 64-bit subkeys kwt fort E (1, 2, 3, 4). 
Input: 18 64-bit subkeys kr for r E (1, 2, 3, ... , 18). 
Input: 4 64-bit subkeys klv for v E (1, 2, 3, 4). 
Comment: Let L, R, LN, Ltemp, Rtemp, and temp be 64-bit variables. 
Comment: Let LH and RH be 32-bit variables. 
N <c- M EEl (kw1 & kw2 ) 
L <c- N(15 ... s) 
R <c- N(7 ... o) 
for r = 1 to 18 do 
temp <c- L 
L <c- L EEl kr 
L <c- SBOX1(L(7)) & SBOX2(L(6J) & SBOX3(L(5J) & SBOX4(L(4J) 
& SBOX2(L(3J) & SBOX3(L(z)) & SBOX4(L(l)) & SBOX1(L(o)) 
LN(7) <c- L(7) EEl L(5) EB L(4) EEl L(z) EB L(l) EEl L(o) 
LN(6) <c- L(7) EEl L(6) EEl L(4) EEl L(3) EB L(l) EEl L(o) 
LN(5) <c- L(7) EB L(6) EB L(5) EEl L(3) EB L(z) EEl L(o) 
LN(4) <c- L(6) EEl L(5) EB L(4) EEl L(3) EB L(z) EEl L(l) 
LN(3) <c- L(7) EB L(6) EB L(z) EEl L(l) EB L(o) 
LN(z) <c- L(6) EB L(5) EB L(3) EEl L(l) EB L(o) 
LN(l) <c- L(5) EB L(4J EB L(3) EEl L(z) EB L(o) 
LN(o) <c- L(7) EB L(4) EEl L(3) EB L(z) EB L(l) 
L <c-REEl LN 
R <c- temp 
if r = 6 orr= 12 then 
Ltemp <c- L, Rtemp <c- R 
k1 <c- klzr/6-1, kz <c- klzr/6 
RH <c- (((Ltemp)(7 .. .4) 1\ (k1)(7 ... 4)) <<< 1) EEl (Ltemp)(3 ... 0) 
LH <c- (RH V (ki)(3 ... o)) EEl (Ltemp)(7 .. .4) 
L <c- LH & RH 
LH <c- ((Rtemp)(3 ... 0) V (kz)(3 ... o)) EEl (Rtemp)(7 ... 4) 
RH <c- ((LH 1\ (k2)(7 .. .4J) <<< 1) EB (Rtemp)(3 ... o) 
R<c- LH & RH 
end if 
end for 
Output: 128-bit ciphertext C <c- (R & L) EB (kw3 & kw4 ) 
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Algorithm 3.1.8 Camellia Key Schedule 
Input: 128-bit key K. 
Input: 64-bit key constants kc1 ... kc4 = [a09e667f3bcc908b, b67ae8584caa73b2, 
c6ef372fe94f82be, 54ff53a5fld36flc]. 
Output: 4 64-bit subkeys kwt for t E (1, 2, 3, 4), 18 64-bit subkeys kr for r E 
(1, 2, 3, ... , 18), and 4 64-bit subkeys klv for v E (1, 2, 3, 4). 
Comment: Let L, R, LN, and temp be 64-bit variables, and let K L and K A be 
128-bit variables. 
KL~K 
L ~ K(15 ... s) 
R ~ K(7 ... o) 
for r = 1 to 4 do 
temp~ L 
L ~ L EEl kcr 
L ~ SBOX1(L(7)) & SBOX2(L(6)) & SBOX3(L(5)) & SBOX4(L(4)) 
& SBOX2(L(3)) & SBOX3(L(2)) & SBOX4(L(l)) & SBOX1(L(o)) 
LN(7) ~ L(7) EEl L(5) EB L(4) EB L(2) EB L(l) EB L(o) 
LN(6) ~ L(7) EB L(6) EB L(4) EB L(3) EB L(l) EB L(o) 
LN(5) ~ L(7) EB L(6) EB L(5) EEl L(3) EB L(2) 8 L(o) 
LN(4) ~ L(6) EEl L(5) EEl L(4) EEl L(3) EB L(2) 8 L(l) 
LN(3) ~ L(7) EEl L(6) EEl L(2) EEl L(l) EB L(o) 
LN(2) ~ L(6) EEl L(5) EEl L(3) EEl L(1) EB L(o) 
LN(l) ~ L(5) EB L(4) EEl L(3) EB L(2) EEl L(o) 
LN(o) ~ L(7) EEl L(4) EEl L(3) EEl L(2) EEl L(l) 
L ~ REBLN 
R ~temp 
if r = 2 then 
L ~ K L(l5 ... 8) EB L 
R ~ KL(7 ... o) EB R 
end if 
end for 
KA~(L&R) 
kw1 ~ (KL <<< 0)(7 .. .4), kw2 ~ (KL <<< 0)(3 ... o), kw3 ~ (KA <<< 111)(7 .. .4), 
kw4 ~ (KA <<< 111)(3 ... o) 
kl1 ~ (KA <<< 30)(7 .. .4), kl2 ~ (KA <<< 30)(3 ... o), kl3 ~ (KL <<< 77)(7 .. .4), 
kl4 ~ (KL <<< 77)(3 ... o) 
k1 ~ (KA <<< 0)(7 .. .4), k2 ~ (KA <<< 0)(3 ... o), k3 ~ (KL <<< 15)(7 ... 4), 
k4 ~ (KL <<< 15)(3 ... o), k5 ~ (KA <<< 15)(7 .. .4), k6 ~ (KA <<< 15)(3 ... o), 
k1 ~ (KL <<< 45)(7 .. .4), ks ~ (KL <<< 45)(3 ... o), kg ~ (KA <<< 45)(7 .. .4), 
k10 ~ (KL <<< 60)(3 ... o), kn ~ (KA <<< 60)(7 .. .4), k12 ~ (KA <<< 60)(3 ... o), 
k13 ~ (KL <<< 94)(7 .. .4), k14 ~ (KL <<< 94)(3 ... o), k15 ~ (KA <<< 94)(7 .. .4), 
k16 ~ (KA <<< 94)(3 ... o), k11 ~ (KL <<< 111)(7 .. .4), k1s ~ (KL <<< 111)(3 ... o) 
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bits. It is given as a matrix multiplication, but the specification also provides an al-
ternate implementation using 6 8-bit additions modulo 28 . In the specification below, 
the term 4-PHT is used for brevity, but can be replaced with the implementation 
shown in Algorithm 3.1.9. 
Algorithm 3.1.9 4-PHT 
Input: 32-bit input X composed of individual bytes [a, b, c, d]. 
Comment: Let A, B, C, D be intermediate 8-bit variables. 
D <--- d + a + b + c modulo 256 
C <--- c + D modulo 256 
B <--- b + D modulo 256 
A <--- a + D modulo 256 
Output: 32-bit Y <--- A & B & C & D 
Note that there is also an inverse of the 4-PHT, which is referred to as 4-IPHT, 
which is implemented similarly [54]. 
The encryption operation of SAFER++128 is shown in Algorithm 3.1.10. In this 
description, 4-PHT is abbreviated as a function called PHT. 
Decryption is similar to encryption, but requires the same operations in a different 
order, as shown in Algorithm 3.1.11. IPHT is used to represent the inverse of the 
4-PHT transform. 
Each round uses 2 128-bit subkeys giving 14 round keys, plus one additional subkey 
is used at the end. The subkeys are generated via Algorithm 3.1.12. 
3.1.6 RC6 
The RC6 algorithm is fully parameterizable [53], but the version illustrated here is 
known as RC6-32/20/16, meaning that the algorithm operates on 128-bit blocks, uses 
a 128-bit key, and has 20 rounds. RC6 is something of a software-oriented algorithm 
- inclusion of operations like multiplication and addition play to the strengths of 
general-purpose microprocessors, while they prove quite costly to custom hardware 
implementations. RC6 encryption is described in Algorithm 3.1.13. 
54 
Algorithm 3.1.10 SAFER++128 Encryption 
Input: 128-bit input plaintext M. 
Input: 15 128-bit subkeys, k1 to k15 . 
N~M. 
for i = 1 to 7 do 
N ~ (N(15) EB (kzi-1)(15)) & (N(14) + (kzi-1)(14)) & (N(13) + (kzi-1)(13)) 
& (N(12) E8 (kzi-1)(12)) & (N(n) EB (kzi-1)(n)) & (N(lo) + (kzi-l)(lo)) 
& (N(9) + (kzi-1)(9)) & (N(s) CD (kzi-l)(s)) & (N(7) (B (kzi-1)(7); 
& (N(6) + (kzi-1)(6)) & (N(5) + (kzi-1)(5)) & (N(4) 8 (kzi-1)(4) 
& (N(3) EB (kzi-1)(3)) & (N(2) + (kzi-1)(z)) & (N(l) + (kzi-1)(1) 
& (N(o) E8 (kzi-1)(o)) 
N ~ SBOXexp (N(15)) & SBOXza9 (N(14)) & SBOXta9 (N(13)) 
& SBOXexp (N(12)) & SBOXexp (N(n)) & SBOXza9 (N(lo)) 
& SBOXtag (N(9)) & SBOXexp (N(s)) & SBOXexp (N(7)) 
& SBOXza9 (N(6)) & SBOXza9 (N(5)) & SBOXexp (N(4)) 
& SBOXexp (N(3)) & SBOXtag (N(z)) & SBOXtag (N(l)) 
& SBOXexp ( N(o)) 
N ~ (N(15) + (kzi)(15)) & (N(14) EEl (kzi)(14)) & (N(13) EB (kzi)(13)) 
& N(12) + (kzi)(12)) & (N(ll) + (kzi)(ll)) & (N(lo) EB (kzi)(lo)) 
& N(9) E8 (kzi)(9)) & (N(s) + (kzi)(s)) & (N(7) + (kzi)(7)) 
& N(6) EB (kzi)(6)) & (N(5) EEl (kzi)(5)) & (N(4) + (kzi)(4)) 
& N(3) + (kzi-1)(3)) & (N(2) E8 (kzi)(z)) & (N(l) EB (kzi)(l)) 
& (N(o) + (kzi)(o)) 
N ~ N(7) & N(1o) & N(13) & N(o) & N(15) & N(2) & N(5) & N(s) 
& N(n) & N(14) & N(l) & N(4) & N(3) & N(6) & N(9) & N(12) 
N ~ PHT (N(15 ... 1z)) & PHT (N(n ... s)) & 4PHT (N(7 .. .4)) & PHT (N(3 ... o)) 
N ~ N(7) & N(1o) & N(13) & N(o) & N(15) & N(z) & N(5) & N(s) 
& N(ll) & N(14) & N(l) & N(4) & N(3) & N(6) & N(9) & N(lz) 
N ~ PHT (N(15 ... 12)) & PHT (N(ll ... s)) & PHT (N(7 ... 4)) & PHT (N(3 ... o)) 
end for 
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Algorithm 3.1.11 SAFER++12s Decryption 
Input: 128-bit ciphertext C. 
Input: 15 128-bit subkeys, k1 to k15 . 
for i = 7 down to 1 do 
N +--- IPHT (N(15 ... 12)) & IPHT (N(n ... s)) & IPHT (N(7 .. .4)) & IPHT (N(3 ... o)) 
N +--- N(n) & N(6) & N(13) & N(o) & N(7) & N(14) & N(l) & N(5) 
& N(15) & N(2) & N(9) & N(4) & N( 3 ) & N(lo) & N(5) & N(12) 
N +--- IPHT (N(15 ... 12)) & IPHT (N(n ... s)) & IPHT (N(7 .. .4)) & IPHT (N(3 ... o)) 
N +--- N(n) & N(6) & N(13) & N(o) & N(7) & N(14) & N(l) & N(5) 
& N(15) & N(2) & N(9) & N(4) & N(3) & N(1o) & N(5) & N(l2) 
N +--- (N(15)- (k2i)(15)) & (N(14) EB (k2i)(14)) & (N(l3) EB (k2i)u3)) 
& (N(12)- (k2i)(12)) & (N(n)- (k2i)(ll)) & (N(lo) EB (k2i)(Io)) 
& (N(9) EB (k2i)(9)) & (N(s)- (k2i)(s)) & (N(7)- (k2i)(7)) 
& (N(6) EEl (k2i)(6)) & (N(5) EB (k2i)(5)) & (N(4)- (k2i)(4)) 
& (N(3)- (k2i-1)(3)) & (N(2) EB (k2i)(2)) & (N(l) EB (k2i)(l)) 
& (N(o)- (k2i)(o)) 
N +--- SBOXza9 (N(15)) & SBOXexp (N(14)) & SBOXexp (N(13)) 
& SBOXza9 (N(12)) & SBOXza9 (N(n)) & SBOXexp (N(lo)) 
& SBOXexp ( N(9)) & SBOXzo9 ( N(s)) & SBOXza9 ( N(7)) 
& SBOXexp (N(6)) & SBOXexp (N(5)) & SB0Xza9 (N(4)) 
& SBOXza9 (N(3)) & SBOXexp (N(2)) & SBOXexp (N(1)) 
& SBOXza9 ( N(o)) 
N +--- (N(15) EB (k2i-1)(15)) & (N(14)- (k2i-1)(14)) & (N(13)- (k2i-1)(13)) 
& N(12) EB (k2i-1)(12)) & (N(n) EB (k2i-d(u)) & (N(lo)- (k2i-l)(Io)) 
& N(9)- (kzi-1)(9) & 1N(s) EB (kzi-l)(s)l & (N(7) EB (kzi-1)(7)) 
& N(6)- (k2i-1)(6) & N(5) - (k2i-1)(5) & (N(4) EB (kzi-1)(4)) 
& N(3) EB (k2i-1)(3) & N(z) - (k2i-1)(2) & (N(l) - (kzi-1)(1)) 
& (N(o) EB (kzi-1)(o) 
end for 
Output: 128-bit plaintext M +--- N 
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Algorithm 3.1.12 SAFER++128 Key Schedule 
Input: 128-bit key K 
Input: 128-bit constants B2 to B15. 
Output: 15 128-bit sub keys k0 to k15. 
Comment: X E, XO be 136-bit (17-byte) variables. 
Comment: Let P be parity byte of K and concatenate: 
XE f.- XO f.- (K & P) 
for i = 1 to 7 do 
Rotate each individual byte of XO 6 bits to the left. 
Let temp f.- bytes 18 - 2i to 3 - 2i mod 17 from XO (allowing wraparound). 
k2i+l f.- temp+ B2i+1 (addition is done byte-by-byte modulo 256) 
Rotate each individual byte of XE 3 bits to the left. 
Let temp f.- bytes 17- 2i to 2- 2i mod 17 from XE (allowing wraparound). 
k2i f.- temp+ B2i (addition is done byte-by-byte modulo 256) 
end for 
Algorithm 3.1.13 RC6 Encryption 
Input: 128-bit input plaintext M. 
Input: 44 32-bit round keys So ... S43 . 
Comment: Let W, X, Y, Z be 32-bit variables. 
Comment: Lett, u be temporary 32-bit variables. 
W f.- M(15 ... 12) 
X f.- M(ll...S) 
Y f.- M(7 .. .4) 
z f.- M(3 ... o) 
X f.- X +So 
z f.- z + s1 
for i = 1 to 20 do 
t f.- (X X ( 2X + 1)) < < < 5 
u f.- (Z X (2Z + 1)) <<< 5 
W f.- ((WEB t) <<< u) + S2i 
Y f.- ((Y EB u) <<< t) + S2i+l 
(W, X, Y, Z) f.- (X, Y, Z, W) 
end for 
w f.- w +S42 
y f.- y + s43 
Output: 128-bit ciphertext C f.- W & X & Y & Z 
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RC6 decryption, shown in Algorithm 3.1.14, is similar to encryption, but not 
identical. 
Algorithm 3.1.14 RC6 Decryption 
Input: 128-bit ciphertext C. 
Input 44 32-bit round keys S0 ... S43 . 
Comment: Let W, X, Y, Z be 32-bit variables. 
Comment: Lett, u be temporary 32-bit variables. 
w *- c(15 ... 12) 
x *- c(u ... s) 
Y *- c(7 ... 4) 
z *- c(3 ... o) 
Y *- Y- s43 
w *- w- S42 
for i = 20 down to 1 do 
(W, X, Y, Z) *- (Z, W, X, Y) 
u *- (Z X (2Z + 1)) <<< 5 
t *- (X X ( 2X + 1)) < < < 5 
Y *- ((Y- S2i+l) >>> t) EB u 
W *- ((W- S2i) >>> u) EB y 
end for 
z *- z- s1 
X*- X- So 
Output: 128-bit plaintext M *- W & X & Y & Z 
The large number of round keys are generated by a rather involved key schedule, 
shown in Algorithm 3.1.15. 
3.1.7 SHA-1 
The secure hash algorithm SHA-1 is a NIST standard [52] derived from the older 
MD4 and MD5 algorithms [3]. There are other standardized variations as well, such 
as SHA-384 and SHA-512, but this analysis focuses on basic SHA-1. 
SHA-1 uses word-oriented operations- that is, it works on input data in groups 
of 32 bits. It takes an arbitrary length message (so long as the length is < 264 - 1) in 
512-bit blocks and produces a final 160-bit hash value. Should the message size not 
be a multiple of 512 bits, it is padded according to a scheme described in [52] and [2]. 
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Algorithm 3.1.15 RC6 Key Schedule 
Input: 128-bit key K. 
Output: 44 32-bit round keys S0 ... S43 . 
Lo +- K(l5 ... 12) 
£1 +- K(n ... s) 
L2 +- K(7 ... 4) 
£3 +- K(3 ... o) 
S0 +- b7e15163 
for k = 1 down to 43 do 
sk +- sk-l + 9e3779b9 
end for 
A+-B+-j+-i+-0 
for s = 1 to 132 do 
A+- Si +- (Si +A+ B)<<< 3 
B +- Lj +- (Lj +A+ B)<<< (A+ B) 
i +- (i + 1)mod44 
j +- (j + 1)mod4 
end for 
Each block is processed in sequence, the result of the hash function's operation on 
earlier blocks being incorporated into the processing of later blocks. This is shown in 
Algorithm 3.1.16, which is similar to the description in [2]. 
SHACAL 
SHACAL is something of a unique algorithm in that it is an encryption algorithm 
based on the hash function SHA-1 [55]. It makes use of the fact that the compression 
function of SHA-1 (the function that is iterated 80 times) is invertible. Thus, SHA-1 
can be used for encryption if a secret key is input to the algorithm as the message, 
the plaintext is used as the initial value, and the final addition with the initial values 
is skipped [55]. Thus, SHACAL is a block cipher that has a 160-bit block and a key 
size of up to 512 bits. 
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Algorithm 3.1.16 SHA-1 Hash Function 
Input: properly padded message y = M1 & M2 & ... & Mn, where each Mi is a 
512-bit block. 
Comment: Let A, B, C, D, E be 32-bit variables. 
Comment: Let H0 <--- 67452301, H1 <--- EFCDAB89, H2 <--- 98BADCFE, 
H3 <--- 10325476, H4 <--- C3D2E1FO 
for i = 1 to n do 
Comment: Let Mi be defined as a concatenation of 16 32-bit words, 
Mi = Wo & W1 & . . . & W15 
for t = 16 to 79 do 
Comment: Create additional words for subsequent use, 
Wt <--- (Wt-3 EEl Wt-s EEl Wt-14 EEl Wt-16) < < < 1 
end for 
A<--- Ho, B <--- H1, C <--- H2, D <--- H3, E <--- H4 
for t = 0 to 79 do 
if 0 ~ t ~ 19 then 
Comment: Let K = 5A827999. 
temp<--- (A<<< 5) + ((B 1\ C) V ((•B) 1\ D))+ E + Wt + K 
else if 20 ~ t ~ 39 then 
Comment: Let K = 6ED9EBAl. 
temp<--- (A<<< 5) + (B EB C EEl D)+ E + Wt + K 
else if 40 ~ t ~ 59 then 
Comment: Let K = 8F1BBCDC. 
temp<--- (A<<< 5) + ((B 1\ C) V (B 1\ D) V (C 1\ D))+ E + wt + K 
else if 60 ~ t ~ 79 then 
Comment: Let K = CA62C1D6. 
temp <--- (A < < < 5) + ( B EB C EEl D) + E + Wt + K 
end if 
E<-D 
D<-C 
C <--- B <<< 30 
B<-A 
A<--- temp 
end for 
Ho <--- Ho +A, H1 <--- H1 + B, H2 <--- H2 + C, 
H3 <--- H3 + D, H4 <--- H4 + E 
end for 
Output: 160-bit hash value HASH <--- H0 & H1 & H2 & H3 & H4 
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3.2 Algorithm Analysis 
A cursory examination of the preceding algorithms indicates a few common traits 
characteristic to block ciphers and hash functions. Chief among these similarities 
is the fact that all of the algorithms are round-oriented, iterating through the same 
structure multiple times to improve security. This type of iterative behaviour is 
present in most (if not all) block ciphers not included in this study as well, and is an 
important aspect on which to build. Within each round, the operations are usually 
sequential, occurring in a distinct order. This, too, can be exploited. 
All of the modern block ciphers operate on 128-bit blocks, with the legacy cipher 
DES the only one operating on 64-bit blocks. The hash function SHA-1 operates 
on 512-bit blocks and produces 160-bit output hash values, although its predecessors 
MD4 and MD5 produce 128-bit hash values. Thus, a standard block size of 128 bits 
seems to be a reasonable choice. 
The specifics of each algorithm under consideration are drastically different. Each 
algorithm was analyzed to identify the basic primitive operations on which it is built, 
noting the type of operation, size and type of operands, and frequency of occur-
rence. Any operations with special implementation techniques, such as the 4-PHT 
in SAFER++128 [54] were interpreted in terms of their implementation details. The 
results of this analysis are shown in Table 3.1. The values in this table are for the 
whole algorithm, not just a single round. 
As can be seen in Table 3.1, there is only a relatively small set of operations used 
in these widely varying algorithms. This suggests that a reconfigurable cryptographic 
hardware module is feasible, since it need only support this set of operations. How-
ever, it should be noted that the different algorithms have different operand sizes in 
some cases, so this needs to be accounted for in any reconfigurable design. 
• All of the algorithms studies use bitwise Boolean operations, usually the 
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AES Camellia RC6 SAFER++12s SHA-1 DES 
(10-round) (18-round) (20-round) (7-round) (80-round) (16-round) 
XOR Bit Size 128 128, 64, 32 32 8 32 48, 32 
# ops. 11 2, 36, 8 40 112 272 16, 16 
AND Bit Size 32 32 
# ops. 4 100 
OR Bit Size 32 32 
# ops. 4 60 
NOT Bit Size 32 
# ops. 20 
Rotation/ Bit Size 32 32 32 
Shift # ops. 4 120 160 
Addition/ Bit Size 32 8 32 
Subtraction # ops. 84 448 325 
Multiplication Bit Size 32 
# ops. 40 
S-boxes/ Bit Size 8x8 8x8 8x8 6x4 
LUTs # ops. 160 144 112 128 
Byte Bit Size 16-byte 16-byte 16-byte 16-byte 20-byte 8-byte 
Permutations # ops. 10 18 20 14 80 16 
Bit Bit Size 64, 32 
Permutations # ops. 2, 16 
Linear Bit Size 32 64 
Transformation # ops. 36 18 
Bit Bit Size 32-to-48 
Expansion # ops. 16 
Table 3.1: Basic Operations of Block Ciphers and Hash Functions 
exclusive-or (XOR), but some also using AND, OR, and NOT. Operand sizes 
range from 8 bits to 128 bits. 
• Several algorithms use rotations, which are usually called circular shifts. In all 
cases, the shifts work on 32 bits at a time. 
• Addition or subtraction modulo 2n where n is the bit size of the operands is 
also common. In most instances, the operands are 32-bit, but 8-bit operands 
are also used. 
• Multiplication is only present in RC6, in the form of 32-bit x 32-bit multipli-
cation modulo 232 . 
• Substitutions in the form of S-boxes are also common, appearing mostly as 8-
bit x 8-bit substitutions. These substitutions are also frequently referred to as 
LUTs. 
• Permutation of data bytes is also common, although often it is 32-bit words 
that are reordered, not the bytes directly. This operation is something of a data 
routing issue, and will be considered as such. 
• Bitwise permutations of the data appear only in DES, since it is an inefficient 
operation for software. Nevertheless, it must be considered. 
• Linear transformations such as the MixColumns() operation in AES [17] or 
the P() function in Camellia [16] are becoming more common in modern block 
ciphers. In these operations, each output bit is produced from the XOR of a 
subset of the input bits. 
• DES also uses bitwise expansions, taking a 32-bit string and expanding it to a 
48-bit string by duplicating certain bit values. 
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To support the algorithms considered in this study, a reconfigurable cryptographic 
hardware module would have to support all of the above operations. 
3.3 Summary of Algorithm Analysis 
This chapter has detailed the analysis of a number of cryptographic algorithms. This 
analysis identified a small number of core operations necessary to implement the 
algorithms under consideration. These basic operations included bitwise Boolean op-
erations, rotations and shifts, addition and subtraction, multiplication, substitutions 
and permutations, and linear transformations. These operations form the basis of the 
system designed in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 4 
Component Implementation 
Having identified the set of operations desired in a flexible cryptographic hardware 
module, it was then necessary to design hardware components to implement these 
operations. Since the most common block size of the studied algorithms was 128 bits, 
that size will be used as the input size to the hardware components. Some components 
such as Boolean operations, addition/subtraction, multiplication, and shifting will 
have two 128-bit inputs, whereas other components such as the substitutions and 
linear transforms will have only a single 128-bit input. 
The algorithm survey also showed that the Boolean operations, addition/subtrac-
tion, and LUTs all operated on 8-bit operands at some point. Thus, it was decided 
to make those components configurable and usable at the byte-level, and if larger 
operand sizes are needed, they must be accommodated by combining byte-level op-
erations. Thus, component of this type will have 16 8-bit operations available, which 
can be combined to allow processing of larger operands. 
Multiplication, shifting/rotation, linear transformations, bit permutations, and 
bit expansions all operate on 32-bit or larger operands. Thus, these components will 
be configurable and usable at the word-level, providing 4 32-bit operations which can 
be combined to allow processing of larger operands. 
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Configuration of the components is accomplished via control signals. Setting val-
ues on the control lines will set a particular configuration of the component. Discus-
sion of the source of those values can be found in Section 4.3. The components must 
also be able to be disabled or bypassed, since not every component will be used in 
every algorithm implementation. 
4.1 Basic Operational Components 
There are s1x basic components which can be implemented to provide all of the 
functionality specified in the algorithm survey. 
• The Boolean component handles XOR, AND, OR, and NOT operations. 
• The Shifter component handles shifts and rotations. 
• The Add/Sub component handles addition and subtraction. 
• The Multiplier component handles multiplication. 
• The LUT component handles substitutions/S-boxes. 
• The XORnet component handles bit permutations, bit expansions, and linear 
transformations. 
Note that byte permutations are considered to be a part of data routing, and are 
discussed in Section 4.2.2. 
The following sections discuss each of the components in detail. 
4.1.1 Boolean Logic Component 
The basic Boolean operations- XOR, AND, OR, and NOT- are trivial to implement 
in hardware, as they are the basic gates on which most hardware is built. However, 
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it is desirable to have a Boolean component that can be configured for any of the 
four specified operations. This can be achieved by using a 4-to-1 multiplexer to select 
which operation is desired, as shown in Figure 4.1. There is also a 2-to-1 multiplexer 
shown to allow all the Boolean logic to be bypassed if desired. The values of the 
control signals to the multiplexers are part of the component's configuration. 
A 
B 
A 
Inputs/outputs 
are all 8-bit. 
Contro lines from 
configuration data. 
Figure 4.1: 8-bit Boolean Logic Component 
Since they are always used as bitwise operations, the Boolean operations scale 
easily- two 8-bit XORs in parallel are equivalent to a 16-bit XOR. Note that when 
referring to an n-bit Boolean operation, it is implicitly understood that it means n 
2-input gates in parallel. Thus 16 8-bit operations in parallel will be sufficient to 
meet the needs specified by the algorithm analysis and earlier in this chapter, and 
this is shown in Figure 4.2. Note that the control lines for all 16 are separate, so each 
byte can be configured for a different operation. Thus the overall component takes 
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A input byte 15 
A input byte 14 
A input byte 13 
A input byte 1 
A input byte 0 
Inputs/outputs 
are all 8-bit. 
Output byte 15 
Output byte 14 
Output byte 13 
-~ 
• 
• 
Note: Control lines come 
from configuration data . 
Output byte 1 
Output byte 0 
Figure 4.2: Full Boolean Logic Component 
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two 16-byte inputs and produces one 16-byte output which is the result of each byte 
being subjected to a bitwise Boolean operation. 
A sample of the VHDL code implementing the core Boolean logic component 
described here can be found in Appendix A, Section A.1, on page 196. 
4.1.2 Shifter Component 
The shifter component is built around a 32-bit rotation/shift component that can be 
configured either for rotation (circular shift) or shifting operation, as well as shift /ro-
tate left or right. All shifts are logical - that is, they shift in 0 values. The control 
signals of the shifter are provided by the configuration, but the amount of the shift/ro-
tation is controlled by a 5-bit input that comes from the datapath. 
The 32-bit rotation/shift takes place in a single clock cycle because it is imple-
mented as a series of layers of multiplexers, as shown in Figure 4.3. Each layer's 
multiplexers are controlled by a single bit of the 5-bit shift amount. If the controlling 
bit is 0, no shift occurs. If the controlling bit is 1, a shift occurs of size 2n where n 
is the bit position of the controlling bit: the most significant bit of the amount is in 
position 4, the least significant is in position 0. 
data in 
(32-blt) 
amount(4) 
amount(4) 
amount(3) amount(2) amount(1) 
amount(3) amount(2) amount(1) 
Figure 4.3: 32-bit Shift/Rotate Component 
amount(O) 
amount(O) right/ 
leftb 
Four such 32-bit shifter components are used in parallel to service a 128-bit data-
path block. This can be seen in Figure 4.4. Thus, the overall component takes 4 
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32-bit data input and 4 5-bit shift amounts and produces 4 32-bit outputs. Note that 
bypass functionality is also included. 
8(127 .. 96) bypass_b 
8(95 .. 64) bypass_b 
8(63 .. 32) bypass_b 
8(31 .. 0) bypass_b 
Control signals come 
from configuration register. 
Figure 4.4: Full Shift/Rotate Component 
This general shifter architecture is generalizable. Ann-bit shifter requires log2 (n) 
layers of multiplexers for shifting (in each shift direction), plus an extra multiplexer 
to select direction. If we consider each 1-bit 2-to-1 multiplexer to be 3 gates, then, 
accounting for the multiplexers and the necessary AND gates, the implementation of 
ann-bit bidirectional rotation/shift-in-0 unit requires 6nlog2 (n) + 5n- 2 gates and 
log2 ( n) + 2 memory elements to store control data. 
A barrel shifter could also be used for the shifter component. This would have the 
added benefit of supporting general bitwise permutations, but would require a signif-
icantly larger number of control bits. However, since bitwise permutations are now 
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rarely used in modern algorithms, and because they can be implemented by another 
basic component, it was decided to use the shifter described above for the prototype 
proof-of-concept implementation. Future revisions to this design may incorporate a 
barrel shifter into the system in order to benefit from its greater functionality. 
Sample VHDL code used in implementing the core shifter component described 
here can be found in Appendix A, Section A.2, starting on page 197. 
4.1.3 Add/Subtract Component 
This component proved most difficult to design even though addition and subtrac-
tion are well-studied algorithms, since a variety of operand sizes was required. The 
natural inclination to use adders of the largest size needed - which can naturally per-
form smaller additions - was problematic due to the quantity of additions required. 
SAFER++128 [54] requires over 400 8-bit additions, and providing that many 32-bit 
adders (which is the size required by RC6 [53]) would be prohibitive. 
Thus, the add/subtract component must be designed around fast 8-bit adders 
(which can also be used to perform 2's complement subtraction). The basic 8-bit 
adders can be cascaded together to form larger adders. Whether the adders are 
cascaded or not is determined by the values of control lines from the configuration. 
Thus each 8-bit adder component can be configured for addition or subtraction, and 
cascaded or not cascaded, which affects how the carry-in to each adder is handled. 
This setup is illustrated in Figure 4.5. Note that the specific implementation of the 
adder circuit is unimportant, and can be left to the synthesis tool. If the synthesis 
timing constraints are aggressive enough, it will likely be synthesized as a Carry 
Look-Ahead Adder (CLA). 
It would seem natural to directly cascade these blocks together to allow larger 
operand sizes, but the structure of SAFER++128 requires additions in sequence to 
compute the 4-PHT [54]. That is, the output of one 8-bit adder is the input to the 
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connect--~--------~ 
add_subb -+----r--, 
CIN -+-----+---! 
Fast 8-bit 
Adder 
CIN 
SUM 
A-~----+-----~ A 
SUM 
s: 
B COUTt-----7---:-c-=-ouT 
Figure 4.5: 8-bit Add/Subtract Block 
next. Rather than require the use of multiple add/subtract components to support 
this, a further architectural change can be made. A multiplexer can be placed on the 
input of each adder in the cascade sequence after the first, which selects one of the 
adder inputs between the current data input and the outputs of the preceding adder. 
Note that this requires multiplexers of increasing size the further down the cascade 
it is placed. This scheme is illustrated in Figure 4.6. A maximum of 8 adders can 
be cascaded together, as shown. Note that the control signals to each of the 8-bit 
adders and to the various multiplexers are not shown in the figure, but are driven by 
the configuration data register. 
The add/subtract component consists of 16 8-bit adders (to process a 128-bit 
block), arranged in two banks of 8 adders each. The adders in each bank may be 
cascaded together to form up to one 64-bit adder, two 32-bit adders, and so on. Fur-
thermore, in each adder bank, every adder after the first can either use the datapath 
input as one of its inputs, or else use the output of any preceding adder in the same 
bank. Subtraction is configured in the same way. This overall system can be seen 
in Figure 4. 7. Note that each individual byte out output from the adders can be 
72 
I M CIN SUMO 
A SUM 
+ 
Bi)SCOUT ~)~IN A1 SUM1 A SUM 
+ 
81 SCOUT )I A2 CIN SUM2 '--- A +UIVI 
82 SCOUT -
• • • 
• SUMO 
• SUM1 
• 
SUM2 
SUM3 
SUM4 
SUMS 
A7 SUM6 
87 
Figure 4.6: One Add/Subtract Bank 
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bypassed using a layer of multiplexers at the output. 
A(12 7 .. 64) 
Adder Bank 
(eight 8-bit 
8(12 7 .. 64) adders) 
A(63 .. 0) 
Adder Bank 
(eight 8-bit 
8(63 .. 0) adders) 
Control and conf1gurat1on s1gnals come 
from the configuration register. 
SUM(127 .. 64) 
SUM(63 .. 0) 
~ SUM Byte 15 SUM Byte 14 
• 
• 
• 
SUM Byte 8 
~ B Byte 15 
B Byte 8 
~ SUM Byte 7 SUM Byte 6 
• 
• 
• 
SUM Byte 0 
~ B Byte 7 
• 
• 
• 
B Byte 0 
Figure 4. 7: Core Add/Subtract Component 
SUMB~ 
B Byte 15 O 
bypass_b15 
SUMB~ 
B Byte 14 O 
bypass_b14 
• 
• 
• 
SUMB~ 
B Byte 0 O 
bypass_bO 
Sample VHDL code used in implementing the 8-bit add/subtract component and 
the 64-bit adder bank described here can be found in Appendix A, Section A.3, 
starting on page 198. 
4.1.4 Multiplier Component 
Of the algorithms considered, only RC6 [53] uses multiplication. However, since 
it is a fairly fundamental operation, it is conjectured that new algorithms might 
also incorporate multiplication, and so a multiplier component is included despite its 
current limited use. 
The basic operation is 32-bit x 32-bit multiplication modulo 232 , meaning that 
the output is only 32 bits, not 64. Multiplication is a costly component to implement, 
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especially when required to compute the product in a single clock cycle. Thus, a 32-
bit Wallace tree multiplier was used since it provides a good balance between speed 
and complexity, and, as shown in [57], more than half of its hardware complexity can 
be removed since the operation is modulo 232 . 
Wallace tree multiplication works by using 32-bit Carry-Save Adders (CSAs) to 
add the partial products of the multiplicand and multiplier through a tree of CSAs 
until there are only two values are left, which are then added normally [58, 59] (modulo 
232 for RC6). CSAs are much like Carry-Ripple Adders (CRAs) except that, rather 
than connecting the carries from one full adder to the next, the carry is sent directly 
to the output [58]. Thus, a 32-bit CSA has 3 32-bit inputs (say a, b and carry-in 
vector) and 2 32-bit outputs (sum and carry-out vectors). This allows all the full 
adders to process the input in parallel and improve speed, rather than waiting for the 
carry to ripple. In the Wallace tree multiplier, the carry values eventually get added 
in by a later layer of CSAs. 
The structure of the Wallace tree used in this multiplier component is shown in 
Figure 4.8. It takes two 32-bit inputs and produces one 32-bit output. 
The partial products for the multiplication Ax B are generated as shown in Figure 
4.9. Note that in this figure, the boxes labeled "A<< N" (where N is some number) 
represent a left shift-in-0 operation. The partial products are the result of a logical 
AND of these shifted versions of the multiplicand A and the corresponding bits in 
the multiplier B (that is, each of the 32 bits of the shifted A value are ANDed with 
the same bit of B). Only the least significant 32 partial products are generated since 
this is an implementation of modulo 232 multiplication. 
Four such multipliers are used in parallel to allow processing of a 128-bit block. 
This structure is shown in Figure 4.10. Note that the bypass functionality is still 
provided, albeit at the word-level. This overall component takes two 4-word inputs 
and produces a single 4-word output, where each output word is the product of the 
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'1"'"0 
MM 
Q. Q. ••• 
Q.Q. 
32-bit Partial Product Inputs 
+ Fast 32-bit adder 
32-bit Product 
Figure 4.8: 32-bit x 32-bit Wallace Tree Multiplier 
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••• Q.Q.Q. 
Q.Q.Q. 
A 
32 32 
A 
••• 
A 
••• 
• •• 
Figure 4.9: Partial Product Generation 
corresponding two input words (modulo 232 ). 
4.1.5 LUT Component 
A A 
32 
This component performs substitution operations. While many modern algorithms 
may define their substitutions mathematically as Boolean functions, in the general 
case it is easiest to implement such substitutions (or 8-boxes) as a look-up table 
(LUT). For our LUT component, an array of sixteen 8 x 8 LUTs is used, which is 
sufficient for any of the algorithms under consideration. Each LUT takes an 8-bit 
input and produces the corresponding 8-bit substitution value as output. 
Normally, LUTs would be implemented as memory. The standard forms of mem-
ory produced by memory compiler tools introduce a degree of latency - for example, 
one clock cycle may be required to latch and decode the memory address, and an-
other clock cycle to fetch the data from memory. To avoid this latency, the L UTs have 
been implemented as banks of flip-flops which are selected via a large multiplexer. 
The input data controls the multiplexer, which selects 8 bits of output data from the 
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A(127 .. 96) 
32-bit 
Wallace 1------~ OUT(127 .. 96) 
Tree 
.;....;..;;.;~~ Multiplier 
A(95 .. 64 
32-bit 
bypass_b 
Wallace 1------~ OUT(95 .. 64) 
8(95 .. 64) Tree Multiplier 
32-bit 
bypass_b 
Wallace 1------~ 
Tree 
~..;;-=..~ Multiplier 
A(31 .. 0 
32-bit 
bypass_b 
Wallace 1------~ 
Tree 
".....:....:..:-T-1-~ Multiplier 
bypass_b 
Control signals come 
from configuration register. 
Figure 4.10: Full Multiplier Component 
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flip-flops. This scheme is highly inefficient in terms of area, but is sufficient for proto-
typing purposes. The substitution values are stored in the flip-flops, which allows the 
component to be configured to support the different S-boxes required by the various 
different algorithms. The currently implemented form of the LUT is shown in Figure 
4.11. 
8-bit Registers 8 ~ 7 0 15 8 / 
23 16 / 2 
• • ~: 
• • Substitution • • Value Out 
32759 327521--r/-----!254 
1---------1 
._3_27_67 __ 3_27_6_,0 / ~ 
8 
Data In 
Figure 4.11: Single 8 x 8 L UT 
As stated above, each LUT has an 8-bit input which therefore allows it to select 
one of 256 possible 8-bit outputs. This means that a single LUT stores a total of 
256 x 8 = 2048 bits. Thus, the overall LUT component stores 16 times this amount, 
which is 32768 bits or 4 kB. That is a significant amount of data, which must be 
set by the configuration. Having 32768 control lines available to set the flip-flops of 
the LUT would be infeasible, so instead the data is shifted in to the flip-flops one 
bit at a time during configuration. In essence, the registers of the LUT components 
are configuration registers, and are part of the configuration chain. This is discussed 
more completely in Section 4.3. 
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The overall representation of the component is shown in Figure 4.12. Note that 
there is only one data input, and that multiplexers can be used to bypass each LUT. 
Input byte 15 8x8 
LUT t------1 
bypass_b15 
Input byte 14 8x8 t------1 
LUT 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
Input byte 0 I ~~~ I ~o Output byte 0 I ·~ 
bypass_bO 
Bypass control data comes from configuration. 
Figure 4.12: Core LUT Component 
4.1.6 XORnet Component 
The final component, called the XORnet, is perhaps the most general of all the 
components in the system. It serves to implement a variety of operations, such as the 
Galois field multiplication by a constant (the MixColumns() operation of AES [17]), 
bitwise permutations and bit expansions in DES [43], and other bitwise manipulations 
and linear transformations (such as Camellia's P() function [16]). 
The XORnet component operates such that each output bit is generated from the 
XOR of any number of the input bits. The logic to generate a single output bit is 
a tree of 2-input XOR gates, with an initial layer of AND gates to allow selection of 
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the desired inputs. This is shown in Figure 4.13. The structure is simply repeated in 
parallel to produce the output for each desired output bit, so a 32-bit XORnet would 
repeat the structure in Figure 4.13 32 times. 
• • • 
Figure 4.13: Logic to generate single output bit for XORnet. 
It is shown in [60] that multiplication by a constant in a Galois field can be 
implemented in the above fashion. Such operation also mirrors the definition of 
Camellia's P() function [16]. With respect to bitwise permutations and expansions, 
it is trivial to see that the XORnet can implement these by having the output bits 
consist of the XOR of only the desired input bit to be permuted/expanded to that 
output. Likewise, the XORnet can also implement fixed shifts and rotations, though 
such operations are more efficiently done in the shifter component. 
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The maJor difficulty introduced by this component is that it requires a large 
amount of configuration data (the enable signals seen in Figure 4.13) - each output 
bit requires a number of configuration bits equal to the number of input bits to allow 
potential selection of any of the inputs. Thus, the memory requirement for storing 
configuration data for the XORnet becomes a major problem -- a 32-bit XORnet 
(which has a 32-bit input and 32-bit output) requires 1024 bits of configuration data. 
The hardware cost of the XORnet, in terms of gate count and memory bits, is 
quite easy to quantify. An n-bit XORnet requires n x (2n - 1) gates and n 2 bits of 
memory. Thus, a 32-bit XORnet (the minimum size we need) requires 2016 gates and 
1024 bits of control data, and a 64-bit XORnet requires 8128 gates and 4096 bits of 
control data. 
Several approaches involving implementing larger XORnets out of smaller ones 
were tried. For example, an 8-bit XORnet can be implemented as a monolithic block, 
or else it can be implemented from 4 4-bit XORnets. This is illustrated in Figure 
4.14. The inputs to the smaller XORnets must be set appropriately, and the outputs 
of each group of XORnets XORed together, but it is feasible. 
It was found that the gate count and memory requirements for, say, a 32-bit 
XORnet implemented out of 8-bit XORnets were exactly the same (note that the 
32-bit XORnet requires 16 8-bit XORnets to implement it). Thus, neither monolithic 
nor compartmentalized designs give any size advantage. However, implementing large 
XORnets out of smaller ones gives the bonus of greater flexibility- with a monolithic 
32-bit XORnet, 4 8-bit XORnets can be emulated, but with the compartmentalized 
design, in which the 32-bit XORnet is realized from 16 8-bit XORnets, there are 
4 times as many 8-bit XORnets available. The only added hardware cost to this 
approach is the addition of some extra control logic. 
AES requires 32-bit XORnets [17], whereas Camellia requires a 64-bit XORnet 
[16]. DES requires at most a 64-bit XORnet. Thus, it makes the most sense to base 
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. . . 
. . . . 
4-bit 
ENi,j_3 XORnet 
4-bit 
ENi,j_2 XORnet 
4-bit 
ENi,j_1 XORnet 
4-bit 
ENi,j_O XORnet 
. . . . 
. . . 
. . . . 
8 
.... 
. . . . . 
. . . . . 
. ... 
. .... 
. ... 
Figure 4.14: Building an 8-bit XORnet from 4 4-bit XORnets. 
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. .... 
the implementation of the component around 32-bit XORnets. 
The XORnet component consists of 4 32-bit XORnets in parallel. To meet the 
requirements of Camellia and DES, the option of combining the 4 32-bit XORnets 
into a single 64-bit XORnet exists by repeating the 64-bit input across the second two 
XORnets and then running the outputs of all four through an XOR tree to produce a 
single 64-bit output. This overall arrangement is shown in Figure 4.15. The XORnet 
is a unary operation, so there is only one 4-word input that produces a 4-word output. 
Note that the bypass multiplexers operate at the word-level, as well. 
........ ·················· 
Mode Control Multiplexers 
\ 
32-bit 
XORnet 
32-bit 
XORnet 
IN(63_ .. 3_2.c.e) --+---1 32-bit 
XORnet 
IN(31-'-' ..0::..!.)_-4----l 32-bit 
XORnet 
Configuration and control signals not shown. 
\ 
OUT(127 .. 96) 
OUT(63 .. 32) 
OUT(31..0) 
IN(31 .. 0) 
Bypass 
Multiplexers 
Figure 4.15: Core XORnet Component 
4.2 Data Routing and Selection 
With the basic operational components designed, it is necessary to consider data 
routing to those components. While the general form of data processing in block 
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ciphers and hash functions is sequential, not all data is necessarily processed at the 
same time. For example, in DES [43] and Camellia [16], which are Feistel ciphers, 
half of the input data is processed and used to update the other half, while that half 
is swapped into a new position. Thus, it is necessary to have some sort of temporary 
data storage, to allow input data to be held until needed. 
Rather than use an actual memory element, which would require complex ad-
dressing and decoding, the concept of the scratch path is introduced (named after 
a scratch pad of paper often used to hold temporary workings). It is a set of data 
lines parallel to the datapath, onto which the datapath values may be switched. The 
scratch path bypasses all computational components completely. When the values 
on the scratch path are needed, they can be switched back into the datapath on a 
byte-by-byte basis. 
Also, the basic operations often need input other than the data being enciphered. 
For example, almost every block cipher mixes a round key with the data being enci-
phered via an XOR operation. Thus, data from two different sources (data path and 
key) must be routed to the inputs of a Boolean component. Similarly, several algo-
rithms use shifts by a constant value. Since the Shifter component has an input to 
allow control of the shift amount, it is clearly necessary for the constant value (stores 
in some configuration memory) to be routed to the shifter control inputs. These are 
only two simple examples of how data other than message data may be used by the 
basic components. Thus, there needs to be a way to switch key data and constant 
data onto the datapath as well so that the components can operate on data from 
these different sources. All of this functionality is encapsulated in the input switch. 
4.2.1 Input Switch 
The input switch is designed to switch the needed data into the operational compo-
nent and scratch path. An instance of this switch is meant to precede each basic 
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component, to allow each to be have its inputs fully configurable. 
The data inputs to the basic operations are selected at the byte level by 4-to-1 
multiplexers, selecting between the current datapath input, the scratch path input, 
a constant value specific to the configuration of the component being switched into, 
and a key value from the key memory (this is discussed further in Section 5.1.2). This 
multiplexer arrangement is shown in Figure 4.16. 
Datapath Byte 8 0 
Scratchpath BY.te 8 1 8 Output Byte A 
Constant Byte 8 2 (to core logic) 
Key Byte 8 
2 
Figure 4.16: Single 8-bit Input Switch Datapath Multiplexer 
The new scratch path values are selected at the byte level by 2-to-1 multiplexers, 
selecting between current datapath inputs and current scratch path inputs. Thus, 
data on the scratch path can be kept there or replaced with new datapath data. The 
scratch multiplexer is shown in Figure 4.17. 
8 
1--T-- Scratch Byte 
Figure 4.17: Single 8-bit Input Switch Scratch Path Multiplexer 
The overall input switch requires 16 8-bit 4-to-1 multiplexers to switch the data 
path, and 16 8-bit 2-to-1 multiplexers to switch the scratch path. Thus, overall, it 
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takes four 128-bit inputs (datapath, scratch path, constant value, and key value) 
and produces two 128-bit outputs ( datapath and scratch path) where each datapath 
output byte is selected between corresponding bytes of the four inputs, and where 
each scratch path output byte is selected between corresponding bytes of the datapath 
and scratch inputs. This is shown in Figure 4.18. Note that the control lines to the 
multiplexers are naturally driven by the configuration data. 
4.2.2 Byte Reordering 
In the algorithm survey, byte permutations were identified as a common operation 
among many of the algorithms. Such an operation can be considered a simple rerout-
ing of data, and as such its implementation is considered here. Note that byte re-
ordering is not just useful for explicit byte permutation operations, but also for when 
portions of the input data need to by processed by other parts of the datapath hard-
ware. 
Byte reordering is implemented using an 8-bit 16-to-1 multiplexer to select which 
byte of the 128-bit input gets switched onto a particular byte of the output. This is 
illustrated in Figure 4.19. 
The overall byte reordering component consists of 16 such multiplexers in parallel, 
as shown in Figure 4.20. Note that this arrangement allows duplication of output 
bytes, since more than one of the multiplexers may select the same input byte to 
switch to the output. That is why this component is referred to as a byte reordering 
component rather than strictly as a byte permutation component. 
This component is meant to be instanced at each of the basic component outputs, 
to allow reordering of the datapath values before data reaches the next input switch. 
The multiplexer control lines are driven by the configuration data. 
A conceptual flaw exists in the design of the byte reordering multiplexer, in that 
the 4-bit control signal for the multiplexer selects the input byte corresponding to 
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Datapath Byte 15 ;: :p 8£:: ) ) Scratch Byte 15 Scratch Out 
Byte 15 
Datapath Byte 14 ;: :p 8£:: ) ) Scratch Byte 14 Scratch Out 
Byte 14 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
Datapath Byte 0 ;: 0 8£:: 7 ) Scratch Byte 0 Scratch Out Byte 0 
Datapath Byte 15 
Scratch Byte 15 8 
Constant Byte 15 Data path 
Key Byte 15 Out Byte 15 
Datapath Byte 14 8 
Scratch Byte 14 8 8 
Constant Byte 14 8 Data path 
Key Byte 14 8 Out Byte 14 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
Datapath Byte 0 
Scratch Byte 0 
Constant Byte 0 Data path 
Key Byte 0 Out Byte 0 
Figure 4.18: Overall Input Switch 
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Byte 0 8 
Byte 1 8 1 
Byte 2 8 2 
Byte 3 8 3 
Byte 4 8 4 
Byte 5 8 5 
Byte 6 8 6 
Byte 7 8 7 8 
Byte 8 8 8 Output 
Byte 9 8 9 Byte 
Byte 10 8 10 
Byte 11 8 11 
Byte 12 8 12 
Byte 13 8 13 
Byte 14 8 14 
Byte 15 8 
Figure 4.19: 8-bit 16-to-1 Multiplexer for Byte Reordering 
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Figure 4.20: Overall Byte Reordering Component 
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its value. That means that, in the default mode, when all configuration values are 
zero, all sixteen of the byte reordering multiplexers will select input byte 0 onto 
their outputs, rather than each multiplexer passing through its corresponding input. 
This negates the desired bypass functionality for the zero configuration. However, 
since there was no logical mapping of the input bytes to the multiplexer ports that 
made sense other than each byte going into its correspondingly-numbered port, it was 
decided to leave the multiplexers as they are and enforce bypass configuration of the 
byte reordering component in the software configuration utility. 
4.3 Configurability 
The fact that each component is configurable has been mentioned frequently. Most 
of the configuration of the components mentioned in preceding sections is the result 
of using multiplexers to select and control routing of data to the components. The 
control lines for these multiplexers are driven by configuration data. 
Also, the L UTs can be configured to hold arbitrary data, and arbitrary constant 
values can be provided to every component for selection by the input switch. These 
kinds of data are part of the configuration data as well. 
Thus, the configuration data for a component is a bit sequence containing control 
signals and data values. All values of the configuration data are needed at all times, 
so storing them in memory is infeasible. Thus, the configuration data must be stored 
in a flip-flop or register. 
The configuration register is a generic construct of n bits, where n is the num-
ber of bits of configuration data required. It is essentially a shift register. Before 
system operation, when the system is in configuration mode, the configuration bits 
are shifted into the system serially, until the entire configuration register is filled. 
Once configuration is complete, the values are held in the register, and are available 
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thereafter unless the system is reset or goes back into configuration mode. 
An example of a configuration register is shown in Figure 4.21. It outputs all of its 
data in parallel, but only loads data serially, on the positive edge of the configuration 
clock signal, and only when the configuration mode control signal is asserted. 
Configuration Data Outputs to Components 
••• 
shift_data_in 
config_enable---.._+----l-----.._+----l-------+-~f----­
config_clk---------1--------~------...._~f----­
rstb -----~>---------~>-------------4>-------
Figure 4.21: General Configuration Register Circuit 
• •• 
The configuration register will be cascadeable, so that the configuration register 
for one component will connect to the next component, and so on, so that the en-
tire system configuration can be viewed as a concatenation of individual component 
configurations. 
Note that the clock signal driving the configuration register is not the same as the 
overall system clock. That is because when in configuration mode, the only relevant 
behaviour or the system is the shifting of configuration data, which can be done at a 
much higher clock rate than regular operation due to the close proximity of flip-flop 
elements. Thus, we can use a faster configuration clock and configure the device more 
quickly. When not in configuration mode, the value is held on the flip-flop output, 
so the disparity between the configuration clock and the system clock is irrelevant. 
This is very similar to the concept of a scan chain for production testing of ASICs. 
Depending on what component is being configured, the configuration register will 
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be of different sizes. In subsequent diagrams, configuration registers will be repre-
sented as shown in Figure 4.22, with the bit size specified. 
shift_data_in 
Configuration Data Outputs 
to Components 
••• 
n-1 n-2 n-3 1 0 
n-bit Configuration Register 
rstb config_clk config_enable 
shift_data_out 
Figure 4.22: Configuration Register Block Diagram 
Sample VHDL code implementing a 256-bit configuration register can be found 
m Appendix A, Section A.4, on page 199. Other configuration register sizes are 
discussed in the following section. 
Note that the flip-flops in the LUT component implementation are connected 
to each other like a configuration register. Thus, the LUT component acts as its 
own configuration register, and the LUT data is shifted in as part of the system 
configuration. 
4.4 Basic Operational Building Block 
As mentioned in preceding sections, the input switch is meant to be instanced before 
every computational component, and the byte reordering after. It makes sense, then, 
to group the input switch, specific component, byte reordering, and their correspond-
ing configuration register into a SLAB. This will make higher level system design 
much easier. 
Naturally, there will be six different SLABs, one for each basic component. Thus, 
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each SLAB will have a different size of configuration register. For the Boolean, Add/-
Sub, Shifter, and Multiplier SLABs, the general structure will be as shown in Figure 
4.23. Note that any bit signal not labeled is assumed to be 128 bits, and clock, reset, 
and enable signals are not shown. 
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Figure 4.23: Binary Operation SLAB 
The SLAB has two primary 128-bit inputs ( datapath and scratch data) plus con-
figuration register I/0 and a 128-bit key input, and two 128-bit outputs (again, 
datapath and scratch data). Internally, note that the input switch takes four 128-bit 
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inputs (data path, scratch path, constant data from the configuration register, and 
key data) plus control signals from the configuration register, and it generates two 
128-bit outputs, the scratch output (which goes directly to the SLAB scratch output) 
and the data output (which feeds into the primary input of the core operation). 
The second input to the core operation is directly connected from the datapath 
input of the SLAB. Thus, only one of the two operands of these operations is switched 
by the input switch. This still allows sufficient flexibility to meet the design require-
ments. 
The core operations have two 128-bit inputs plus control signal inputs driven by 
the configuration register. Details of these core operations have been discussed in 
prior sections. The core operation produces a single 128-bit output which is fed into 
the byte reordering component (which is controlled by the configuration register). 
The 128-bit output of the byte reordering component is connected directly to the 
SLAB output. 
The LUT and XORnet SLABs are slightly different in that they are unary op-
erations, only having a single 128-bit input. Thus, there is no second input to the 
core operation, and so the only input is fully switched by the input switch. This 
arrangement is shown in Figure 4.24. Note that any bit signal not labeled is assumed 
to be 128 bits, and clock, reset, and enable signals are not shown. 
4.5 Configuration Formats of Basic SLABs 
Each of the basic SLABs will have different sizes of configuration register since each 
operation works different. However, there are some commonalities. 
It was previously mentioned that each component has a constant value associated 
with it, that is selected by the input switch. This 128-bit constant value is stored 
in the configuration register as the 128 Most Significant Bits (MSBs). Immediately 
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Figure 4.24: Unary Operation SLAB 
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after the constant value, the 48 control bits for the input switch are stored. After the 
input switch control bits, the 64 control bits for the byte reordering are stored. Then, 
finally, the specific control bits for the core component are stored. Thus, the 240 
MSBs of each configuration register hold the same function, whereas the remaining 
Least Significant Bits (LSBs) vary according to the specific operation. 
4.5.1 Boolean SLAB 
The Boolean SLAB configuration register is 288 bits in size, meaning the 48 LSBs 
control the core Boolean component. Those bits are split into 16 groups of three, 
the groups corresponding to each of the 16 byte-operations. Two of the 3 bits in 
each group select the operation; the third bit controls bypass. This format is more 
accurately described in Appendix B, Section B.1 on page 200. 
4.5.2 Shifter SLAB 
The Shifter SLAB configuration register is 252 bits in size, meaning the 12 LSBs 
control the core Shifter component. Those bits are split into 4 groups of 3 bits each, 
the groups corresponding to each of the 32-bit shifters. Those bits control left/right, 
rotate/shift, and bypass operation. This format is more accurately described in Ap-
pendix B, Section B.2 on page 200. 
4.5.3 Add/Sub SLAB 
The Add/Sub SLAB configuration register is 324 bits in size, meaning the 84 LSBs 
control the core Add/Sub component. The 84 bits are cut in half, each controlling 
one of the adder banks. In each 42 bit control vector, 2 bits are set aside for each 
of the 8 adders to control add/subtract and connect/not connect, and the remaining 
bits control the input multiplexers on the adders. This format is more accurately 
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described in Appendix B, Section B.3 on page 201. 
4.5.4 Multiplier SLAB 
The Multiplier SLAB configuration register is 244 bits in size, meaning the 4 LSBs 
control the core Multiplier component. Each of the 4 bits controls the bypass func-
tionality of one of the four 32-bit multipliers. This format is more accurately described 
in Appendix B, Section B.4 on page 202. 
4.5.5 LUT SLAB 
The L UT SLAB is somewhat different from the others, because a large part of its 
configuration is stored within the flip-flops of the LUT components themselves, which 
can function as configuration registers. Thus, the SLAB structure for the LUT does 
not quite match that in Figure 4.24, since the configuration register, rather than 
connect directly to the configuration output of the SLAB, must connect to the con-
figuration input of the LUT core, and the core's configuration output connects to the 
configuration output of the SLAB. This is illustrated in Figure 4.25. 
The configuration register in this SLAB is 256 bits in size, but the overall configu-
ration for this component is 33024 bits in size. In the configuration register itself, the 
16 LSBs control the core LUT component, each of the 16 bits controlling the bypass 
functionality of one of the 8 x 8 L UTs. The other 32768 bits of configuration data 
are stored directly into the flip-flops of the LUT. 
This format is more accurately described in Appendix B, Section B.5 on page 202. 
4.5.6 XORnet SLAB 
The XORnet SLAB configuration register is 4341 bits in size, meaning the 4101 
LSBs control the core XORnet component. Of those 4101 bits, 4096 are the enable 
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Figure 4.25: L UT SLAB 
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signals for the four 32-bit XORnets, with 1024 bits controlling each XORnet. Of the 
remaining 5 control bits, 1 bit selects whether the XORnet component is operating 
in 32-bit mode or 64-bit mode, and the other 4 bits control the bypass for each of 
the four 32-bit XORnets. This format is more accurately described in Appendix B, 
Section B.6 on page 203. 
4.6 Summary of Component Implementation 
This chapter has discussed the design of hardware components to implement the ba-
sic operations identified by the algorithm survey in the previous chapter. The six 
components described in this chapter- the Boolean SLAB, Shifter SLAB, Add/Sub 
SLAB, Multiplier SLAB, LUT SLAB, and XORnet SLAB - not only the desired 
operations, but also are configurable to handle different operand sizes and dataflow 
options, thanks to the incorporation of the input switch and byte reordering compo-
nents. These basic components form the basis of the overall cryptographic hardware 
system described in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
System Architecture 
In the previous chapter, designs for configurable cryptographic hardware operations 
were presented, providing a basis from which to build a reconfigurable cryptographic 
hardware module. The arrangement of those components into a working, flexible 
system is a non-trivial problem. 
The design of the overall system architecture is influenced by the structure of 
the algorithms under consideration. Those algorithms, despite having vastly differ-
ent organization, are all round-oriented, iterating through the same operations over 
and over again to provide security. Furthermore, within each round, operations are 
generally sequential. The system architecture must be built with this in mind. 
Thus, it was decided to use a coarse-grained reconfigurable solution, with each 
processing element (PE) designed to be able to implement a single round of most of 
the algorithms considered. Since AES would likely be the most common algorithm 
implemented, the proof-of-concept system presented here will have ten PEs in order 
to implement a fully-pipelined, loop-unrolled version of AES. Algorithms requiring 
more rounds will therefore require iterative implementation, and thus the system 
architecture must accommodate that as well. 
This general architecture depends almost entirely on the flexibility of the PE, 
which must be able to implement one round of almost all of the algorithms desired. 
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The arrangement of the PEs is also a factor in system flexibility. In any real applica-
tion, block ciphers are often used in modes other than ECB mode, and thus providing 
system support for different modes of operation is highly desirable. Since pipelining 
provides no benefit to most block cipher modes other than ECB, even algorithms that 
could be pipelined might be better suited to iterative implementation. 
The key advantage to iterative implementation is that it improves resource usage, 
especially when block ciphers are used in CBC, OFB, and CFB modes. In each of 
those modes, encryption (or decryption) of a block of data is dependent upon the 
result of the encryption of the preceding block. In other words, one block must be 
completely processed for the next block can be processed. In pipelined implementa-
tions, this means that the pipeline must be stalled until the first block is encrypted, 
and then the result can be used to start processing the next block. This leads to most 
of the active hardware in the pipeline processing invalid data most of the time. 
A more efficient use of resources in such scenarios is to iterate the data through 
the same round hardware (in our case, the PE). There will be little difference in 
performance since subsequent blocks must wait for the current block to finish in any 
case, but much less hardware will be used. For the particular system under design, 
that means that the other PEs are free to use in other ways, such as implementing 
other algorithms in parallel which will allow an increase in overall system through-
put. Parallel implementation will be supported through the addressing scheme, so 
that data can be written to one PE, and while that data is being iteratively processed, 
a separate, unrelated block of data (perhaps from a separate communication chan-
nel) could be written to a different PE for processing. Thus, support for iteration 
allows maximal use of hardware resources and greater aggregate throughput, though 
individual messages will see little speedup. 
Consequently, the proof-of-concept system developed in the rest of this chapter 
has been designed with two primary goals in mind. 
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• The processing elements must be capable of implementing a single round of 
most algorithms. 
• The system must offer support for pipelining and iteration, as well as different 
modes of operation. 
These design goals raise several issues, which are explored throughout the rest of the 
chapter. 
5.1 Processing Element 
The processing element that forms the basis of the overall system is called the Process-
ing Element with Functional Units and Networked Connections (PE-FUNC), or more 
commonly, just the PE. It is intended to be built from from the SLABs described 
in Section 4.4, and to be able to implement a single round of most of the algorithms 
under consideration. Thus, the design of the PE-FUNC must be guided by the nature 
of the algorithms themselves. 
Table 5.1 shows the rounds of each algorithm broken down into a sequential list of 
the basic operations that are used. From this table, several important characteristics 
become evident. 
First and foremost, Boolean operations are used frequently in many different or-
ders within the rounds of almost all of the algorithms. Their high rate of occurrence 
and extremely variable positioning with the rounds suggests that there must be a 
large number of Boolean SLABs spread throughout the PE. 
Secondly, add/subtract and shifter operations are also used often, albeit with 
less frequency than basic Boolean operations. They are sometimes used in sequence, 
with the shift preceding the addition/subtraction. Thus, it is necessary to provide 
a number of shifter and add/subtract components, spread throughout the PE. The 
number of add/subtract and shifter components would be significantly less than the 
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AES Camellia RC6 SAFER++12s SHA-1 DES 
LUTs Boolean Shifter Boolean during initialization XORnet 
Byte Reorder LUTs Add/Sub Add/Sub Boolean ( x 3) Boolean 
XORnet XORnet Multiply LUTs Shifter LUTs 
Boolean Boolean Shifter Boolean during 80 rounds XORnet 
and on every 6th round Boolean Add/Sub Shifter 
Boolean Shifter Byte Reorder Boolean ( 3 to 5 times) 
Shifter Add/Sub Add/Sub Add/Sub ( x2) 
Boolean ( x 6) Byte Reorder Byte Reorder 
Shifter Add/Sub 
Boolean 
Table 5.1: Algorithm Round Breakdown into Sequence of Basic Operations 
number of Boolean components due to their relatively less common occurrence and 
variability of positioning. 
Lastly, the three "big" operations (multiplication, LUT, and XORnet) are used 
infrequently, generally only once in a given round. Thus, if the rest of the PE is 
sufficiently flexible, providing a single component for each of these operations should 
be sufficient to meet the needs of the system. 
5.1.1 Organization of Components 
A sequence of 29 SLABs was determined to be sufficient to meet the needs of most 
of the algorithms under consideration, while still providing flexibility to implement 
other algorithms. Note that the use of 29 SLABs results in extensive overprovision 
of basic components since most algorithms need only four to six basic operations in 
a given round. This overprovision provides great flexibility and avoids the need for 
any complex data switching within the PE. 
Each PE-FUNC has one LUT SLAB, one Multiplier SLAB, one XORnet SLAB, 
four Shifter SLABs, four Add/Sub SLABs, and 18 Boolean SLABs, arranged as shown 
in Figure 5.1. Clocks, enable signals, and input/output registers are not shown. 
In Section 4.2, the scratch path was introduced to the SLAB in parallel to the 
datapath. Both can be clearly seen in Figure 5.1. The datapath values obviously come 
from the datapath input of the PE-FUNC itself, but the scratch path value must be 
initially introduced into the first SLAB in the PE. Thus, a 4-to-1 multiplexer allows 
the user to configure the initial scratch path data between a copy of the datapath, a 
constant value from the PE-FUNC configuration register, or one of two possible key 
values. The key values come from the key memory, which is discussed in the following 
section. 
The inputs and outputs of the PE-FUNC are registered, but in the proof-of-
concept implementation there is no pipelining inside the PE-FUNC. It has a 129-bit 
105 
key_start ------, 
key_write -----, 
datapath_in 
(128 bits) 
shift_data_ln 
Figure 5.1: Processing Element Component Organization 
datapath input (the 129th bit is asserted when valid data is being input), key memory 
write and key memory start control signals, configuration register inputs and outputs 
that are connected directly to the configuration registers internal to the PE-FUNC, 
and a 129-bit datapath output. This I/0 layout is illustrated in Figure 5.2. Note 
that the valid bit is directly passed from the input register to the output register, 
rather than through the processing logic, which is why it does not appear in Figure 
5.1. 
datapath_in 
(129 bits) 
key_write_enable 
start_keymem 
elk 
rstb 
shift_data_in 
config_clk 
config_enable 
PE-FUNC 
datapath_out 
(129 bits) 
shift_ data_ out 
Figure 5.2: Processing Element Input/Output Signals 
This arrangement of SLABs, in conjunction with the key memory discussed in the 
next section, allows great flexibility. 
5.1.2 Key Memory Design and Operation 
Management of the subkeys of a cryptographic is a major concern. As seen in Chapter 
3, the key schedules of cryptographic algorithms can frequently be more complex that 
the algorithms themselves. This is usually mitigated by the fact that a single key is 
usually used to encrypt many blocks of data, and thus the computational costs of 
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computing the subkeys is amortized over many encryptions. In other words, it can 
be done up front, and once finished, does not slow processing down any further. 
In keeping with this ideology, and to simplify technical matters, the SHERIF cryp-
tographic hardware module will not readily support implementation of key schedules. 
Rather, it requires that the key schedules be pre-computed by an external processor, 
and the resulting subkeys must then be loaded in to the PEs. These subkeys are 
loaded into a special component in each PE-FUNC called the key memory. 
Some of the algorithms use 32-bit subkeys; others full 128-bit subkeys. Many of 
the algorithms require multiple subkeys in each round. Thus, the key memory must 
be capable of providing at least two different 128-bit keys to the SLABs. Therefore 
the key memory has an independent output to connect to each SLAB's key input. 
Each of those outputs can be configured to provide one of the two key values. The 
key memory also provides those two key values to the scratch path input multiplexer 
mentioned above. 
Such a component would be straightforward in design, if not for the fact that the 
overall system is intended to support both pipelined, loop-unrolled implementations 
of cryptographic algorithms, as well as iterative implementations. Thus, the key 
memory must be capable of providing different subkey values during different clock 
cycles (but still no more than two 128-bit values at a time). 
A comparison of the the subkey requirements of the algorithms under considera-
tion is shown in Table 5.2. Note that SHA-1 [52] is excluded since it is not a keyed 
hash function. A key memory size of 1664 bits is selected, allowing up to 13 128-bit 
subkeys to be available to a given PE. This means that algorithms like SAFER++128 
[54] cannot be implemented in a single PE, but in the case of SAFER++128 , a single 
round would likely require two PEs anyway, due to the sequence in which the adders 
are used. 
This problem is solved by implementing the key memory as a large shift register, 
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Algorithms Number/Size of Keys Approx. Freq. of Keys Total Bits 
AES 11 128-bit round keys 1 per round 1408 
Camellia 26 64-bit round keys 1 per round (sometimes 3) 1664 
RC6 44 32-bit round keys 2 per round 
SAFER++12s 15 128-bit round keys 2 per round 
DES 16 48-bit round keys 1 per round 
Table 5.2: Algorithm Subkey Requirements 
as shown in Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3: Key Memory Architecture 
When the key memory write signal is asserted, the key memory assumes the 
datapath input to the PE-FUNC is subkey data, and writes that 128-bits into the 
MSB end of the shift register after shifting the current contents down by 128-bits. 
Thus, 13 clock cycles are needed to fill the key memory. Also, note that the output 
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of the key memory is taken from the LSB end of the shift register. That means that 
even if only one 128-bit key is needed in the key memory, it still takes 13 clock cycles 
to shift it into the right position. 
The two key values available at any given time come from the least significant 256-
bits of the key memory register. Each of the 29 SLAB outputs multiplexes between 
the two, according to the configuration set in the configuration register. 
To support iterative implementations, the key memory must be able to shift new 
values into the output position during operation. This shifting is controlled by a 
state machine. When in the idle state, the state machine prevents the key memory 
from shifting. However, if it receives a key memory start signal assertion, the state 
machine begins operation and waits a number of clock cycles set by the user (up to 
127), then shifts the register values right (by some multiple of 32-bit words, up to 8, 
with the shift amount being configured by the user), allowing new subkey values to 
enter the output range of the shift register. The number of clock cycles between shifts 
is determined by a shift counter that resets at each shift. Another counter increments 
every time a shift occurs, essentially counting the rounds of the algorithm, and when 
it reaches its limit as configured by the user, the state machine reverts to idle mode 
and resets the contents of the shift register. The instant reset is possible through 
the use of a non-shifting 1664-bit register in parallel with the shifting register, that 
simply holds the original value of the key memory for use in resets. 
The counters are used to account for the latency introduced by the registers at 
the input and output of the PE. The presence of those registers means that, in an 
iterative algorithm implementation, each iteration takes multiple clock cycles, and 
thus the subkey data for each iteration must be synchronized with its proper round. 
This design of the key memory allows the user to configure its operation to ac-
commodate pipelined algorithm implementations (which generally require no shifting 
behaviour of the key memory), single-PE iterative implementations (which require 
110 
new subkeys every round), and multiple-PE iterative implementations, where the al-
gorithm is implemented in two or more PEs, and must iterate through them. In this 
last case, each PE's key memory only needs to hold part of the key schedule. 
5.2 Processing Fabric 
The arrangement of PEs into a processing fabric was also a point of concern. Sev-
eral different approaches were considered, including a 2D array as discussed in [61]. 
The array structure was abandoned due to difficulties in coordinating data transfers 
between adjacent PEs. A linear, sequential arrangement of PEs was selected since it 
mimics the linear ordering of the rounds of the algorithms being considered. The key 
drawback to this arrangement is that the system can only handle data blocks of 128 
bits, so implementations of most hash functions like SHA-1 are infeasible. 
As described in previous sections, the PEs have very simple I/0, and while the 
key memories of each PE are capable of handling iterative algorithm implementations, 
nothing else about the PEs themselves handles feedback or iteration. Thus, Routing 
Nodes (RNs) are implemented between all of the PEs, as shown in Figure 5.4. 
control ! signals 
... ; 
i 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
128 LSBs. : • 
••• 
Figure 5.4: SHERIF Processing Fabric 
shift .... data .... out 
(unconnected) 
The routing nodes control the flow of data within the system, routing data from 
111 
the system input to the PEs, and from the PEs to the system output or to other PEs 
via the datapath or feedback signals. The routing nodes are key to completing the 
functionality of the SHERIF system, since they handle all of the data routing and 
storage needs that the PE-FUNCs do not. 
5.2.1 Routing Nodes 
The routing nodes would seem to have a simple task in routing the data between the 
various PEs, but it turned out that coordinating the data flow was a very difficult 
task. The design of the PE-FUNC was kept simple, but that off-loaded responsibility 
for control and other complex tasks to the routing node. 
The basic responsibility of the routing node is to switch or route data between 
the PEs, the system input, and the system output. However, it must be sufficiently 
configurable to handle both pipelined and iterative implementations. Furthermore, 
if the SHERIF system is to support different modes of operation (see Section 1.3.2) 
for its block cipher implementations, then the routing nodes must handle this as 
well, since all of the modes are defined as being external to the ciphers themselves 
[3]. Other functionality off-loaded from the PE-FUNC includes selection of the key 
memory start signal, and controlling key writes. 
Design and Operation of the Routing Node 
Figure 5.5 shows the basic interface of the routing node. It has three inputs (data-
path in, feedback in, and system in) and three corresponding outputs (datapath out, 
feedback out, and system out). The three outputs are switched independently of each 
other. It has a number of control signal inputs to indicate the type of the current 
system input data: key write assertion means that a key value is being written to the 
key memory of the following PE, IV write means that an IV is being written into the 
routing node, and stream write means that the data is part of an ongoing encryption. 
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The implications of these signals will be discussed later. 
There is also an 11-bit start vector input, driven by the address decoder at the 
system level. The individual bits of this correspond to the individual start signals 
generated by the address decoder when data is addressed to particular routing nodes. 
Those signals are used at the top level to set the valid bit (MSB) of the system 
input for each routing node, but all of the signals are available to each routing node 
to allow the internal state machines to start when data is addressed to any of the 
routing nodes, if so desired. 
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Figure 5.5: Routing Node I/0 Interface 
datapath_out 
feedback_out 
system_out 
keymem_write 
keymem_start 
shift_data_out 
The routing node is configurable, so it has the same standard configuration register 
interface as well. Also, apart from the data output described above, there are two 
output control signals (key write and key start) which connect to the key memory 
control signals in the following PE-FUNC. At this point, many of the top level 
routing node control signals seem extraneous. Their function will become apparent 
as the implementation of the routing node is discussed in detail. 
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Figure 5.6 shows the architectural details of the routing node. Note that the 
external I/0 in this figure has been rearranged so that all the inputs are on the left 
and all the output are on the right, in order to make the diagram more understandable. 
Also, many of the control and configuration signals are not shown to preserve clarity. 
Details of the routing node configuration register are given in Figure 5. 7. 
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Figure 5.6: Top Level Routing Node Implementation 
datapath_out 
1---~(129 bits) 
feedback out 
1---~(129 bits) 
system_ out 
1---~(129 bits) 
keymem_start 
keymem_write 
shift_data_out 
The data inputs to the routing node are registered immediately, although there 
are two extra registers for storing special data as well. This is illustrated in Figure 
5.8, and discussed in detail later. 
Each of the routing node's data outputs (datapath, feedback, and system) are 
selected independently by 8-to-1 multiplexers, meaning each output can be one of 
eight possible options despite the fact that there are only three data inputs. These 
extra values are available to support different modes of operation; beyond outputting 
the three data inputs directly, the routing node can also output the XOR of any of 
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Figure 5. 7: Routing Node Configuration Register Detail 
the inputs with each other or an IV (in certain combinations). The possible output 
values for the system output, datapath output, and feedback output are as follows. 
1. System Input 
2. Feedback Input 
3. Datapath Input 
4. Datapath Input XOR IV 
5. Datapath Input XOR Feedback Input 
6. Datapath Input XOR System Input 
7. System Input XOR Feedback Input 
8. System Input XOR IV 
Note that the IV value in the above XOR operations comes from either the IV register 
or the stream register, depending on whether the stream write signal is asserted. This 
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is the first example of where the routing node operation gets complex. This values 
are generated as shown in Figure 5.9. 
Stream Controller 
The IV register can be written to by asserting the IV write signal, which causes the 
data on the system input to be stored into the register. This action also invalidates the 
system input value stored in the system input register. Thus, an IV can be set and 
changed on-the-fly. When implementing an algorithm in CBC mode, for example, 
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the user can write the IV and set the datapath output to the system input XOR 
IV option, to perform the XOR on the plaintext. The next plaintext block to be 
encrypted, however, must be XORed with the ciphertext produced by the encryption 
of the previous plaintext block. That ciphertext can be sent via the feedback path 
when the encryption is done: so that it may be used in the XOR with the next 
plaintext. Rather than require the external controlling processor to keep precise 
track of how many clock cycles are needed to encrypt one block through whatever 
algorithm is implemented, and then ensure that the next plaintext is written into the 
routing node just as the previous ciphertext arrives at its feedback input, a simple 
state machine controller is used. 
This state machine controller: called the stream controller, uses a 7-bit counter. 
When the state machine receives a start signal (selected from one of the 11 possible 
signals by a multiplexer controlled by values in the configuration register), it starts 
counting clock cycles. When it reaches the maximum value, as set by the user in the 
configuration register, it takes the current feedback input value and writes it into the 
stream register before returning to an idle state. Thus, the stream controller can be 
configured to know how many clock cycles until the valid ciphertext will return to the 
feedback input, so that it can be stored, and when the external processor writes the 
next plaintext block in the same encryption process (at some point coincident with or 
after this), it can assert the stream write signal to ensure that the datapath output 
will be the datapath input XORed with the stored ciphertext in the stream register, 
rather than the still-stored value in the IV register. The stream controller is shown 
in Figure 5.8. 
System Output Controller 
The system output also requires a little management. While it is only necessary to 
select one of the eight values for the system output, it is also necessary to specify 
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Figure 5.10: System Output Generation and Control 
when that value is valid. Relying on the MSB of the signal, the valid bit, will not 
always work, since in an iterative implementation, the same block of valid data will 
pass through a routing node several times before the algorithm is complete. 
Thus, it is necessary to use a state machine controller, similar to the stream 
controller, to validate the output data. This system output controller uses a 7-bit 
counter. Once triggered by a start signal or valid input data (selected by a multiplexer 
controlled by configuration register values), it counts until it reaches the configured 
maximum value and outputs a validation pulse that is ANDed with the valid bit 
of the selected output signal value. The counter should be configured to count the 
number of clocks from the start signal until the output value will be available, and 
this ensures only valid data is sent to the system output, and only at the appropriate 
times. This system is illustrated in Figure 5.10. 
The operation of the system output controller should make apparent the necessity 
of having every start signal available to each routing node. The routing node that 
actually sends data to the system output will usually be a different node from the one 
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where the data is entered into the system, and thus, if each routing node only knew 
its own start signal value, the system output controller would never get a start signal. 
By making all start signals available to each routing node, a great deal of flexibility is 
facilitated. Also, the output controller start signal can be configured to use any valid 
data coming into the node, and if the count is set to 0, it allows data to pass directly 
to the system output. This is useful for pipelined algorithm implementations. 
Datapath and Feedback Output Controller 
It has already been stated that the datapath and feedback outputs are selected by 
8-to-1 multiplexers. Unfortunately, they cannot be used as simply as the system 
output. For example, in an iterative implementation of an algorithm would require 
the datapath input to come from the system input on the first iteration, but on 
subsequent iterations, the datapath output would have to come from the feedback 
input. Thus, depending on how an algorithm is implemented, a single configuration 
of the datapath output value will be insufficient. Similar examples can be shown for 
the feedback output. 
To solve this problem, a state machine controller is used to control the output 
multiplexers for the datapath and feedback outputs. This controller, called the data-
path controller, is rather more complex than the system output or stream controller. 
It uses two 7-bit counters as well. 
The datapath controller can be configured to operate in either 2-state mode or 
3-state mode. In 2-state mode, it transitions from an idle state to a running state 
upon receiving a start signal (which is selected from the 11 possible start signals), and 
stays in the running state until the first counter reaches its set maximum, at which 
time it will return to the idle state. If the 3-state mode is enabled, it will transition 
from idle to the first running state as in 2-state mode, and then to a second running 
state, where it will stay until the second counter reaches its configured maximum, at 
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Figure 5.11: Datapath and Feedback Output Control 
which time it will return to idle. 
In each of these states, both the datapath output and feedback output may have 
different output values selected. Furthermore, if streaming is enabled in the configu-
ration, then in the idle state, a different output value again may be selected for each 
output (which is used via the XOR with IV when a stream write occurs). Thus, the 
datapath output may have up to four different values over the course of the controller's 
operation, as might the feedback output. The output values for each state are set in 
the configuration register. The datapath and output feedback control architecture is 
shown in Figure 5.11. 
121 
This setup allows the previously mentioned iterative example to be implemented. 
For an iterative algorithm, the datapath output for the idle state would be the system 
input, and in the running state, the datapath output would be the feedback input. It 
would stay in the running state for a number of clock cycles as set in the configuration 
register, counted by the counter, until the algorithm is done, at which time it would 
return to the idle state to wait for the next input. 
Key Memory Control 
As previously mentioned, to keep the key memory and PE-FUNC design simple, some 
of its required complexity was off-loaded to the routing node. In particular, generation 
of the key memory start signal is performed in the routing node. The routing node 
also passes the key memory write enable signal along to the PE-FUNC. 
The key memory start signal is selected via a large multiplexer controlled by the 
routing node configuration register. The start signal can be selected from any of the 
11 routing node start signals, no start signal at all can be selected (for non-iterative 
implementations), or the valid bit of the data path output can be used as the key 
memory start signal. 
The key memory start signal, as well as other internal start signals, are generated 
as shown in Figure 5.12. 
5.3 Overall System Architecture and Control 
The overall system architecture for the SHERIF cryptographic hardware module is 
shown in Figure 5.13. Note that the top level inputs and outputs are registered, as 
is each of the inputs to the output controller and routing nodes, and both the inputs 
and outputs of all of the PE-FUNCs are registered as well. 
At this level, the system architecture is quite simplistic. The processing fabric 
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has been discussed in detail in prior sections; the address decoder and system output 
arbiter are covered in the following sections. In brief, the address decoder handles 
generation of control signals to the routing nodes, whereas the system output ar-
biter manages switching all of the routing node system output signals onto the single 
SHERIF output bus. All the configuration and data processing occurs in the process-
ing fabric- the other top-level components are merely to support the routing nodes 
and PE-FUNCs. 
5.3.1 Address Decoder 
The address decoder module is relatively straightforward in terms of its role. It 
processes the address values from the system input, as well as the write control 
signals, in order to drive the control signals going to each of the routing nodes. Thus, 
it takes the 5-bit address, as well as the key write, IV write, stream write, and valid 
bit as inputs, and generates start signals, key write signals, IV write signals, and 
stream write signals to each of the routing nodes. All of the start signals are sent to 
each routing node, as mentioned above, but at the top level, individual start signals 
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are used to to set the valid bit of the data going into each routing node. 
The address decoder works on a priority system. If the key write signal is asserted, 
it takes highest priority, so any other valid write inputs are ignored. Next in priority 
is the IV write signal, followed by the stream write signal, and then regular writes. 
The address decoder also has a rudimentary multicast decode mode: if the address 
"11111" is input, it is interpreted as being a simultaneous write to all the routing 
nodes, and so the appropriate control signals are sent to all routing nodes. 
5.3.2 Dataflow Control 
Once the data has entered the processing fabric, all dataflow control is entirely de-
pendent on the routing nodes. Because the routing nodes are all independent, it is up 
to the user configuring the entire system to ensure that the data flows properly based 
on the configurations of the independent routing nodes and processing elements. 
Pipelined/loop-unrolled implementations are easiest to implement with respect 
to controlling the dataflow; each routing node is simply set to a fixed configuration, 
and the system output controller just counts until data has made it from the input 
routing node to the final routing node. Iterative implementations are more difficult, 
requiring accurate timing of iterations and processing to ensure that everything works 
together properly. Ideally, a means of abstracting the overall dataflow control would 
be desirable. 
5.3.3 Output Control 
The system output is governed by an output bus arbiter. Since it is theoretically 
possible to have multiple algorithms running in parallel on different groups of PEs, it 
might happen that two algorithms finish at the same time, and thus both algorithms 
have to output their respective results to the system output. The output bus arbiter 
resolves contention for the single system output in such cases. 
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The output bus arbiter stores valid output signals from the PEs, and selects 
which valid output is switched onto the system output in a round-robin fashion. It 
can switch one value to the output every clock cycle, so as long as the average number 
of valid outputs is not greater than one per cycle, the output bus arbiter can keep 
up. It is the responsibility of the algorithm implementation to ensure that particular 
implementations do not generate valid outputs too frequently, to ensure that a prior 
output value is not overwritten before it has a chance to be switched to the output 
bus. 
The selection algorithm works by checking the storage registers for each routing 
node input into the arbiter, in order, from 0 to 10. The first register that it finds 
with valid data in it, it switches to the system output. On the next clock cycle, it 
continues its check of the registers, starting from the register just after the register 
previously output, to ensure equal opportunity for data from all routing nodes. Note 
that the register checking is a combinational process, done within the switching clock 
cycle, which allows the system's high throughput. 
5.3.4 Designing for Expandability 
The architecture described in this section has been in reference to the proof-of-concept 
design that was implemented, using only ten processing elements (to allow pipelined 
implementation of the AES algorithm) and having no pipeline registers internal to 
the PEs. It should be noted, however, that the system components were designed 
and implemented with expandability in mind. 
The address decoder decodes a 5-bit address to access the routing nodes, with the 
address "11111" accessing all of the nodes simultaneously. Thus, the address space 
has room for up to 31 routing nodes, which means 30 processing elements. Thus, 
the processing fabric can easily be expanded by up to a factor of three by logically 
extending the existing address decoder and processing fabric. 
126 
Similarly, since all the routing node and key memory state machine timing is based 
on counter values set by the system configuration, adding pipeline registers inside the 
PE-FUNC will only require algorithm implementations to change by increasing the 
set counter values to account for the added latency. Thus, further refinements and 
variations of the design in the future will be easily implemented, with simple redesign 
of only the address decoder and output arbiter. 
5.4 Summary of System Architecture 
This chapter has described the organization of the basic operational components de-
veloped in the previous chapter into a processing element capable of being configured 
to implement a single round of a variety of algorithms. These processing elements 
were then integrated into a sample system which allowed support for different modes 
of operation, as well as different implementation styles such as pipelining and itera-
tion. 
The proof-of-concept SHERIF system designed in this chapter is oriented toward 
supporting implementation of a pipelined version of the AES algorithm Rijndael [17], 
and thus has 10 PEs integrated into the system, with dataflow between them con-
trolled by 11 routing nodes. The routing nodes are very complex, and responsible for 
the system's ability to support pipelining, iteration, and different modes of operation. 
The next chapter details a software configuration utility designed to help manage the 
complexity of the design and allow easy implementation of cryptographic algorithms 
on the proof-of-concept SHERIF system. 
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Chapter 6 
System Configuration 
The hardware design of the SHERIF cryptographic hardware module has been de-
scribed in detail in the preceding chapters. The stated goal of this device is to provide 
superior performance to software implementation of cryptographic algorithms with 
greater ease of implementation than custom hardware implementations. While the 
device architecture has clearly been designed to fulfill the speed requirements, no 
mention has been made of how the SHERIF module is to be configured; that is, 
issues related to ease of implementation have not been dealt with until now. 
In discussion of the SLABs in Section 4.4 and in Appendix B, the bit strings 
needed to to configure each component were outlined in detail. Thus, implementation 
of an algorithm on the SHERIF cryptographic hardware module entails creating a 
bit string to configure all of the components in the whole system. Hence, ease of 
implementation of cryptographic algorithms will depend on the ease of creation of 
the configuration bit strings. 
The SHERIF cryptographic hardware module is configured much like an FPGA, 
in that the configuration is loaded in upon system start-up via the configuration 
I/0 interface as shown in Figure 6.1. Either a dedicated start-up circuit or an ex-
ternal processor must assert the config_enable input, and then, on each clock cycle 
of the configuration clock, a single bit of the system configuration is shifted in to 
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the shift_data_in input from a serial memory device such as a serial Programmable 
Read-Only Memory (PROM). The configuration bit string is shifted in from LSB to 
MSB. 
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Note that the configuration clock is separate from the main system clock. That 
is because the simplicity of the configuration logic and the close proximity of each 
configuration register means that the configuration register can run much faster than 
the entire system. Thus, by clocking the configuration logic separately, a much faster 
clock can be used to allow for faster configuration times. However, the same clock 
can be used for both system clock and configuration clock if so desired. 
The proof-of-concept system described in this thesis contains 10 PEs and 11 rout-
ing nodes. The PEs require 4527 4 configuration bits each, and the routing nodes 
require 73 bits each. Thus, the total configuration size for the SHERIF cryptographic 
hardware module is 453543 bits. To generate such a configuration by hand would 
arguably be more difficult than designing a hardware implementation, and certainly 
more error-prone. The solution to this problem is to develop a software configuration 
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utility to allow users to configure the SHERIF cryptographic hardware module. 
6.1 Software Configuration Utility 
The purpose of the SHERIF Configuration Utility is to provide a graphical front end to 
the configuration process, providing a more human-readable interface than strings of 
O's and 1 's and restricting users to valid configuration string choices. Most computer 
systems with windowing user interfaces share common interface components, such 
as combo boxes (whereby users select options from a drop-down list), check boxes, 
and text boxes. These standard interface components can allow users to implement 
algorithms on the SHERIF device more easily than custom hardware, and possibly 
more easily than software. 
The SHERIF Configuration Utility was written in the Java programming language 
[62] using the free NetBeans 3.6 Integrated Development Environment [63]. The Java 
language was selected due to its ease of use and cross-platform capabilities, as well 
as the comprehensive Swing windowing library which provides all the desired user in-
terface controls. The NetBeans IDE made graphical user interface development easy, 
allowing the creation of user interface forms with virtually no coding. The only pro-
gramming directly required was the underlying reading, validation, and manipulation 
of the data represented by the components. 
The configuration utility was designed in a modular fashion, with separate user 
interface forms implemented for each of the components to be configured. A Con-
figurationString class was implemented to encapsulate the behaviour needed by the 
configuration forms: it had to store the strings, overwrite the string or parts of them, 
and allow them to be read as a whole, in part, or one bit at a time for saving to a 
file. 
The forms for each component are accessed hierarchically. Each of the forms was 
130 
implemented as a modal form, meaning that when it is active, the user cannot switch 
to a different form directly, but has to close the existing form or cause it to launch a 
new one. This was done to ensure the user is able to keep track of what is currently 
being configured. 
The main form of the configuration utility is shown in Figure 6.2. It consists 
of buttons representing each of the PEs and routing nodes, each of which launches 
a new configuration form to configure that particular component. Configuration of 
individual components is covered in the following sections. This form could be further 
refined by offering combo boxes instead of buttons to allow selection between the 
different routing nodes and PEs. Such a modification would simplify the interface, 
and at the same time make it scalable to systems with different numbers of PEs. 
Figure 6.2: SHERIF Configuration Utility Main Form 
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The main form also includes basic functionality such as the ability to save the 
configuration to a text file, or to read in an existing configuration. 
The system configuration is saved as a standard text file. The first line contains 
the text "SHERIFCONFIG", and the last line the text "END SHERIFCONFIG". In 
between these lines are the 453543 configuration bits, all stored in a single line, from 
the LSB at the beginning of the line to the MSB at the end. This is so that the 
text file, when used in functional simulation of the SHERIF cryptographic hardware 
module, can be read with a single line read and then shifted in to the configuration 
one bit at a time. Should the SHERIF device be fabricated, the configuration utility 
would have to be extended to support generation of a binary configuration file that 
could be programmed into a PROM. 
Overall the system is designed so that each form generates a small configuration 
based on its controls. When the user accepts the configuration of the component, 
the configuration is validated and then passed back to a parent form, where the 
configuration string is integrated into the larger configuration (which might itself 
then be accepted and passed to another parent and integrated to its configuration). 
Following this strictly hierarchical design process greatly simplified implementation, 
allowing easy use of the forms for the different components as needed and ensuring 
that reading values from the user interface was kept as simple as possible. 
Thus, the main form in Figure 6.2 has 10 ConfigurationString objects representing 
the PEs, and 11 representing the routing nodes. When one of the buttons is clicked 
to launch the configuration form for a PE or routing node, the main form passes a 
reference to the configuration string it holds to that newly created form, and that 
form, once its configuration is accepted, writes the new configuration values back into 
the string held by its parent. When saving the overall configuration to a text file, the 
21 different strings are combined into one temporary ConfigurationString object that 
is then written to the file. 
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The operation of the software is more obvious when the individual forms are 
considered, in the following sections. 
6.2 PE-FUNC Configuration Form 
When the PE-FUNC configuration form is launched from the main form by clicking 
one of the PE buttons, a new form as shown in Figure 6.3 is displayed. 
Figure 6.3: Top-level PE-FUNC Configuration Form 
It contains 29 buttons to launch configuration forms for the individual SLABs, a 
button to launch the key memory configuration form, and some standard buttons at 
the top of the form. The only items configurable at this level are the scratch path 
input selection and the top-level PE-FUNC constant value. 
A combo box is used to select the input to the scratch path between two key 
values, the aforementioned constant value, or the datapath value. A simple text 
box is provided to allow the user to enter the desired constant value in hexadecimal 
notation. The software verifies the length and format of the user-entered values to 
ensure they are valid. 
The standard control buttons that appear on every component configuration form 
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are "Accept Configuration", "Clear Configuration", "Copy Configuration", "Paste 
Configuration", and "Cancel Configuration". 
"Accept Configuration" allows the user to accept and store the changes they 
have made to the configuration. It reads the data from the components into the 
configuration string (after validating it, of course), then writes the configuration string 
back into the parent configuration and closes the form, returning window focus to the 
parent form. 
"Clear Configuration" sets the configuration string to the default, all zeros. "Can-
cel Configuration" discards any changes that have not been accepted and closes the 
form, returning focus to the parent. It does provide a warning before doing so, how-
ever. 
"Copy Configuration" and "Paste Configuration" work together. Copying stores 
the current configuration to a component-specific clipboard held by the parent. Then, 
whenever in a form of the same type, the value can be pasted in to quickly configure 
the new, different form, or overwrite its existing configuration. 
For example, in the PE-FUNC configuration form for PEO, the user might set a 
configuration, and click "Copy". Then, the user might accept the configuration, and 
from the main window, open the PEl form, and click "Paste" to give PEl the same 
configuration as PEO. Note that the copied configuration includes the configuration 
of all the sub-forms, as well. If the user tried to paste into a routing node form, 
however, nothing would happen. The clipboards are form-specific, and only copy and 
paste between forms of the same type. 
The PE-FUNC configuration form has an additional control button, allowing the 
PE-FUNC configuration to be saved to a file. This ability to save just a single PE-
FUNC configuration was included for testing and debugging purposes. 
The key memory configuration form is detailed in the following section. Configu-
ration forms of the individual SLABs are covered in Section 6.3. 
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6.2.1 Key Memory Configuration Form 
The key memory configuration form, which is launched from the PE-FUNC config-
uration form, is shown in Figure 6.4. It is a relatively straightforward form, having 
the standard control buttons at top. 
Figure 6.4: Key Memory Configuration Form 
There are 29 combo boxes allowing the user to select whether Key 0 (the least 
significant 128 bits of the key memory register) or Key 1 (bits 255 down to 128 of the 
key memory register) is sent to their respective SLABs. 
There are also 3 spinner components, which allow selection of integer values within 
a specified range. Here, the first spinner allows the user to set the maximum value 
of the shift counter (which counts the clock cycles between shifts of the key memory 
register) to a value in the range of 0 to 127. The next spinner allows the user to set 
the maximum value of the reload counter (which counts the number of shifts until key 
memory reset) in the same range. The third spinner ranges from 0 to 8, and controls 
the size of the key memory shift, with the value representing the number of 32-bit 
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words by which the key memory register will shift when the shift counter reaches its 
maximum. 
6.3 SLAB Configuration Forms 
Each of the six SLABs has its own configuration form. However, since all SLABs 
incorporate input switch and byte reordering components, they all use identical forms 
to configure those parts of the SLAB. Each of the six forms has buttons to launch 
configuration forms for the input switch and byte reordering. 
The input switch configuration form is shown in Figure 6.5. It has the standard 
controls at the top, and 32 combo boxes. The 16 combo boxes on the left control the 
multiplexers on the datapath of the input switch, allowing the user to select for each 
of the 16 datapath bytes whether a datapath byte, scratch data byte, constant byte, 
or key byte gets passed to the core component. The rightmost 16 combo boxes select 
the data to be sent to the scratch path output, either the current scratch input, or 
else the current datapath input. 
The byte reordering configuration form shown in Figure 6.6 is somewhat similar, 
having the standard controls across the top. It has only 16 combo boxes, which allow 
the user to configured the multiplexers of the byte reorder component. Each combo 
box represents an output byte, and any of the 16 input bytes can be selected for each 
output. 
The following sections discuss the individual SLAB configuration forms, which 
incorporate the two forms discussed above as sub-forms. 
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Figure 6.5: Input Switch Configuration Form 
137 
Figure 6.6: Byte Reordering Configuration Form 
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6.3.1 Boolean SLAB Configuration Form 
The Boolean SLAB configuration form, shown in Figure 6. 7, is relatively straightfor-
ward. It has the standard control buttons at the top, and buttons to launch configu-
ration of the input switch and byte reordering forms. The core logic is configured by 
the 16 combo boxes, which allows each output byte to be selected between the default 
bypass mode, or the boolean operations AND, OR, and XOR of the datapath and 
input switch values, or the inverse of the input switch values. The SLAB constant 
can be entered via the text box in hexadecimal notation. 
Figure 6. 7: Boolean SLAB Configuration Form 
6.3.2 Shifter SLAB Configuration Form 
The Shifter SLAB configuration form is shown in Figure 6.8. It has the standard 
controls across the top, as well as the SLAB-standard text box for entry of the constant 
value in hexadecimal notation and buttons to launch input switch and byte reordering 
forms. Since the shifter is based around 32-bit shift components, only 4 combo boxes 
are needed to configure the component. Each combo box selects between bypass, 
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Figure 6.8: Shifter SLAB Configuration Form 
left/right shift, and left/right rotation for its corresponding 32-bit input. 
6.3.3 Add/Sub SLAB Configuration Form 
The Add/Sub SLAB configuration form, shown in Figure 6.9, is a bit more complex 
than the previous two SLABs. It does, however, have the same standard controls, 
constant value text box, and input switch and byte reordering buttons. 
Figure 6.9: Add/Sub SLAB Configuration Form 
The configuration of the adders themselves is rather extensive, since there are a 
number of options. Including that many components on the SLAB form would be 
unwieldy, so a separate sub-form was designed to configure the two banks of 8 adders 
each. This form is shown in Figure 6.10. 
The adder bank configuration form is fairly complex. It has the standard controls 
at the top, and then is broken into eight panels, one to configure each of the adders. 
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Figure 6.10: Configuration Form for Bank of 8 Adders 
Each of the panels has check boxes to allow the user to select whether the adder is 
active or not, and whether is is connected to the preceding adder (that is, whether 
is uses the carry-in). Each panel also has a combo box allowing the component to 
be switched from addition to subtraction. The remaining combo box differs slightly 
between the panels. 
In the first panel, the topmost combo box allows selection of the carry-in to the 
first adder. In the rest of the panels, however, the topmost combo box allows selection 
of one of the adder inputs between the direct input and t~e outputs of the preceding 
adders. Thus, the combo box for each adder gets more and more options. The full 
flexibility of the add/sub component is made available through this form. 
6.3.4 Multiplier SLAB Configuration Form 
The Multiplier SLAB configuration form, shown in Figure 6.11, is quite simple. It has 
the standard controls, constant value input text box, and input switch/byte reorder 
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buttons. It then has four combo boxes to configure the four 32-bit multipliers by 
either bypassing them or using them. 
Figure 6.11: Multiplier SLAB Configuration Form 
6.3.5 LUT SLAB Configuration Form 
The LUT SLAB configuration form is shown in Figure 6.12. It has the standard 
controls, constant value input text box, and input switch/byte reorder buttons, as 
well as 16 buttons and 16 check boxes. The check boxes select which LUTs are in 
use, and the buttons configure the L UTs. 
The configuration interface of the actual LUTs themselves is complex, and so was 
relegated to a sub-form to avoid cluttering the screen. A sub-form to configure the 
individual 8 x 8 L UTs was implemented, as shown in Figure 6.13. 
The form is built around a 16 x 16 table of two-digit hexadecimal values. Concep-
tually, an 8-bit input selects a row and column from the table, and the value in the 
cell at the intersection of the row and column is the output value. The first 4 bits of 
the 8-bit input select the row; the last 4 bits select the column. 
To configure the LUT, the user simply enters the desired values into the table in 
hexadecimal notation. The software validates the length and value of the user inputs. 
This form has the standard controls at the top, plus one extra, "Load From CSV 
File". Since entering 256 table values can be tedious, and since many algorithm 
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Figure 6.12: LUT SLAB Configuration Form 
Figure 6.13: 8 x 8 LUT Configuration Form 
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specifications provide some sort of representation of L UT values in a format that can 
be converted into a text file, an additional piece of functionality was provided to the 
8 x 8 L UT form to allow it to read in such text files, in CSV (comma separated values) 
format. The data can be read from a text file, saving the user time and removing 
the possibility of transcription error. The text file, however, must have a specific 
format: 256 values, each value being 2 hexadecimal characters, arranged in 16 lines 
of 16 values each, where the values are separated by commas. 
6.3.6 XORnet SLAB Configuration Form 
The XORnet SLAB configuration form is shown in Figure 6.14. It is relatively simple, 
with standard controls at the top, buttons for the input switch and byte reorder 
configuration forms, and a text box for constant value input. 
Figure 6.14: XORnet SLAB Configuration Form 
The form also provides a combo box to select the mode of operation of the XORnet 
component. There are two possible modes, "32-bit Mode" and "64-bit Mode". "32-bit 
Mode" allows the XORnet component to operate as 4 independent 32-bit XORnets. 
"64-bit Mode" uses all four 32-bit XORnets to operate as a single 64-bit XORnet. 
There are four buttons which launch forms to configure the individual 32-bit 
XORnets themselves, and four check boxes to select which XORnets are to be active. 
The configuration form for a single 32-bit XORnet is shown in Figure 6.15. 
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Figure 6.15: 32-Bit XORnet Configuration Form 
This single XORnet configuration form has standard controls and 32 text boxes. 
The 32 text boxes correspond to the 32 output bits of the component. The component 
is configured by typing values into the text boxes (separated by commas). The values 
must be decimal values in the range of 0 to 31, and represent which input bits are 
XORed together to produce an output for that bit. Thus, if the text box labeled 
"Output Bit 1" had the values "31, 17, 4" in it, it would mean that output bit 1 is 
generated by input bit 31 XORed with input bit 17 XORed with input bit 4. Each of 
the output bits is independent of the others. An empty text box means the output 
for that bit will be zero. 
This type of interface is the simplest way to provide the flexibility needed for the 
XORnet. Each output bit can be the XOR of any of the input bits, but this text box 
based interface avoids the tedium of switching 32 bits on and off for each output bit, 
and allows only the desired ones to be typed in. 
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6.4 Routing Node Configuration Form 
The routing node configuration form is shown in Figure 6.16. Though the opera-
tion of the routing node is very complex to understand, configuring it is relatively 
straightforward. It just requires selection of a large number of unrelated options. 
Figure 6.16: Routing Node Configuration Form 
The combo boxes for datapath output and feedback output allow the user to 
select what values will be output during each state of the main operation. Note 
that the four options presented do not match the actual states the controller goes 
through. The four actual states are RESET, IDLE, RUNNING!, and RUNNING2. 
However, the combo boxes present IDLE, STREAM, RUNNING!, and RUNNING2. 
The routing node behaviour for the actual RESET and default (non-streaming) IDLE 
states are selected by the IDLE State combo box. The STREAM State combo box 
selects the behaviour of the actual IDLE state when data is input in streaming mode. 
The RUNNING! and RUNNING2 state combo boxes select the behaviour of the 
corresponding actual states. 
The system output if fixed for every state, but has the same eight options as the 
datapath output and feedback output. The outputs can be selected from the system 
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input, feedback input, datapath input, datapath input XORed with the IV, datapath 
input XORed with feedback input, datapath input XORed with the system input, 
system input XORed with the feedback input, or the system input XORed with the 
IV. Note that when in streaming mode, the IV is replaced with the feedback storage 
register value. 
There are two check boxes used to enable streaming operation and three-state 
operation of the main datapath controller. Three-state operation means that both 
RUNNING1 and RUNNING2 states will be used, whereas normally only RUNNING1 
will be used. 
There are four combo boxes to select the various start signals. The system-level 
address decoder generates start signals when it writes to a particular routing node. 
However, all ofthe start signals are available to all the routing nodes. Thus, the start 
signals that trigger the operation of the various controlling state machines (streaming 
controller, datapath controller, and system output controller) can be selected from 
any of the system's 11 possible start signals. Also, the signal that is sent to the 
PE-FUNC to start the key memory operation can also be selected, though it has an 
extra option whereby no start signal may be selected, thus preventing the key memory 
from shifting at all (which would be used in non-iterative implementations). The key 
memory may also be started by the input of valid data. 
Lastly, there are four spinner controls to set the maximum value of the state 
machine counters. The stream counter selects how many clock cycles the stream 
controller waits before storing the feedback input into the feedback storage register. 
The system output counter selects how many clock cycles the controller waits after 
its start signal before validating the system output. The two datapath counters count 
the number of clock cycles the system remains in states RUNNING1 and RUNNING2. 
All the counters are limited to the range 0 to 127 (7-bit counters). 
The routing node configuration form has standard controls at the top, as well as 
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an additional control button, allowing the routing node configuration to be saved to 
a file. This ability to save just a single routing node configuration was included for 
testing and debugging purposes. 
6.5 Summary of System Configuration 
This chapter has presented the design, implementation, and operation of the SHERIF 
software configuration utility. This configuration software is vital to the ease-of-use 
of the SHERIF system, and is responsible for managing, validating, and compart-
mentalizing the configurations input by the user, as well as abstracting away from 
the actual hardware (to a limited extent). By providing a graphical user interface 
to represent the various hardware structures and limiting user options to only valid 
choices, the software configuration utility makes algorithm implementation relatively 
quick and simple. This will be seen in the next chapter, which shows the software 
configuration utility in use to create a sample implementation of the AES algorithm 
Rijndael [17]. 
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Chapter 7 
Functional Testing and Synthesis Results 
Having designed a flexible cryptographic hardware platform and its associated con-
figuration software, it is naturally desirable to test whether the prototype proof-of-
concept implementation works. Ideally, with sufficient time, each of the algorithms 
considered in Chapter 3 would be implemented on the SHERIF cryptographic hard-
ware module, but time and resource constraints precluded that possibility. Only a 
minimal amount of testing could be carried out, but such simple tests were very 
informative in identifying problems with system design and organization. 
As will be seen in subsequent sections, the proof-of-concept implementation of 
the SHERIF cryptographic architecture is very large in terms of silicon area and the 
number of signals in the system. This made complete synthesis infeasible on the 
available workstations, and also made functional simulation difficult, since there were 
so many signals and so much logic to simulate. Thus, it was not possible to perform 
system-level functional testing, nor to provide the most optimized, accurate synthesis 
results. However, individual components of the system have been functionally tested 
independently of each other, a sample pipelined functional implementation of the AES 
algorithm Rijndael [17] has been simulated one round at a time, and synthesis has 
been performed on individual components, allowing conclusions to be drawn about 
overall system flexibility, area, and performance. 
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7.1 Functional Testing 
In general, functional testing of the system proved difficult because of the large num-
ber of signals in the system. This is not always a crippling problem, but in the 
SHERIF system, configuration must be performed before operational simulation. 
Simulating the configuration process is very time-consuming, requiring more than 
450 000 clock cycles of simulation before any valid operational simulation can be 
done. Such a simulation would require more than 12 hours of real-time simulation in 
a non-interactive mode. 
Fortunately, the individual PE-FUNCs and routing nodes can be simulated inde-
pendently from the entire system in reasonable amounts of time. This means that an 
algorithm implementation on the SHERIF architecture can be tested by simulating 
each routing node and PEs independently, in sequence, verifying that each component 
works properly and forwards the correct data to the next component. 
The AES algorithm Rijndael was chosen as the target for functional testing since 
it is a recent standard that will see frequent use. A pipelined implementation was 
chosen for its simplicity and greater throughput. The details of implementation and 
simulation are in the following subsections. 
7.1.1 Pipelined Implementation of AES 
The AES algorithm Rijndael [17] is an ideal candidate for implementation on the 
SHERIF architecture because its basic operations directly map onto the SLABs within 
the PE-FUNC. Round key addition is done via the XOR mode of the Boolean SLABs, 
substitutions by the LUT SLAB, and the XORnet implements the MixColumns() 
operation. 
The first step in creating the pipelinecl AES implementation was to create a single 
round implementation in one of the PEs. A normal round of AES uses the SLABs 
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Figure 7.1: SLABs used in a normal AES round. 
highlighted in Figure 7.1. Before implementing any of the algorithm's operations, all 
of the byte reorder components had to be manually set to pass through data directly, 
due to the slight design error discussed in Section 4.2.2. 
The S-boxes are implemented directly in the LUT SLAB, in which all of the LUTs 
are used as shown in Figure 7.2. Each LUT has identical values, loaded in from a 
text file copied directly from the AES specification [17]. This is shown in Figure 7.3. 
The ShiftRows() operation from the specification is just a byte reordering. Thus, 
the byte reordering component of the L UT SLAB can be used to implement this. The 
implementation is shown in Figure 7.4. 
Unfortunately, the MixColumns() operation, defined as multiplication by a con-
stant in a Galois field, is not so easy to implement. It is known from [60] and other 
sources that such operations can be implemented with a series of XORs, but the 
details of implementation are still needed before the XORnet SLAB can be used. 
The columns in the AES specification match up the each of the 32-bit words in the 
algorithm representation in Chapter 3. 
The operation is defined as follows, noting that the numbers inside curly braces 
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Figure 7.2: Setting the LUTs to active 
Figure 7.3: Filling out the LUT 
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Figure 7.4: Byte Reordering implementing ShiftRows() 
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are hexadecimal values, 
R = D x [{03}x3 + {01}x2 + {01}x + {02}] mod x4 + 1 (7.1) 
where D and R are 32-bit values representing the data input to the MixColumns() 
operation and the result of the MixColumns() operation, respectively. 
This can also be expressed as the following matrix operation [17], where r3 to r0 
are the most significant to least significant bytes of R above, and d3 to do are the 
most significant to least significant bytes of D above: 
r3 02 03 01 01 d3 
rz 01 02 03 01 dz (7.2) 
rl 01 01 02 03 dl 
ro 03 01 01 02 do 
This can be multiplied out as per a normal matrix operation, at least insofar as 
multiplying rows by columns. However, it is also possible to take advantage of the 
fact that in the defined field, {03} · d = {02} · d E9 d. This gives expressions for each 
byte of output for this operation: 
r3 {02} · d3 EB {02} · dz EB dz EB d1 EB do 
rz d3 EB {02} · dz E9 {02} · d1 EB d1 EB do 
r1 d3 E9 dz EB {02} · d1 EB {02} ·do EB do 
ro {02} · d3 EB d3 EB dz EB d1 EB {02} ·do . 
In [64], a simple means of solving the {02} · d operation is described which is 
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dependent on the value of d: 
{02}. d = { (d(6 .. o) & o) 
( d(6 .. o) & 0) EB {1B} 
if d < {80} 
if d?::: {80} 
where d(6 .. o) represents the seven least significant bits of the input byte d. 
Thus, if the byte value is less than {80}, the operation is a simple left shift-in-
0. If the byte value is greater than or equal to {80}, the result is the same shift, 
but then XORed with the value {1B}. Although this solution is defined in terms of 
bytes, the XORnet component can easily be used to compute the fixed shift required. 
Furthermore, noting that d?::: {80} means that d = 1XXXXXXX, so the MSB of the 
byte can be used to determine whether or not the XOR with {1B} is needed, and 
can in fact be used directly to implement it in the XORnet by XORing the MSB with 
the appropriate bits so that it forms the value {1B} when the MSB is 1. Thus, the 
four equations can be written out bitwise as follows, where d(i) represents bit position 
i of input data word D from Equation 7.1, rj(k) represents bit position k in byte rj 
of result R from Equation 7.1, and R(n) represents bit position n of output result R 
from Equation 7.1: 
155 
R(31) = r3(7) 
R(3o) = r3(6) 
R(29) = r3(5) 
R(28) = r3(4) 
R(27) = r3(3) 
R(26) = r3(2) 
R(25) = r3(1) 
R(24) = r3(0) 
R(23) = r2(7) 
R(22) = r2(6) 
R(21) = r2(5) 
R(20) = r2(4) 
R(19) = r2(3) 
R(ls) = r2(2) 
R(17) = r2(1) 
R(16) = r2(o) 
d(23) EB d(15) EB d(7) EB d(3o) EB d(22) 
d(22) EB d(14) EB d(6) EB d(29) EB d(21) 
d(21) EB d(13) EB d(5) EB d(28) EB d(2o) 
d(2o) EB d(12) EB d(4) EB d(27) EB d(19) EB d(31) EB d(23) 
d(l9) EB d(n) EB d(3) EB d(26) EB d(ls) EB d(31) EB d(23) 
d(ls) EB d(lo) EB d(2) EB d(25) EB d(l7) 
d(l7) EB d(9) EB d(l) EB d(24) EB d(16) EB d(31) EB d(23) 
d(l6) EB d(s) EB d(o) EB d(31) EB d(23) 
d(31) EB d(l5) EB d(7) EB d(22) EB d(l4) 
d(3o) EB d(l4) EB d(6) EB d(21) EB d(13) 
d(29) EB d(l3) EB d(5) EB d(2o) EB d(l2) 
d(28) EG d(l2) EB d(4) EB d(19) EB d(n) EB d(23) EB d(l5) 
d(27) EB d(ll) EB d(3) EB d(ls) EB d(lo) EB d(23) EB d(15) 
d(26) EB d(lo) EB d(2) EB d(17) EB d(9) 
d(25) EB d(9) EB d(l) EB d(16) EB d(s) EB d(23) EB d(15) 
d(24) EB d(s) EB d(o) EB d(23) EB d(15) 
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R(ls) = r1(7) 
R(14) = r1(6) 
R(13) = r1(5) 
R(12) = r1(4) 
R(n) = r1(3) 
R(lo) = r1(2) 
R(9) = r1(1) 
R(s) = r1(0) 
R(7) = ro(7) 
R(6) = ro(6) 
R(s) = ro(s) 
R(4) = ro(4) 
R(3) = ro(3) 
R(2) = ro(2) 
R(l) = ro(l) 
R(o) = ro(o) 
d(31) EB d(23) EB d(7) EB d(14) EB d(6) 
d(3o) EB d(22) EB d(6) EB d(13) EB d(s) 
d(29) EB d(21) EB d(s) EB d(12) EB d(4) 
d(28) EB d(2o) EB d(4) EB d(n) EB d(3) EB d(ls) EB d(7) 
d(27) EB d(19) EB d(3) EB d(lo) EB d(2) EB d(ls) EB d(7) 
d(26) EB d(ls) EB d(2) EB d(9) EB d(l) 
d(25) EB d(17) EB d(l) EB d(s) EB d(o) EB d(15) EB d(7) 
d(24) EB d(16) EB d(o) EB d(15) EB d(7) 
d(31) EB d(23) EB d(ls) EB d(3o) EB d(6) 
d(3o) EB d(22) EB d(14) EB d(29) EB d(s) 
d(29) EB d(21) EB d(13) EB d(28) EB d(4) 
d(28) EB d(2o) EB d(12) EB d(27) EB d(3) EB d(31) EB d(7) 
d(27) EB d(19) EB d(n) EB d(26) EB d(2) EB d(31) EB d(7) 
d(26) EB d(ls) EB d(lo) EB d(25) EB d(l) 
d(2s) EB d(17) EB d(9) EB d(24) EB d(o) EB d(31) EB d(7) 
d(24) EB d(16) EB d(s) EB d(31) EB d(7) . 
The top level configuration of the XORnet SLAB is shown in Figure 7.5, whereas 
the implementation of the MixColumns() operation itself is shown in Figure 7.6. 
The round key addition is quite straightforward. The input switch of a Boolean 
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Figure 7.5: Top-level XORnet SLAB selection 
Figure 7.6: XORnet configuration for MixColumns() 
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Figure 7. 7: Round key addition input switch configuration 
SLAB is configured to select all key bytes, and then all of the gates are set to the 
XOR operation. Thus, the key bytes are XORed with the incoming datapath bytes. 
The configuration of the input switch is shown in Figure 7. 7, and the configuration 
of the Boolean logic itself in Figure 7.8. This finishes the implementation of a single 
round of Rijndael. 
The above round implementation is copied and pasted into each of the other 
PEs. Once that was done, to account for the initial key addition and the lack of 
MixColumns() in the final round, slight changes were made to the configurations of 
the first PE and the last PE. In the first PE, to handle the initial key addition, 
another Boolean SLAB (SLAB 0) was used to add in the first round key. This also 
required changing the key memory output to that SLAB from key 0 to key 1, and 
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Figure 7.8: Boolean SLAB configured for AES round key addition 
thus also requires the external system responsible for generating the subkeys to write 
the initial key after the regular round key. In the final round PE, the XORnet was 
disabled to bypass the final MixColumns(). 
With the rounds implemented, all that remains is to configure the routing nodes. 
Routing node configuration is fairly straightforward for pipelined implementations, 
as they do not have to handle any iterative data. Thus, the first routing node must 
simply be configured to put the system input onto the datapath for all possible states, 
to ensure the data written into the system gets processed. This is shown in Figure 
7.9. 
Routing nodes 1 through 9 are all configured identically, and share the simple task 
of passing the datapath input to the datapath output in all modes of operation. This 
configuration is shown in Figure 7.10. 
The final routing node is responsible for sending the encrypted data to the system 
output. The system output controller is responsible for ensuring only valid, com-
pletely processed data gets sent to the system output. As such, it is based on a state 
machine and counter that counts the number of cycles from the start of processing, 
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Figure 7.9: Initial routing node for AES 
Figure 7.10: Middle routing nodes for AES 
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Figure 7.11: Final routing node for AES 
and then passes any valid data in the routing node to the system output at the end 
of that time. This behaviour of the system output controller is not desirable for a 
pipelined implementation, however, since it can only be counting from the start of 
one block of data being processed. To support the high throughput of pipelined im-
plementation, the start signal for the system output controller must be selected as 
any valid data input, and the maximum count set to 0 to ensure that the controller 
will validate any valid data that comes into the routing node that is destined for the 
system output. This configuration is shown in Figure 7.11. 
The configurations of each PE and routing node were saved to separate files for 
piecewise simulation. The entire configuration was also saved for future simulation. 
7.1.2 Simulation of Pipelined AES 
Once the configuration files for each PE and routing node were generated, they 
could be simulated independently of each other, using test vectors provided in 
Appendix C of the AES specification [17]. The provided test vectors are es-
pecially useful since they show the result of every operation performed dur-
ing encryption, and thus subkey values and the data values after each round 
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are available. The given test vector for encryption takes a plaintext block 
Ox00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF (the "Ox" prefix denotes hexadecimal 
notation) and a key Ox000102030405060708090AOBOCODOEOF to produce a cipher-
text Ox69C4EOD86A 7B0430D8CD B78070B4C55A. 
To verify the pipelined implementation of AES, first each of the routing nodes was 
simulated independently to verify the correct operation. In a pipelined implementa-
tion, the operation of the routing nodes is trivial, and it was easily verified that the 
data is routed correctly by each of the routing node configurations. Verification of 
the PEs themselves would be a much more difficult task. 
Simulation of the PEs first required the PE to be configured from the prepared 
configuration files. Configuration was a slower process to simulate for the AES config-
uration than for earlier component tests since the greater variety of the configuration 
data caused a lot more signal switching to be simulated, thus slowing down execution 
time. In fact, more than 99% of the simulation time was for configuration. 
Once configuration was completed, the test vectors were applied. First, subkey 
values were written in to the PE's key memory. This required thirteen clock cycles. 
After that, valid test vectors could be applied, with valid output data appearing once 
clock cycle later due to latency introduced by registers at the inputs and outputs of 
the PE-FUNC. 
For example, to simulate the first round of the pipelined AES implemen-
tation, a PE was configured using the data saved from the PEO configura-
tion form in the software configuration utility. Then, the VHDL testbench 
applied key values: OxD6AA74FDD2AF72FADAA678FlD6AB76FE, followed by 
Ox000102030405060708090AOBOCODOEOF twelve times. Only the first of those twelve 
repeated values are actually used; the rest are needed to shift the valid key data into 
the proper location in the key memory register, and could just as easily be all zeros. 
However, if simulating the entire SHERIF system, using the same second key value 
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(which is actually the first subkey applied) as padding allows some slight efficiency 
since the same padding value can be written to the other key memories at once, even 
though they only require one subkey value. Thus, each PE's key memory would have 
a unique subkey value written in, and then all PEs would have the padding/first key 
value written twelve times. 
Once the key data has been configured, the input test vector can be applied as valid 
data. Thus Ox00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF is input to the system with 
an extra valid bit prepended to it, and one clock cycle later the output value should 
be Ox89D810E8855ACE682D1843D8CB128FE4 (also with a valid bit prepended). As 
can be seen in the simulation waveform results in Figure 7.12, the configuration for 
the first round of the AES algorithm simulates successfully. 
Subsequent rounds of the pipelined implementation were simulated in a similar 
fashion, using the subkey values and intermediate values from the example vectors 
in [17]. They were simulated in non-interactive mode to speed up the simulation 
time, and stored their results in text files to allow verification of correct operation. 
For each of the remaining nine rounds, operation was verified against the expected 
results from the example vectors in [17], with the output of the final round simulation 
being Ox69C4EOD86A7B0430D8CDB78070B4C55A (with a valid bit prepended). 
Thus, even though it was not possible to simulate the operation of the whole 
system, it is still possible to consider the PE datapath verified for a pipelined imple-
mentation of the AES algorithm Rijndael. 
7.2 Synthesis Results 
While functional simulation proved difficult on the available computing resources, 
complete synthesis proved virtually impossible. Early attempts at synthesizing a PE-
FUNC ran for nearly two weeks with no result, and ultimately the synthesis process 
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was killed to free resources for other tasks. The synthesis attempt took so long because 
the PE-FUNC is primarily an extremely large pool of combinational logic (estimated 
at more than 800 layers of logic gates), with only the inputs and outputs registered. 
Synthesis tools typically have difficulty synthesizing such large designs. 
The normal route to synthesizing large designs is to synthesize smaller components 
first, then use those as building blocks for synthesizing the total design. Unfortu-
nately, the PE-FUNC is the smallest element with registered I/0, and so synthesis of 
its component SLABs individually would be sub-optimal since there would be no way 
to constrain the speed of the components without having any sequential logic. Adding 
more pipelining to the internal stages of the PE-FUNC and thereby breaking it into 
several components might allow successful synthesis of the entire PE-FUNC, but that 
does not help synthesis of the proof-of-concept design currently implemented. 
While more powerful computing resources could potentially complete synthesis 
of the existing PE-FUNC, the difficulty of doing so suggests the design is extremely 
large and inefficient in terms of area, and that improvements in this respect would 
be desirable. Still, it is necessary to at least find area and speed estimates for the 
existing design, so a compromise is made. 
Each of the basic components of the system was synthesized individually, but 
with their inputs and outputs registered to allow for constraining the timing of each 
component. A set of registers only was also synthesized, so that the area of the 
registers can be subtracted out of the area results for each component to give an 
approximate area of the unregistered components as they would appear in the actual 
PE-FUNC. 
To facilitate this synthesis, VHDL code was written to instantiate each component 
of interest as a registered component. These "stub" components were then synthe-
sized. To make the synthesis of these stubs easier, all of the configuration registers 
(which are already easily-constrained sequential logic) were synthesized first, as was 
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the 8 x 8 L UT, which is primarily configuration register logic with a large combina-
tional multiplexer on the outputs. 
The following components were synthesized. The stub components are registered 
versions of the SLABs in the case of the basic operation components, and thus encap-
sulate the configuration register of the component, the core logic, the input switch, 
and the byte reordering. The other stubs are just registered versions of the named 
components. The input switch and byte reordering were also synthesized as stubs to 
allow an idea of how much area they consume overall. 
• register_stub (to allow subtracting out of register area) 
• config_register _4 7bit 
• config_register _73bit 
• config_register _130bit 
• config_register _244bit 
• config_register _252bit 
• config_register _256bit 
• config_register _288bit 
• config_register _324bit 
• config_register _4341 bit 
• luL8x8 
• address_decoder_stub 
• outpuLscheduler _stub 
• routing_node_stub 
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• key _memory _stub 
• boolean_stub 
• shifter _stub 
• adder_stub 
• multiplier_stub 
• xorneLstub 
• lut_stub 
• inpuLswitch_stub 
• byte_reorder_stub 
Results and analysis of this test synthesis are presented in the following subsections. 
7.2.1 Area 
All synthesis was performed using 0.18 J.-lm CMOS technology. All area values are 
given in square microns (Mm2 ). Approximate gate counts are determined by dividing 
the total area by 12.97 (Mm2), which is an experimentally determined value for the 
area of a 2-input NAND gate in the target technology. 
First, a set of input/output registers was synthesized to provide reference values. 
The synthesized register_stub component had three 128-bit input registers and two 
128-bit output registers, and synthesized with a total cell area of 54121 (approxi-
mately 4172 gates), which suggests a single 128-bit register would have an area of 
approximately 10825 J.-lm2 (approximately 835 gates) and a single 1-bit register would 
have an area of approximately 85 J.-lm2 (roughly 7 gates). These values can be used 
to subtract out the area of the registers from the other synthesized stub components. 
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Configuration Register: Area (fkm'2): Gates: 
config_register _4 7bit 15022 1158 
config_register _73bit 25003 1927 
config_register _130bit 40485 3121 
config_register _244bit 75949 5855 
config_register _252bit 78555 6056 
config_register _256bit 79921 6162 
config_register _288bit 89044 6865 
config_register _324bit 100582 7755 
config_register _4341 bit 1374537 105978 
luL8x8 234537 18083 
Table 7.1: Configuration Register Synthesis Results (Area) 
Next, the configuration registers were synthesized independently. The area re-
suits of this synthesis are given in Table 7.1. Note that synthesis results for the 
independently-synthesized 8 x 8 LUT are also included here, since the LUT is essen-
tially a configuration register. 
The area synthesis results for each of the component stubs are shown in Table 7.2. 
The table also shows estimated areas for the core logic by subtracting out the area 
of the input and output registers added to the stub components. 
The area for a single PE-FUNC can be estimated from the component areas. 
Each PE-FUNC contains a 130-bit configuration register, a key memory, 18 Boolean 
SLABs, 4 Add/Subtract SLABs, 4 Shifter SLABs, 1 Multiplier SLAB, 1 LUT SLAB, 
and 1 XORnet SLAB, 2 129-bit input/output registers, plus an input multiplexer on 
the scratch path. The scratch path input multiplexer will be smaller than the input 
switch with each SLAB, but for the sake estimating the area it contributes to the 
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Component Stub: Total Area (fLm 2): Register Area: Core Area: Core Gates: 
inpuLswitch_stub 96273 69004 27268 2102 
byte_reorder _stub 79490 27060 52430 4042 
address_decoder _stub 6988 4397 2591 199 
outpuLscheduler_stub 332465 130906 201559 15540 
routing_node_stub 442203 66806 375397 28943 
key _memory _stub 1519422 324897 1194524 92099 
boolean_stub 319784 54121 265662 20482 
shifter_stu b 319641 54121 265520 20471 
adder_stub 353601 54121 299480 23090 
multiplier _stub 619822 54121 565700 43616 
xorneLstub 1778557 54121 1724436 132955 
lut_stub 4039512 54121 3985391 307277 
Table 7.2: Component Stub Synthesis Results (Area) 
overall PE-FUNC, the input switch area will be used. 
Total PE-FUNC Area (18 X 265662) + ( 4 X 265520) 
+( 4 X 299480) + (565700) 
+(1724436) + (3985391) 
+( 40485) + (27268) + (21817) 
13407036 ~Jm2 
approximately 1, 033, 696 gates 
With an estimation of the total PE-FUNC area, it is possible to estimate the size 
of the entire system (designed to be capable of implementing a pipelined version of 
AES), based on 10 PEs, 11 routing nodes, the address decoder, output arbiter, and 
the need for registering 137 bits at the inputs and 129 bits at the outputs. The values 
for the routing nodes, address decoder, and output arbiter were shown in Table 7.2 
along with the areas of the basic components used to calculate the PE-FUNC area. 
Total SHERIF Area (10 X 13407036) + (11 X 375397) 
+(2591) + (201559) + (22494) 
138426378 ~Jm2 
approximately 10, 672, 813 gates 
Thus, each PE-FUNC is approximately one million gates in size, and the whole 
system would be on the order of ten million gates. 
7.2.2 Timing 
Since it was not possible to synthesize the entire system, performance of the SHERIF 
cryptographic hardware module can only be estimated based on the timing analysis 
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of the individually-synthesized components. 
When synthesizing the stub components, the configuration clock was constrained 
to a 2 ns period, whereas the main clock was constrained to a 7 ns clock period. While 
synthesis was not always able to meet these requirements, reports on the slack (either 
positive or negative) allow estimation of the clock speed at which each component 
could successfully run. 
Table 7.3 shows each synthesized component and its largest usable slack for both 
the configuration clock and main clock. A negative slack indicates that the timing 
requirement could not be met, and is exceeded by the given value. A positive slack 
indicates that the timing requirements were easily met, with the given value to spare. 
Thus, the latency of a component is given by the clock period minus the slack. Note 
that most of the configuration registers are incorporated into the larger components 
in the table, and thus their timing is given as part of their parent component. 
The critical path for the entire system will be the PE-FUNC datapath, since it 
is essentially one large pool of combinational logic. The latency of the PE-FUNC 
datapath can be estimated from the component latencies in Table 7.3. 
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Component: Clock Period ( ns): Slack (ns): Latency (ns): 
address_decoder _stub 7 0.57 6.43 
outpuLscheduler _stub 7 -3.64 10.64 
routing_node_stub 7 -0.48 7.48 
2 -4.23 6.23 
key _memory _stub 7 0.61 6.39 
2 -4.16 6.16 
boolean_stub 7 0.61 6.39 
2 -4.28 6.28 
shifter _stub 7 0.57 6.43 
2 -4.30 6.30 
adder_stub 7 -4.25 11.25 
2 -4.31 6.31 
multiplier _stub 7 -3.36 10.36 
2 -4.29 6.29 
xornet_stub 7 0.57 6.43 
2 -4.63 6.63 
luLstub 7 0.61 6.39 
2 -8.24 10.24 
Table 7.3: Synthesis Results (Timing) 
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PE-FUNC latency - (18 x Boolean latency) 
+ ( 4 x Shifter latency) 
+(4 x Add/Sub latency) 
+Multiplier latency 
+ L UT latency 
+XORnet latency 
- (18 X 6.39) + ( 4 X 6.43) 
+( 4 X 11.25) + 10.36 + 6.39 + 6.43 
208.92 ns 
A latency of 208.92 ns suggests a that a datapath clock frequency of approximately 
4. 78 MHz would be the upper limit of the clock speed. Any other components running 
on the main clock will have more than enough time to complete operation with such 
a long clock period being used. 
The configuration registers have a worst-case latency of just over 10 ns, so running 
the configuration clock with a period of 15 or 20 ns should be acceptable. Note that 
this means the configuration clock can run more than 10 times faster than the main 
clock, if so desired. 
7.2.3 Synthesis Analysis 
The implementation of the PE-FUNC is clearly the focus of this system, as it con-
strains the rest of the system to operate at its speed and consumes most of the area on 
the device. Most of the PE-FUNC area, however, comes not from the data processing 
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hardware, but rather from configuration registers and data routing hardware. 
The configuration registers alone make up approximately 20% of the total PE-
FUNC area; if the LUTs are included in the count, the amount jumps to almost 59% 
of the area. The input switches and byte reorder components account for almost 17% 
of the PE-FUNC area. Thus, almost 76% of the device area is not directly used for 
data computation, but is necessary to offer the desired level of flexibility. 
Using an estimated clock speed of 4. 78 MHz, the pipelined implementation of 
the AES algorithm should achieve a throughput of 128 bits/cycle x 4.78 MHz = 
611.84 Mbps. This offers speed comparable to many software implementations, and 
certainly superior to software running on processors of equivalent speed, but is a 
little slow compared to some dedicated ASIC implementations or software running 
on high-end microprocessors. 
7.3 Summary of Testing and Results 
This chapter has discussed the simulation and synthesis results for the SHERIF cryp-
tographic hardware architecture. While the vast size and complexity of the current 
architecture made it infeasible to do system-level functional simulation or synthesis, 
it was possible to simulate and synthesize the major components of the design in 
order to determine the feasibility of the overall design. 
A sample implementation of a pipelined version of the AES algorithm Rijndael was 
used to demonstrate the operation of the SHERIF hardware architecture and some of 
its flexibility. While implementation of other algorithms would be desirable to fully 
verify the flexibility of the system, time constraints forced them to be relegated to 
future work. 
The basic components of the SHERIF architecture were synthesized in 0.18 J-Lm 
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CMOS technology, and based on component synthesis, the total area of the proof-of-
concept SHERIF cryptographic hardware module is estimated to be 138426378 f-lm 2 
or approximately 10.7 million gates for a system implemented to allow a fully pipelined 
implementation of the AES algorithm. By far the largest contributors to the area 
of the device are the PE-FUNCs, each of which has an area of 13407036 pm2 or 
1, 033,696 gates. The large size of the PE-FUNC constrains the speed of operation, 
limiting the system to running at approximately 4. 78 MHz. 
Overall, while the SHERIF architecture seems to offer the desired degree of flexi-
bility in terms of its PEs, this flexibility comes at the cost of large area and low speed 
of operation. Future research efforts may find ways to overcome these problems. 
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Chapter 8 
Future Directions and Conclusions 
The design of the SHERIF cryptographic hardware module has been a challenging, 
but ultimately rewarding, project. While the SHERIF architecture has been designed 
to provide great flexibility in implementing cryptographic algorithms, it provides that 
flexibility at the expense of area and speed. Nevertheless, the current version of 
the SHERIF architecture provides a basis on which future, more powerful and more 
efficient versions may be built, and has suggested several directions in which such 
research may go. 
8.1 Conclusion 
The primary focus of this research has been on the design of a flexible cryptographic 
hardware module. Implementation of the SHERIF cryptographic hardware module 
has been done solely as a proof-of-concept for the design ideas presented, and as such 
its performance in terms of area and speed is sub-optimal. 
Careful analysis of several leading block cipher and hash function algorithms led 
to the identification of six basic operations that are sufficient to implement a wide 
variety of algorithms. Functional components were designed and implemented to 
allow these operations to be configured to support the necessary variety of operand 
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sizes. These were then arranged into a PE capable of being configured to implement 
a single round of most of the considered algorithms. The PE-FUNC proved to be a 
success in terms of flexibility, but its size was also responsible for the overall system's 
less-than-desirable performance. 
Most of the design difficulties arose from the flexibility that was designed into the 
system: the large amounts of configuration data, the complexity and amount of data 
routing, and the extreme redundancy which lead to the large device area and slow 
speed of operation. Despite these drawbacks, the SHERIF system offers a great deal of 
flexibility, not only in terms of the variety of algorithms that can be implemented, but 
also in the fact that it supports different kinds of implementations, such as pipelined 
and iterative, as well as multiple implementations in parallel. This degree of flexibility 
is far greater than that offered by any other cryptographic hardware platform, and 
superior to many software platforms as well. 
The large area of the SHERIF device (roughly 138426378 Jtm2 or 10,672,813 
gates) and its slow clock speed of 4.78 MHz leads to somewhat disappointing per-
formance compared to custom hardware, but its throughput of 611.84 Mbps for a 
pipelined implementation of Rijndael is on par with or superior to all but the fastest 
software implementations on the most modern microprocessors. Thus, even this sub-
optimal system implementation offers some performance benefits, and with further 
research, the SHERIF architecture could achieve higher speeds and smaller area. 
Thus, the design of the SHERIF system and the PE-FUNC can be considered 
a success, offering a significant degree of flexibility in hardware implementation of 
cryptographic operations. While current performance levels are somewhat low, there 
are many possibilities for future that may overcome this drawback and add even 
greater power and flexibility to the SHERIF architecture. 
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8.2 Future Research Possibilities 
The key drawbacks to the current SHERIF architecture are its large size and low 
estimated speed. While the device would significantly outperform general-purpose 
microprocessors running at the same clock speed, the low estimated speed means that 
microprocessors anywhere from 10 to 100 times faster could be used, to potentially 
give equivalent (if not greater) performance. The large area of the device means that 
it would be costly to fabricate, and thus a much faster microprocessor may be the 
more cost-effective option. Consequently, most of the future research possibilities 
revolve around reducing the device area and improving the speed, but some also offer 
suggestions for improving the flexibility of the system. 
8.2.1 Further Functional Testing 
Further functional testing of the current SHERIF architecture would provide greater 
insight into the operation of the PEs and the system as a whole. Verifying the applica-
bility of the current architecture in implementing the different algorithms discussed 
in Chapter 3 would identify any dataflow issues in the current architecture and thus 
could guide future revisions of the SHERIF device. Furthermore, testing the applica-
bility of the SHERIF architecture against algorithms not considered in the initial 
survey would be valuable in determining how flexible the system can be. 
8.2.2 Pipelining 
Increasing the degree of pipelining within the PE-FUNC would greatly improve the 
clock speed and throughput for loop-unrolled, pipelined implementations of algo-
rithms. The routing nodes and key memory were designed to handle future pipelin-
ing via their counters, which have a configurable maximum value (up to 127). The 
drawback is that latency - the number of clock cycles between data being applied 
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and a result becoming available - would increase. Thus, iterative implementations 
would see little overall improvement, since they require more of the faster clock cycles 
before completion. 
The added benefit to further pipelining is that it would allow smaller parts of the 
PE-FUNC to be synthesized independently, thus allowing greater optimization and 
reducing area somewhat. Whether this would offset the additional area required for 
the pipeline registers is unknown. 
Careful placement of pipelining registers after the first Add/Sub SLAB, just before 
the L UT SLAB, and just before the third Add/Sub SLAB would allow a clock speed 
of approximately 18 MHz with a latency of 4 clock cycles (as opposed to the current 
1 cycle latency). For the pipelined implementation of AES discussed in Chapter 7, 
this would boost throughput to 2304 Mbps, which would be a significant performance 
enhancement. 
8.2.3 Reducing Device Area 
This recommendation is perhaps trivial, but anything that could be done to reduce 
the device area would make the architecture more cost-effective, synthesizeable, and 
amenable to higher clock speeds. Migrating synthesis to 0.13 J.lm CMOS technology 
would help somewhat, but the key to reducing area will be in optimizing the design 
of the components. 
8.2.4 Elimination of Redundancy 
There is a large degree of redundancy in the current SHERIF architecture, as could 
be seen in the AES implementation in which 26 out of the 29 SLABs were unused 
in a normal round. In that case, almost 90% of the PE-FUNC resources (comprising 
roughly 50% of the area) were not being used. 
Unfortunately, the flexibility offered by the SHERIF architecture comes from its 
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redundancy, since it offers relatively simplistic routing within the PE-FUNC itself. 
The overprovision of resources - especially the Boolean SLABs - could be reduced 
with a more complex and flexible data routing scheme. Also, the large number of 
input switched and byte reorder components could be reduced by pulling them out 
of the SLABs and treating them as separate components. Any such changes would 
require careful analysis to ensure that flexibility is preserved. 
8.2.5 Basic Component Optimization 
There is a lot of room for optimization of individual components. For example, the 
LUTs could be implemented with embedded memory, which offers a smaller area 
than the current fiip-fiop based implementation but introduces access latency. This 
latency could be mitigated by or subsumed into any pipelining that is done, thus 
hiding its effect somewhat. Implementing the LUTs as an SRAM would require a dif-
ferent configuration methodology, since it would no longer function as a configuration 
register. 
The adder component might be improved by using only four banks of 4 adders 
each that cascade together, rather than two banks of 8. This would reduce the 
longest-path delay through the device without posing a problem to most algorithms, 
as well as reducing control logic (since only 3 prior outputs would be multiplexed into 
the fourth adder) and the number of needed configuration bits. Furthermore, in the 
basic 8-bit adder component, replacing the multiplexer that switches between b and 
NOT b with an array of XOR gates each controlled by the inverse of the add_subb 
control signal would allow a reduction in the total logic, as would replacing the carry-
in multiplexer with the inverse of the add_subb control signal. These would provide 
minor improvements in area and speed, but in aggregate such minor improvements 
may be significant. 
The Boolean logic component also has room for optimization. For example, the 
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NOT gate could be removed, since the XOR gate can be used with a constant value 
of all ones to provide an inverting effect. Without the NOT gate taking up one of 
the 4-to-1 multiplexer inputs, the bypass functionality can be incorporated into that 
multiplexer, thus saving a configuration bit and eliminating the need for the 2-to-1 
bypass multiplexer. While this is a minimal improvement, given the large number of 
Boolean SLABs in the device, it may prove beneficial. 
Components such as the multiplier, XORnet, shifter, and adder components might 
also benefit from internal pipelining to reduce the depth of the combinational logic. 
Again, this introduces potentially undesirable latency. Further optimizations are not 
obvious, but are certainly possible. 
8.2.6 Allowing Partial Configurations 
In simulation, most of the time is spent configuring the device. In reality, even if 
configuration takes a long time, once configured, the device can then operate until 
powered down. This is an acceptable constraint, but could be improved. 
In any algorithm implementation, most of the configuration bits will be zero. 
In fact, there will be very large portions of the configuration that are zero-valued. 
Configuration could be much faster if parts of the device could be configured inde-
pendently, rather than via shifting bits in one at a time through the configuration 
registers. If each configuration register could be written directly, then after system 
reset, the configuring circuit or processor would only need to write values to the 
configuration registers that have non-zero values, with the result of needing to write 
fewer bits than the shifting configuration scheme. 
The added benefit of allowing partial configuration beyond shortening the config-
uration time is that a controlling processor could configure one part of the SHERIF 
device while another is processing data. Thus, it would allow a degree of dynamic 
reconfigurability, since the configuration could be changed on-the-fly. 
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Adding such a capability would be costly in terms of area and complexity, how-
ever, and would require a significant degree of modification to the existing SHERIF 
architecture. 
8.2. 7 Dynamic Configurations 
While performing preliminary investigation of iterative implementations of several 
algorithms, a design problem became apparent that had initially been overlooked. 
Almost every algorithm considered has a few operations at the very beginning and/or 
very end that do not fall within their standard round structure. Thus, a single round 
implemented in a PE-FUNC would not be able to perform those extra operations, 
and consequently any iterative implementation would also require the use of PE-
FUNCs before and/or after the iterative round PE-FUNC to implement those extra 
operations. This is wasteful of system resources, since two or three PEs are needed 
to do what should be implementable by one. 
If the PE-FUNC configurations could change while still running, it would be pos-
sible to create iterative implementations that incorporated any additional operations 
into the first round, then while the data was being fed back to the input, it could 
change configuration to a regular round. This regular round configuration could be 
held for the middle rounds, and then for the final round a third configuration could 
be loaded to handle any extra final operations. This capability might be tied to the 
partial configurability described above, or it could be implemented with an entirely 
different system. It would increase the effectiveness of iterative implementations, as 
well as offer an ever greater amount of flexibility in general. 
8.2.8 Different Dataflow Approaches 
The slowness of the current SHERIF architecture is inherent to its design - despite 
any pipelining or other optimizations, it will always be relatively slow due to the large 
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amount of logic in its datapath. Thus, future versions of the SHERIF architecture 
should investigate alternate dataflow approaches. 
For example, using non-regular PEs might be beneficial. In this scenario, each 
PE is smaller and more specialized than the PE-FUNC, supporting a small set of 
the overall operations. The processing fabric would have a large number of highly 
interconnected PEs of this type, moving closer to a fine-grained reconfigurable solu-
tion. Such an architecture may help reduce the redundancy of the design, and could 
potentially allow different paths through the system to allow for different degrees of 
throughput. It would likely have its own currently-unforeseen problems, however. 
Another alternate approach that bears consideration is to implement the basic 
components as functional units in a small microcontroller-style architecture. This 
would allow a much higher clock speed, and would allow greater flexibility since 
the algorithms themselves will be written as microcode instructions. While such a 
microprocessor-oriented architecture would have lower throughput (since pipelining 
would be impossible), there would be virtually no redundancy, and allowing partial 
configurations would be easier. Thus, the overall area of such an architecture would 
be quite small- likely smaller than the estimated area of the PE-FUNC in the cur-
rent design - and so many could be instantiated in parallel on a chip and increase 
throughput through parallelism. The added benefit of adapting the SHERIF archi-
tecture to a microprocessor-like structure in comparison to other processor-oriented 
cryptographic hardware is that the SHERIF architecture would maintain the large 
datapath size ( 128-bit) and configurability, allowing a greater degree of flexibility and 
speed. 
8.2.9 Subkey Generation 
In the future, it would be desirable for the SHERIF architecture to support generation 
of subkeys directly within the device itself, rather than requiring an external processor 
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to pre-compute them. This could be supported in a System On Chip (SoC) fashion, 
in which a general-purpose microprocessor core is incorporated into the design, or via 
a more specialized processing element such as described in the preceding section. The 
subkey generation unit would have to interface directly with the key memory compo-
nents in the current architecture, but could be interfaced with alternate architectures 
in different ways. 
8.2.10 Support for Other Cryptographic Operations 
Once a version of the SHERIF architecture exists that offers reasonable area and 
performance, it may be worthwhile to extend support from block ciphers and hash 
functions to stream ciphers and public key cryptography. This would require develop-
ment of additional processing elements such as LFSRs to support stream ciphers, and 
modular multiplication and exponentiation to support public key operations. These 
components would likely have separate datapaths from the block cipher support, since 
they require very different models of computation. Integrating such components, how-
ever, would make the SHERIF architecture truly flexible. 
8.2.11 Improved Configuration Software 
While the existing configuration software serves its purpose well, it is very closely tied 
to the current SHERIF proof-of-concept implementation and thus does now easily 
allow modifications to the SHERIF architecture without redesigning parts of the 
software. Thus, a more easily expandable version of the configuration software would 
be desirable. 
The configuration software could also be modified to generate VHDL code for 
configuration registers with initial values set to the desired configuration values. Such 
VHDL code would have to be compiled and integrated with the system whenever 
configuration changes were made. When simulating, they would initialize the SHERIF 
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system to the set configuration, and therefore allow functional testing of the algorithm 
implementation much more easily, since system configuration would not have to be 
simulated. This would save hundreds of thousands of clock cycles of simulation time, 
and might allow simulation of the entire system to be simulated, rather than just 
individual PEs and routing nodes. 
Furthermore, while it handles all the bit-flipping and setting, it still puts all the 
responsibility for timing on the person implementing the algorithm, which is tricky to 
handle, especially for iterative implementations. If the configuration software could 
provide a means of implementation that abstracted away from the specific architec-
tural details and timing, without having to provide high-level language support, it 
would make the algorithm designer's task much easier. 
In fact, abstracting further away from the SHERIF hardware would open up the 
possibility of using the configuration software with other reconfigurable hardware de-
vices. For example, if the configuration software allowed specification of algorithms 
in a general sense, it might then generate synthesizable VHDL code that could be run 
through an FPGA synthesis tool, allowing easy creation of FPGA implementations 
and providing greater efficiency and flexibility than the existing SHERIF system. 
Such a software system would clearly move away from being a simple configuration 
utility and into the realm of being a cryptographic hardware development environ-
ment, which could be the topic of much further research. 
8.3 Final Remarks 
This thesis has investigated the design and implementation of a flexible cryptographic 
hardware module. While the estimated performance of the prototype SHERIF ar-
chitecture is poor in terms of area and speed, this research has been valuable in 
uncovering a number of problems that must be overcome before such a cryptographic 
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hardware module could be feasible for production. Some of these problems are specific 
to cryptographic hardware; others are general problems of reconfigurable computing. 
Despite all the difficulties and drawbacks, however, the SHERIF architecture looks 
promising, and with further research could one day provide flexibility, ease-of-use, and 
sufficient speed to make it a viable alternative to conventional hardware or software 
implementation of cryptographic algorithms. 
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Appendix A 
VHDL Code for Basic Components 
A. I Boolean Component 
-- Drive Data Outputs 
drive_datapath_out15: 
PROCESS (a_in15, b_in15, dcon15) 
BIOCaN 
CASE dcon15 IS 
"\Vli!N , 100" => 
-- a AND b 
datapath_out (127 IXMNIO 120) <= a_in15 AND b_in15; 
"\Vli!N, 101" => 
-- a OR b 
datapath_out (127 IXMNIO 120) <= a_in15 OR b_in15; 
"\Vli!N , 110" => 
-- a XOR b 
datapath_out (127 IXMNIO 120) <= a_in15 XCR b_in15; 
"\Vli!N , 111 , => 
--NOT a 
datapath_out (127 IXMNIO 120) <=NOT a_in15; 
"\Vli!N , 000" => 
-- pass b (the datapath) 
datapath_out (127 IXMNIO 120) <= b_in15; 
w-I!N OIHERS => 
datapath_out (127 IXMNIO 120) <= b_in15; 
END CASE; 
END PROCESS drive_datapath_out15; 
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A.2 Shifter Component 
-- Left shift operation 
dir_left: 
PROCESS ( data_in, shift_amt, data_mask16, data_mask8, 
data_mask4 , data-mask2 , data_mask1 , 
llayer5 , llayer4 , llayer3 , llayer2) 
BFGIN 
IF (shift_amt(4) = '1') 'THEN 
-- rotate/shift left by 16 positions 
llayer5 <= data_in(15 IXMNIO 0) & (data_mask16 AND data_in(31 IXMNIO 16)); 
ELSE 
llayer5 <= data_in; 
END IF; 
IF ( shift_amt (3) = '1 ') 'THEN 
-- rotate/shift left by 8 positions 
llayer4 <= llayer5 (23 IXMNIO 0) & ( data_mask8 AND llayer5 (31 IXMNIO 24)); 
ELSE 
llayer4 <= llayer5; 
END IF; 
IF ( shift_amt (2) = '1 ') 'THEN 
--rotate/shift left by 4 positions 
llayer3 <= llayer4(27 IXMNIO 0) & (data_mask4 AND llayer4(31 IXMNIO 28)); 
ELSE 
llayer3 <= llayer4; 
END IF; 
IF (shift_amt(1) = '1') 'THEN 
-- rotate/shift left by 2 positions 
llayer2 <= llayer3 (29 IXMNIO 0) & ( data_mask2 AND llayer3 (31 IXMNIO 30)); 
ELSE 
!layer 2 <= llayer3; 
END IF; 
IF ( shift_amt (0) = '1 ') 'THEN 
-- rotate/shift left by 1 position 
from_left <= llayer2(30 IXMNIO 0) & (data_mask1 AND llayer2 (31)); 
ELSE 
from_left <= llayer2; 
END IF; 
ENDPROCEBS dir_left; 
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A.3 Add/Sub Component 
A.3.1 Sample Code for 8-bit Adder Block 
seLcin: 
PROCEES (carry _in , connect, add_subb) 
BEG1N 
-- Determine carry-in 
IF (connect = '1 ') '!HEN 
cin <= carry_in; 
ELSE 
IF (add_subb = '0 ') '!HEN 
cin <= '1 '; 
ELSE 
cin <= '0 '; 
END IF; 
END IF; 
ENDPROCEES set_cin; 
-- invert b input if subtracting 
seLb_input: 
P:ROC.Effi (b, add_subb) 
BEG1N 
IF (add_subb = '0 ')'!HEN 
b_internal <=:NOT b; 
ELSE 
b_in tern a! <= b; 
END IF; 
END PROCEES seLb_input; 
-- Perform the addition 
adder: 
P:ROC.Effi (a, b_internal, cin) 
BEGIN 
-- Perform the addition 
y_prime <= ("0" & a) + b_internal + cin; 
END PROCEES adder; 
-- Separate adder outputs into data out and carry out 
drive_output: 
PROCEES ( y _prime) 
BEGIN 
y <= y_prime(7 IXMNIO 0); 
carry_out <= y_prime(8); 
END P:ROC.Effi drive_output; 
A.3.2 Sample Code for part of 64-bit Adder Block 
adder_inst4: add_sub_Sbit 
PORI'MAP (-
-- data inputs a, b, carry-in 
a => a_in4, 
b => b_in4, 
carry_in => cout3, 
-- control inputs connect, add_subb 
connect=> conn4, 
add_subb => add_subb4, 
-- data outputs y and carry-out 
y => sum4, 
carry_out => cout4); 
198 
mux4: 
PROCEBS (s4, a_in4x, sumO, sum1, sum2, sum3) 
BEGIN 
CASE s4 IS 
V\lm" "000" => 
-- direct input 
a_in4 <= a_in4x; 
V\lm" "001" => 
-- adder 0 output 
a_in4 <=sumO; 
V\lm" "010" => 
-- adder 1 output 
a_in4 <= sum1; 
V\lm" " 011" => 
-- adder 2 output 
a_in4 <= sum2; 
V\lm" "100" => 
-- adder 3 output 
a_in4 <= sum3; 
V\lm" OIHERS => 
a_in4 <= a_in4x; 
END CASE; 
END PROCEBS mux4; 
A.4 Configuration Register Components 
reg_store: 
PROCEBS ( config_cJk , rstb) 
BEGIN 
IF (rstb /= '1') '!HEN 
- Clear the lookup table 
reg <= (OIHERS => '0 '); 
ELSIF ( confi g_clk 'EVENT AND confi g _c I k = '1 ') '!HEN 
IF (config_enable = '1 ')'!HEN 
-- shift out least significant config bit 
--shift-data_ out <= reg (0); 
-- shift in new config bit as MSB 
reg <= shift_data_in & reg (255 IXMNIO 1); 
ELSE 
-- hold register value 
reg <= reg; 
END IF; 
END IF; 
END PROCE38 reg_store; 
-- Drive data output 
data_out <= reg; 
shift_data_out <= reg (0); 
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Appendix B 
Configuration Formats 
B.l Boolean SLAB Configuration Format 
The Boolean SLAB Configuration is 288 bits, partitioned as follows: 
• Most significant 128 bits are constant data (bits 287 down to 160). 
• Next 48 bits control the input switch (bits 159 down to 112). 
- The most significant 16 bits of the 48 control scratch path multiplexers, 
selecting between datapath and scratch values. 
- The least significant 32 bits control datapath multiplexers, each 2 bit group 
selecting between datapath, scratch, constant, and key values. 
• Next 64 bits control the byte reordering (bits 111 down to 48). 
- Each 4 bits of the 64 selects which of the input bytes is switched to the 
output byte corresponding to the position of the bits. 
• Least significant 48 bits control core Boolean component (bits 47 down to 0). 
- Each 3 bit group corresponds to an output byte, the MSB controls bypass, 
while the LSBs selected between AND, OR, XOR, and NOT operations. 
B.2 Shifter SLAB Configuration Format 
The Shifter SLAB Configuration is 252 bits, partitioned as follows: 
• Most significant 128 bits are constant data (bits 251 down to 124). 
• Next 48 bits control the input switch (bits 123 down to 76). 
- The most significant 16 bits of the 48 control scratch path multiplexers, 
selecting between datapath and scratch values. 
- The least significant 32 bits control datapath multiplexers, each 2 bit group 
selecting between datapath, scratch, constant, and key values. 
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• Next 64 bits control the byte reordering (bits 75 down to 12). 
- Each 4 bits of the 64 selects which of the input bytes is switched to the 
output byte corresponding to the position of the bits. 
• Least significant 12 bits control core Shifter component (bits 11 down to 0). 
- The most significant 4 bits are bypass control for each 32-bit output. 
- The least significant 8 bits control the shifters, with each 2 bit group 
controlling rotate/shift and right/left. 
B.3 Add/Sub SLAB Configuration Format 
The Add/Sub SLAB Configuration is 324 bits, partitioned as follows: 
• Most significant 128 bits are constant data (bits 323 down to 196). 
• Next 48 bits control the input switch (bits 195 down to 148). 
- The most significant 16 bits of the 48 control scratch path multiplexers, 
selecting between datapath and scratch values. 
- The least significant 32 bits control datapath multiplexers, each 2 bit group 
selecting between datapath, scratch, constant, and key values. 
• Next 64 bits control the byte reordering (bits 147 down to 84). 
- Each 4 bits of the 64 selects which of the input bytes is switched to the 
output byte corresponding to the position of the bits. 
• Least significant 84 bits control core Add/Sub component (bits 83 down to 0). 
- The most significant 34 bits control the most significant adder bank. 
* Bits 33 down to 31 control input multiplexer to adder 7. 
* Bits 30 down to 28 control input multiplexer to adder 6. 
* Bits 27 down to 25 control input multiplexer to adder 5. 
* Bits 24 down to 22 control input multiplexer to adder 4. 
* Bits 21 down to 20 control input multiplexer to adder 3. 
* Bits 19 down to 18 control input multiplexer to adder 2. 
* Bit 17 controls input multiplexer to adder 1. 
* Bit 16 controls carry in to adder 0. 
* Each 2 bits fro 15 down to 0 control connect and add_subb signals for 
corresponding adders. 
- The next 34 bits control the least significant adder bank. 
* Bits 33 down to 31 control input multiplexer to adder 7. 
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* Bits 30 down to 28 control input multiplexer to adder 6. 
* Bits 27 down to 25 control input multiplexer to adder 5. 
* Bits 24 down to 22 control input multiplexer to adder 4. 
* Bits 21 down to 20 control input multiplexer to adder 3. 
* Bits 19 down to 18 control input multiplexer to adder 2. 
* Bit 17 controls input multiplexer to adder 1. 
* Bit 16 controls carry in to adder 0. 
* Each 2 bits fro 15 down to 0 control connect and add_subb signals for 
corresponding adders. 
- The least significant 16 bits control bypass for each output byte. 
Multiplier SLAB Configuration Format 
The Yrultiplier SLAB Configuration is 244 bits, partitioned as follows: 
• Most significant 128 bits are constant data (bits 243 down to 116). 
• Next 48 bits control the input switch (bits 115 down to 68). 
- The most significant 16 bits of the 48 control scratch path multiplexers, 
selecting between datapath and scratch values. 
- The least significant 32 bits control datapath multiplexers, each 2 bit group 
selecting between datapath, scratch, constant, and key values. 
• Next 64 bits control the byte reordering (bits 67 down to 4). 
- Each 4 bits of the 64 selects which of the input bytes is switched to the 
output byte corresponding to the position of the bits. 
• Least significant 12 bits control core Multiplier component (bits 3 down to 0). 
- The 4 bits are bypass control for each 32-bit output. 
B.5 L UT SLAB Configuration Format 
The LUT SLAB configuration can be considered to have two parts, the control con-
figuration at the SLAB level, and the actual L UT data itself. They will be considered 
separately. 
The L UT SLAB Configuration is 256 bits, partitioned as follows: 
• Most significant 128 bits are constant data (bits 255 down to 128). 
• Next 48 bits control the input switch (bits 127 down to 80). 
- The most significant 16 bits of the 48 control scratch path multiplexers, 
selecting between datapath and scratch values. 
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- The least significant 32 bits control datapath multiplexers, each 2 bit group 
selecting between datapath, scratch, constant, and key values. 
• Next 64 bits control the byte reordering (bits 79 down to 16). 
- Each 4 bits of the 64 selects which of the input bytes is switched to the 
output byte corresponding to the position of the bits. 
• Least significant 12 bits control core LUT component (bits 15 down to 0). 
- Each of the 16 bits controls bypass for corresponding output bytes. 
The L UT Data Configuration is 32768 bits, partitioned as follows: 
• Each 8 bits of data represents the output corresponding to the equivalent ad-
dress input. Thus, if the address "11111111" was input to the LUT, the most 
significant 8 bits of the 32768 would be selected for the output; similarly, if the 
address "00000000" was input, the least significant 8 bits would be selected. 
B.6 XORnet SLAB Configuration Format 
The XORnet SLAB Configuration is 4341 bits, partitioned as follows: 
• Most significant 128 bits are constant data (bits 4340 down to 4213). 
• Next 48 bits control the input switch (bits 4212 down to 4165). 
- The most significant 16 bits of the 48 control scratch path multiplexers, 
selecting between datapath and scratch values. 
- The least significant 32 bits control datapath multiplexers, each 2 bit group 
selecting between datapath, scratch, constant, and key values. 
• Next 64 bits control the byte reordering (bits 4164 down to 4101). 
- Each 4 bits of the 64 selects which of the input bytes is switched to the 
output byte corresponding to the position of the bits. 
• Least significant 4101 bits control core XORnet component (bits 4100 down to 
0). 
- The most significant bit selects mode of operation (1 for 64-bit mode, 0 
for 32-bit mode). 
- The next 4 bits control bypass for corresponding 32-bit outputs. 
- The next 1024 bits ( 4095 down to 3072) control output bit generation for 
the most significant XORnet. Each group of 32 bits selects which input 
bits contribute to generating the corresponding single output bit. 
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- The next 1024 bits (3971 down to 2048) control output bit generation for 
the next XORnet. Each group of 32 bits selects which input bits contribute 
to generating the corresponding single output bit. 
- The next 1024 bits (2047 down to 1024) control output bit generation for 
the next XORnet. Each group of 32 bits selects which input bits contribute 
to generating the corresponding single output bit. 
- The least significant 1024 bits (1023 down to 0) control output bit genera-
tion for the least significant XORnet. Each group of 32 bits selects which 
input bits contribute to generating the corresponding single output bit. 
Key Memory Configuration Format 
The Key Memory Configuration is 4 7 bits, partitioned as follows: 
• Most significant 7 bits are maximum count of the shift counter (bits 46 down 
to 40). 
• Next 7 bits are the maximum count of the reload counter (bits 39 down to 33). 
• Next 4 bits are the shift amount (bits 32 down to 29). 
• Least significant 29 bits control select between keyO and key1 for each of the 29 
SLABs. 
B.8 PE-FUNC Configuration Format 
The PE-FUNC Configuration is 45274 bits, partitioned as shown in Figure B.l. 
The 130-bit top level configuration shown as the most significant bits of the PE-
FUN C configuration is partitioned as follows: 
• Most significant 128 bits are constant data (bits 129 down to 2). 
• Least significant 2 bits select initial scratch input between SLAB 0 key, SLAB 
1 key, constant, or datapath values. 
B.9 Routing Node Configuration Format 
The Routing Node Configuration is 73 bits, partitioned as follows: 
• Bit 72 enables streaming operation. 
• Bit 71 enables three-state operation. 
• Bits 70 downto 64 are the maximum count for system output counter. 
• Bits 63 downto 57 are the maximum count for the stream counter. 
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Top-level config (130) Keymem config ( 4 7) 
Boolean config (288) Boolean config (288) 
Boolean config (288) Boolean config (288) 
Shifter config (252) Boolean config (288) 
Add/Sub config (324) Boolean config (288) 
Multiplier config (244) Boolean config (288) 
Shifter config (252) Boolean config (288) 
Add/Sub config (324) Boolean config (288) 
LUT config (256) LUT data (32768) 
Boolean config (288) Boolean config (288) 
Boolean config (288) Boolean config (288) 
Shifter config (252) Boolean config (288) 
Add/Sub config (324) Boolean config (288) 
XORnet config ( 4341) Boolean config (288) 
Shifter config (252) Boolean config (288) 
Add/Sub config (324) Boolean config (288) 
Figure B.l: PE-FUNC Configuration Format 
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• Bits 56 downto 50 are the maximum count for data counter 1. 
• Bits 49 downto 43 are the maximum count for data counter 2. 
• Bits 42 downto 40 select the datapath output for the IDLE state. 
• Bits 39 downto 37 select the datapath output for the STREAM condition. 
• Bits 36 downto 34 select the datapath output for the RUNNING1 state. 
• Bits 33 downto 31 select the datapath output for the RUNNING2 state. 
• Bits 30 downto 28 select the feedback output for the IDLE state. 
• Bits 27 downto 25 select the feedback output for the STREAM condition. 
• Bits 24 downto 22 select the feedback output for the RUNNING1 state. 
• Bits 21 downto 19 select the feedback output for the RUNNING2 state. 
• Bits 18 downto 16 select the system output value. 
• Bits 15 downto 12 select the start signal for the key memory. 
• Bits 11 downto 8 select the start signal for the stream controller. 
• Bits 7 downto 4 select the start signal for the system output. 
• Bits 3 downto 0 select the start signal for the datapath. 
B.lO System Configuration Format 
The system configuration is 453543 bits and consists of an interleaving of routing 
nodes and processing elements. For the proof-of-concept system, the overall configu-
ration is as follows: 
• Routing Node 0 Configuration 
• PE-FUNC 0 Configuration 
• Routing Node 1 Configuration 
• PE-FUNC 1 Configuration 
• Routing Node 2 Configuration 
• PE-FUNC 2 Configuration 
• Routing Node 3 Configuration 
• PE-FUNC 3 Configuration 
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• Routing Node 4 Configuration 
• PE-FUNC 4 Configuration 
• Routing Node 5 Configuration 
• PE-FUNC 5 Configuration 
• Routing Node 6 Configuration 
• PE-FUNC 6 Configuration 
• Routing Node 7 Configuration 
• PE-FUNC 7 Configuration 
• Routing Node 8 Configuration 
• PE-FUNC 8 Configuration 
• Routing Node 9 Configuration 
• PE-FUNC 9 Configuration 
• Routing Node 10 Configuration 
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